Still Missing CT - Jennifer Dulos, 50, New Canaan, 24 May 2019 *ARRESTS* #56

[Seattle1]

In addition to CT State law requirements that must be satisfied for the Court to grant a 'Change of Venue' -- most likely calling for:

1) A Motion in writing,
2) One or more affidavits (i.e., the expert witness) setting forth the facts upon which the moving party relies,
3) Whether circumstances exist requiring, in the interest of justice, a change in the
place of trial is a question to be determined by the court in its sound discretion,
the First Amendment and the Sixth Amendment also chime in on this issue which provides:

The constitutional right to trial by an impartial jury “must be considered in light of the
concomitant right of the public and press to the full protections of the First Amendment.” Botham, 629 P.2d at 596. The existence of “extensive pretrial publicity does not alone trigger a due process entitlement to a change of venue.” Harlan, 8 P.3d at 469. An important criminal case:

can be expected to generate much public interest and usually the best qualified
jurors will have heard or read something about the case. To hold that jurors can
have no familiarity through the news media with the facts of the case is to establish
an impossible standard in a nation that nurtures freedom of the press. It is therefore
sufficient if jurors can lay aside the information and opinions they have received
through pretrial publicity.

I'm recalling the party who provided an affidavit for Colorado defendant Barry Morphew, also accused of disappearing his wife because she wanted a divorce, and she was simply the investigator working for the defense who put out a survey and reported the results. Nothing in the Colorado Code required this party to be any type of "expert," and I don't doubt CT is much different here. IMO, calling the witness an "expert," is probably just more spin by Shoenhorn.

In the Order granting a 'Change of Venue' for Morphew, the Court outlined the findings under twelve headings (see below).

It's actually not too difficult to get a Change of Venue but it's also probably not going to get the case as far away from Stamford as Shoenhorn thinks.

In Morphew's case, the trial only moved about 50 miles east, and not to a different Judicial District, as the defense fiercely argued for!

IMO, Shoenhorn's Motion for change of venue might end up backfiring on him! Something about the devil you know...

During the Colorado evidentiary hearing (Morphew change of venue hearing), besides the survey, I mostly remember several binders of news clippings from mostly tabloid news and YouTube Videos -- real sensationalizing stuff, probably not necessarily distributed in the CT County. Shoenhorn will be in his element -- embellishing. MOO

A. PROCEDURAL ISSUES

B. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

1. The Size and Type of the Locale
2. The Reputation of the Victim
3. The Revealed Sources of the News Stories
4. The Specificity of the Accounts of Certain Facts
5. The Volume and Intensity of the Coverage
6. The Extent of Comment by the News Reports on the Facts of the Case
7. The Manner of Presentation
8. The Proximity to the Time of Trial
9. The Publication of Highly Incriminating Facts not Admissible at Trial
10. Other Considerations

CO - Suzanne Morphew, 49, Chaffee County, 10 May 2020 , MEDIA,MAPS,TIMELINE *NO DISCUSSION*

https://www.lawweekcolorado.com/article/capital-offense-bail-animal-cruelty-cases-to-be-heard-before-colorado-supreme-court-in-may/ Supreme Court Rule handed down:

www.websleuths.com

 

[Niner]

Thursday, August 17th:
*Pretrial Motions Hearing (@ 9am ET) – CT – Jennifer Rebecca Farber Dulos (50) (May 24, 2019, New Canaan; still missing) – *Michelle C. Troconis (44/now 48) (Dulos’ GF) arrested & charged (6/1/19) & arraigned (6/3/19) with tampering with or fabricating physical evidence & hindering prosecution. Plead not guilty. $500K bond. Posted bond (on 6/3/19). These charges were dismissed (8/28/20) & recharged below.
*Charged (9/5/19) & arraigned (10/4/19) with tampering with evidence involving the borrowed car from work colleague. Plead not guilty. $100K bond. Posted bond (on 9/5/19). Off GPS 4/6/23.
*Charged (1/7/20) with conspiracy to commit murder. Plead not guilty. $2M bond. Bond reduced (1/8/20) to $1.5M & bonded out (on 1/9/20). Off GPS 4/6/23.
*Charged (8/28/20) with 2nd degree hindering prosecution, tampering with physical evidence & conspiracy to commit tampering with physical evidence. No plea entered yet. $500K bond. Posted bond. Off GPS 4/6/23.
Judge Kevin Randolph presiding for trial.
Bond info & Court info from 6/3/19 thru 8/7/23 reference post #187 here:
https://www.websleuths.com/forums/t...-canaan-24-may-2019-arrests-56.683382/page-10
8/9/23 Update: This February, the state filed a motion to seal records regarding if communication between her lawyer & another attorney is considered privileged. It’s about if a letter written by her lawyer to another attorney is privileged communication. A judge has not yet decided if Schoenhorn will be removed from the defense team, or if Schoenhorn’s request for the trial to be moved to another venue will be granted. Regarding Search warrant for Fotis & Michelle's home - Schoenhorn says overly broad, no probable cause, fishing expedition. Schoenhorn wants ALL the evidence from the tower dump suppressed, not just her phone. Judge will decide on either motion until September. Change of venue is supposedly being heard next week. Next arguments on 8/16/23 & 8/17/23. Earlier this week in a state Supreme Court decision, Troconis lost an attempt to obtain transcripts from the Dulos divorce, in a move Schoenhorn hoped might help his client's defense.
8/16/23 Update: No info yet. A hearing on a separate motion is scheduled for Thursday. Schoenhorn filed a motion last month asking the judge to prohibit prosecutors from using cellphone tower data. Schoenhorn said an expert from Philadelphia will testify Thursday morning. Pretrial motions hearing continues on 8/17/23.
*Kent D. Mawhinney (54/now 57) – Murder: Judge John F. Blawie put the case on the trial docket. Hearing on 5/15/22.
2/23/22: Plead guilty to a charge of violating a protective order that stemmed from an incident involving his ex-wife. Sentenced for violation & assault on 6/17/22 was given a 5 year suspended prison sentence & 3 years of probation on a domestic violence charge.
*Fotis Dulos (52) – Committed suicide on 1/28/20 & declared dead at 5:32pm on 1/30/20. 3/3/20: Charges dismissed. The case against Dulos will be officially dismissed in about a year, unless the state decides to reopen it. 1/17/22: After debt, no money left in Dulos estate for children. While Fotis Dulos’ estate has $395,687 in assets, it owes $548,280.75 in expenses, according to Farmington Probate Court records. Attorney Christopher Hug will be paid $189,525 for settling the estate & attorney Paul Knierim, who represented Hug, will receive $98,326, court documents show."

 

[pernickety]

Attorneys can find all kinds of volunteer "experts" who are willing to testify in trials....Pro-DNA...Those willing to cite the problems with DNA, etc.

Google turned up the following for my search:
About 19,400,000 results (0.32 seconds)


Showing results for expert trial witnesses about media bias

A few years ago I took an adult-ed class taught by a lawyer where we analyzed actual criminal and civil cases, trying to guess their outcomes, etc. One classmate was a psychologist, who said he had testified as an expert witness, and he said they testified according to who paid them—he referred to expert witnesses as “prostitutes.”

 

[Seattle1]

After further research, confirming CT's request to change venue is not so different than Colorado as discussed above.

The defendant bears the burden of showing that he/she/they could not otherwise receive a fair and impartial trial. The trial court's discretion is governed by Practice Book [ §41-23] . . .’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Reynolds, 264 Conn. 1, 222, 836 A.2d 224 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 908, 124 S. Ct. 1614, 158 L. Ed. 2d 254 (2004).”

“In criminal cases, defendants do not have an inherent right to a change in venue. ‘In requesting a change of venue, a defendant bears the burden of showing that he could not otherwise receive a fair and impartial trial.

Under the federal due process cases, the defense can seek a change of venue on the basis of public hostility against the respondent, public belief that the respondent is guilty, public outrage over the offense, or prejudicial news reporting or editorializing that vilifies the respondent or discloses inadmissible evidence against the respondent. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 433 U.S. 368, 378 (1979)

(“This Court has long recognized that adverse publicity can endanger the ability of a defendant to receive a fair trial . . . . To safeguard the due process rights of the accused, a trial judge has an affirmative constitutional duty to minimize the effects of prejudicial pretrial publicity.”); Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 574 (1981) (dictum) (“Trial courts must be especially vigilant to guard against any impairment of the defendant’s right to a verdict based solely upon the evidence and the relevant law.”).

A motion seeking a change of venue on these grounds is ordinarily required to be supported by affidavits, and the defense is given an evidentiary hearing if the motion and affidavits are facially sufficient.

Evidentiary support for the proposition that a fair trial cannot be held in the locality may be found in: newspaper clippings, videotapes, audiotapes, and TV or radio scripts; testimony of persons knowledgeable about public opinion; opinion polls; evidence of petitions, resolutions, speeches, and so forth; and evidence of news conferences, press releases, and media interviews by the police and the prosecutor.

In some jurisdictions a motion for venue change from a court in which the respondent asserts that s/he cannot be fairly tried must await the conclusion of voir dire examination of prospective jurors (see §§ 28.03-28.05 infra); only after an attempt to empanel a fair jury has been made and, in the opinion of the presiding judge, has failed, may venue be shifted. In other jurisdictions a motion for change of venue may be made prior to trial.

Courts commonly hold that a showing of prejudicial publicity or community hostility is not sufficient to require a change of venue on constitutional grounds unless the accused also demonstrates that as a consequence of these biasing factors it is likely to be impracticable to empanel an impartial jury. See, e.g., State v. Komisarjevsky, 338 Conn. 526, 258 A.3d 1166 (2021); Commonwealth v. Briggs, 608 Pa. 430, 12 A.3d 291 (2011); State v. Fowler, 266 S.C. 203, 222 S.E.2d 497 (1976).

The latter demonstration is particularly difficult to make. If the publicity is highly inflammatory or the hostility particularly intense, a doctrine of “presumed prejudice” that finds support in Sheppard, supra, may render evidentiary proof of impracticality unnecessary. See Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); compare Skilling v. United States, supra.

But “[f]or prejudice to be presumed under this standard, the defendant must show: 1) that the pretrial publicity was prejudicial and inflammatory and 2) that the prejudicial pretrial publicity saturated the community where the trial was held. See Coleman v. Kemp, 778 F.2d 1487 (11th Cir. 1985).

Under this standard, a defendant carries an extremely heavy burden of proof. ¶ . . . The presumptive prejudice standard is ‘rarely’ applicable, and is reserved for only ‘extreme situations’.” Brown v. State, 74 So.3d 984, 1031-32 (Ala. App. 2010), aff’d¸74 So.3d 1039 (Ala. 2011). See also, e.g., Gonzalez v. State, 222 S.W.3d 446 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Commonwealth v. Casper, 481 Pa. 143, 151, 392 A.2d 287, 291 (1978) (“t is trite but true to note that a presumption of prejudice pursuant to this exception requires the presence of exceptional circumstances.”).

Ordinarily, counsel who is seeking a change of venue will want to proceed on alternative theories of actual prejudice and presumed prejudice. See Daniels v. Woodford, 428 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2005) (“To support a change of venue motion, Daniels must demonstrate either actual or presumed prejudice. . . . To demonstrate actual prejudice, Daniels must show that ‘the jurors demonstrated actual partiality or hostility that could not be laid aside.’ . . . Prejudice is presumed only in extreme instances ‘when the record demonstrates that the community where the trial was held was saturated with prejudicial and inflammatory media publicity about the crime.’ . . .

¶ Three factors should be considered in determining presumed prejudice: (1) whether there was a ‘barrage of inflammatory publicity immediately prior to trial, amounting to a huge . . . wave of public passion’; (2) whether the news accounts were primarily factual because such accounts tend to be less inflammatory than editorials or cartoons; and (3) whether the media accounts contained inflammatory or prejudicial material not admissible at trial. . . . ¶ Applied here, these factors compel a finding ‘that the venue [wa]s saturated with prejudicial and inflammatory media publicity about the crime’ sufficient for a presumption of prejudice.”).

But in some cases in which counsel anticipates that s/he will fail to persuade the court of either actual or presumed prejudice, s/he may nevertheless be well advised to file a change-of-venue motion. A trial judge who is convinced that the local atmosphere is tainted by the accused’s notoriety or damaging portrayal in widespread media may grant the motion as a matter of discretion without insisting on the showing of impracticality that the constitutional caselaw demands. See, e.g., United States v. Cortez, 251 F.R.D. 237 (E.D. Tex. 2007); and see Meadows v. Mutter, 243 W. Va. 211, 228, 842 S.E.2d 764, 781 (2020).

High publicity cases are labor-intensive and costly to the court and prosecution; savvy trial judges understand that by denying a change-of-venue motion they will risk appellate reversal of a conviction obtained after a laborious trial; they may choose to avoid that risk or simply to escape the burden of trying a troublesome case. Before seeking a change of venue on the grounds sketched in the preceding paragraphs, counsel should ascertain from knowledgeable local attorneys or court personnel where, in granting such motions, the court (or the judge presiding over the case) has been sending cases.

Unlike the motions described in § 20.03(a) supra, which seek transfer of the case to a particular locale, a motion requesting a venue change on the ground of local juror bias cannot control what 603 county the case will be sent to. After investigating the localities to which the case is likely to be sent in the event that a defense motion for a change of venue is granted, counsel should thoroughly review the risks and costs of being transferred to those locales and weigh them against the liabilities of remaining in the current forum.

https://www.jud.ct.gov/lawlib/notebooks/pathfinders/transferofaction.pdf

https://www.jud.ct.gov/publications/PracticeBook/PB.pdf

 

[Jmoose]

After further research, confirming CT's request to change venue is not so different than Colorado as discussed above.

The defendant bears the burden of showing that he/she/they could not otherwise receive a fair and impartial trial. The trial court's discretion is governed by Practice Book [ §41-23] . . .’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Reynolds, 264 Conn. 1, 222, 836 A.2d 224 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 908, 124 S. Ct. 1614, 158 L. Ed. 2d 254 (2004).”

“In criminal cases, defendants do not have an inherent right to a change in venue. ‘In requesting a change of venue, a defendant bears the burden of showing that he could not otherwise receive a fair and impartial trial.

Under the federal due process cases, the defense can seek a change of venue on the basis of public hostility against the respondent, public belief that the respondent is guilty, public outrage over the offense, or prejudicial news reporting or editorializing that vilifies the respondent or discloses inadmissible evidence against the respondent. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 433 U.S. 368, 378 (1979)

(“This Court has long recognized that adverse publicity can endanger the ability of a defendant to receive a fair trial . . . . To safeguard the due process rights of the accused, a trial judge has an affirmative constitutional duty to minimize the effects of prejudicial pretrial publicity.”); Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 574 (1981) (dictum) (“Trial courts must be especially vigilant to guard against any impairment of the defendant’s right to a verdict based solely upon the evidence and the relevant law.”).

A motion seeking a change of venue on these grounds is ordinarily required to be supported by affidavits, and the defense is given an evidentiary hearing if the motion and affidavits are facially sufficient.

Evidentiary support for the proposition that a fair trial cannot be held in the locality may be found in: newspaper clippings, videotapes, audiotapes, and TV or radio scripts; testimony of persons knowledgeable about public opinion; opinion polls; evidence of petitions, resolutions, speeches, and so forth; and evidence of news conferences, press releases, and media interviews by the police and the prosecutor.

In some jurisdictions a motion for venue change from a court in which the respondent asserts that s/he cannot be fairly tried must await the conclusion of voir dire examination of prospective jurors (see §§ 28.03-28.05 infra); only after an attempt to empanel a fair jury has been made and, in the opinion of the presiding judge, has failed, may venue be shifted. In other jurisdictions a motion for change of venue may be made prior to trial.

Courts commonly hold that a showing of prejudicial publicity or community hostility is not sufficient to require a change of venue on constitutional grounds unless the accused also demonstrates that as a consequence of these biasing factors it is likely to be impracticable to empanel an impartial jury. See, e.g., State v. Komisarjevsky, 338 Conn. 526, 258 A.3d 1166 (2021); Commonwealth v. Briggs, 608 Pa. 430, 12 A.3d 291 (2011); State v. Fowler, 266 S.C. 203, 222 S.E.2d 497 (1976).

The latter demonstration is particularly difficult to make. If the publicity is highly inflammatory or the hostility particularly intense, a doctrine of “presumed prejudice” that finds support in Sheppard, supra, may render evidentiary proof of impracticality unnecessary. See Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); compare Skilling v. United States, supra.

But “[f]or prejudice to be presumed under this standard, the defendant must show: 1) that the pretrial publicity was prejudicial and inflammatory and 2) that the prejudicial pretrial publicity saturated the community where the trial was held. See Coleman v. Kemp, 778 F.2d 1487 (11th Cir. 1985).

Under this standard, a defendant carries an extremely heavy burden of proof. ¶ . . . The presumptive prejudice standard is ‘rarely’ applicable, and is reserved for only ‘extreme situations’.” Brown v. State, 74 So.3d 984, 1031-32 (Ala. App. 2010), aff’d¸74 So.3d 1039 (Ala. 2011). See also, e.g., Gonzalez v. State, 222 S.W.3d 446 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Commonwealth v. Casper, 481 Pa. 143, 151, 392 A.2d 287, 291 (1978) (“t is trite but true to note that a presumption of prejudice pursuant to this exception requires the presence of exceptional circumstances.”).

Ordinarily, counsel who is seeking a change of venue will want to proceed on alternative theories of actual prejudice and presumed prejudice. See Daniels v. Woodford, 428 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2005) (“To support a change of venue motion, Daniels must demonstrate either actual or presumed prejudice. . . . To demonstrate actual prejudice, Daniels must show that ‘the jurors demonstrated actual partiality or hostility that could not be laid aside.’ . . . Prejudice is presumed only in extreme instances ‘when the record demonstrates that the community where the trial was held was saturated with prejudicial and inflammatory media publicity about the crime.’ . . .

¶ Three factors should be considered in determining presumed prejudice: (1) whether there was a ‘barrage of inflammatory publicity immediately prior to trial, amounting to a huge . . . wave of public passion’; (2) whether the news accounts were primarily factual because such accounts tend to be less inflammatory than editorials or cartoons; and (3) whether the media accounts contained inflammatory or prejudicial material not admissible at trial. . . . ¶ Applied here, these factors compel a finding ‘that the venue [wa]s saturated with prejudicial and inflammatory media publicity about the crime’ sufficient for a presumption of prejudice.”).

But in some cases in which counsel anticipates that s/he will fail to persuade the court of either actual or presumed prejudice, s/he may nevertheless be well advised to file a change-of-venue motion. A trial judge who is convinced that the local atmosphere is tainted by the accused’s notoriety or damaging portrayal in widespread media may grant the motion as a matter of discretion without insisting on the showing of impracticality that the constitutional caselaw demands. See, e.g., United States v. Cortez, 251 F.R.D. 237 (E.D. Tex. 2007); and see Meadows v. Mutter, 243 W. Va. 211, 228, 842 S.E.2d 764, 781 (2020).

High publicity cases are labor-intensive and costly to the court and prosecution; savvy trial judges understand that by denying a change-of-venue motion they will risk appellate reversal of a conviction obtained after a laborious trial; they may choose to avoid that risk or simply to escape the burden of trying a troublesome case. Before seeking a change of venue on the grounds sketched in the preceding paragraphs, counsel should ascertain from knowledgeable local attorneys or court personnel where, in granting such motions, the court (or the judge presiding over the case) has been sending cases.

Unlike the motions described in § 20.03(a) supra, which seek transfer of the case to a particular locale, a motion requesting a venue change on the ground of local juror bias cannot control what 603 county the case will be sent to. After investigating the localities to which the case is likely to be sent in the event that a defense motion for a change of venue is granted, counsel should thoroughly review the risks and costs of being transferred to those locales and weigh them against the liabilities of remaining in the current forum.

https://www.jud.ct.gov/lawlib/notebooks/pathfinders/transferofaction.pdf

https://www.jud.ct.gov/publications/PracticeBook/PB.pdf

I really do wonder what Schoenhorn thinks a change of venue will do for them? I mean, he may find a friendlier judge, but if he thinks that a Hartford jury will suit him better, he might be mistaken. His jury might be made up of people from Farmington, some of whom may be people like Jennifer. He can eliminate people who knew the Duloses, but he only has so many opportunities to do that. Some jurors may resent that FD and MT dumped evidence in their neighborhood, if they are actually from that area of Hartford. His Hartford jury might not be as helpful as Schoenhorn and Troconis think.

 

[pernickety]

I really do wonder what Schoenhorn thinks a change of venue will do for them? I mean, he may find a friendlier judge, but if he thinks that a Hartford jury will suit him better, he might be mistaken. His jury might be made up of people from Farmington, some of whom may be people like Jennifer. He can eliminate people who knew the Duloses, but he only has so many opportunities to do that. Some jurors may resent that FD and MT dumped evidence in their neighborhood, if they are actually from that area of Hartford. His Hartford jury might not be as helpful as Schoenhorn and Troconis think.

Change of venue would give Schoenhorn an easier commute. He may be hoping for Hartford, but maybe any other venue would be closer than Stamford.

 

[pernickety]

After further research, confirming CT's request to change venue is not so different than Colorado as discussed above.

The defendant bears the burden of showing that he/she/they could not otherwise receive a fair and impartial trial. The trial court's discretion is governed by Practice Book [ §41-23] . . .’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Reynolds, 264 Conn. 1, 222, 836 A.2d 224 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 908, 124 S. Ct. 1614, 158 L. Ed. 2d 254 (2004).”

“In criminal cases, defendants do not have an inherent right to a change in venue. ‘In requesting a change of venue, a defendant bears the burden of showing that he could not otherwise receive a fair and impartial trial.

Under the federal due process cases, the defense can seek a change of venue on the basis of public hostility against the respondent, public belief that the respondent is guilty, public outrage over the offense, or prejudicial news reporting or editorializing that vilifies the respondent or discloses inadmissible evidence against the respondent. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 433 U.S. 368, 378 (1979)

(“This Court has long recognized that adverse publicity can endanger the ability of a defendant to receive a fair trial . . . . To safeguard the due process rights of the accused, a trial judge has an affirmative constitutional duty to minimize the effects of prejudicial pretrial publicity.”); Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 574 (1981) (dictum) (“Trial courts must be especially vigilant to guard against any impairment of the defendant’s right to a verdict based solely upon the evidence and the relevant law.”).

A motion seeking a change of venue on these grounds is ordinarily required to be supported by affidavits, and the defense is given an evidentiary hearing if the motion and affidavits are facially sufficient.

Evidentiary support for the proposition that a fair trial cannot be held in the locality may be found in: newspaper clippings, videotapes, audiotapes, and TV or radio scripts; testimony of persons knowledgeable about public opinion; opinion polls; evidence of petitions, resolutions, speeches, and so forth; and evidence of news conferences, press releases, and media interviews by the police and the prosecutor.

In some jurisdictions a motion for venue change from a court in which the respondent asserts that s/he cannot be fairly tried must await the conclusion of voir dire examination of prospective jurors (see §§ 28.03-28.05 infra); only after an attempt to empanel a fair jury has been made and, in the opinion of the presiding judge, has failed, may venue be shifted. In other jurisdictions a motion for change of venue may be made prior to trial.

Courts commonly hold that a showing of prejudicial publicity or community hostility is not sufficient to require a change of venue on constitutional grounds unless the accused also demonstrates that as a consequence of these biasing factors it is likely to be impracticable to empanel an impartial jury. See, e.g., State v. Komisarjevsky, 338 Conn. 526, 258 A.3d 1166 (2021); Commonwealth v. Briggs, 608 Pa. 430, 12 A.3d 291 (2011); State v. Fowler, 266 S.C. 203, 222 S.E.2d 497 (1976).

The latter demonstration is particularly difficult to make. If the publicity is highly inflammatory or the hostility particularly intense, a doctrine of “presumed prejudice” that finds support in Sheppard, supra, may render evidentiary proof of impracticality unnecessary. See Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); compare Skilling v. United States, supra.

But “[f]or prejudice to be presumed under this standard, the defendant must show: 1) that the pretrial publicity was prejudicial and inflammatory and 2) that the prejudicial pretrial publicity saturated the community where the trial was held. See Coleman v. Kemp, 778 F.2d 1487 (11th Cir. 1985).

Under this standard, a defendant carries an extremely heavy burden of proof. ¶ . . . The presumptive prejudice standard is ‘rarely’ applicable, and is reserved for only ‘extreme situations’.” Brown v. State, 74 So.3d 984, 1031-32 (Ala. App. 2010), aff’d¸74 So.3d 1039 (Ala. 2011). See also, e.g., Gonzalez v. State, 222 S.W.3d 446 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Commonwealth v. Casper, 481 Pa. 143, 151, 392 A.2d 287, 291 (1978) (“t is trite but true to note that a presumption of prejudice pursuant to this exception requires the presence of exceptional circumstances.”).

Ordinarily, counsel who is seeking a change of venue will want to proceed on alternative theories of actual prejudice and presumed prejudice. See Daniels v. Woodford, 428 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2005) (“To support a change of venue motion, Daniels must demonstrate either actual or presumed prejudice. . . . To demonstrate actual prejudice, Daniels must show that ‘the jurors demonstrated actual partiality or hostility that could not be laid aside.’ . . . Prejudice is presumed only in extreme instances ‘when the record demonstrates that the community where the trial was held was saturated with prejudicial and inflammatory media publicity about the crime.’ . . .

¶ Three factors should be considered in determining presumed prejudice: (1) whether there was a ‘barrage of inflammatory publicity immediately prior to trial, amounting to a huge . . . wave of public passion’; (2) whether the news accounts were primarily factual because such accounts tend to be less inflammatory than editorials or cartoons; and (3) whether the media accounts contained inflammatory or prejudicial material not admissible at trial. . . . ¶ Applied here, these factors compel a finding ‘that the venue [wa]s saturated with prejudicial and inflammatory media publicity about the crime’ sufficient for a presumption of prejudice.”).

But in some cases in which counsel anticipates that s/he will fail to persuade the court of either actual or presumed prejudice, s/he may nevertheless be well advised to file a change-of-venue motion. A trial judge who is convinced that the local atmosphere is tainted by the accused’s notoriety or damaging portrayal in widespread media may grant the motion as a matter of discretion without insisting on the showing of impracticality that the constitutional caselaw demands. See, e.g., United States v. Cortez, 251 F.R.D. 237 (E.D. Tex. 2007); and see Meadows v. Mutter, 243 W. Va. 211, 228, 842 S.E.2d 764, 781 (2020).

High publicity cases are labor-intensive and costly to the court and prosecution; savvy trial judges understand that by denying a change-of-venue motion they will risk appellate reversal of a conviction obtained after a laborious trial; they may choose to avoid that risk or simply to escape the burden of trying a troublesome case. Before seeking a change of venue on the grounds sketched in the preceding paragraphs, counsel should ascertain from knowledgeable local attorneys or court personnel where, in granting such motions, the court (or the judge presiding over the case) has been sending cases.

Unlike the motions described in § 20.03(a) supra, which seek transfer of the case to a particular locale, a motion requesting a venue change on the ground of local juror bias cannot control what 603 county the case will be sent to. After investigating the localities to which the case is likely to be sent in the event that a defense motion for a change of venue is granted, counsel should thoroughly review the risks and costs of being transferred to those locales and weigh them against the liabilities of remaining in the current forum.

https://www.jud.ct.gov/lawlib/notebooks/pathfinders/transferofaction.pdf

https://www.jud.ct.gov/publications/PracticeBook/PB.pdf

Does Colorado have individual voir dire, as Ct does?

 

[Jmoose]

Change of venue would give Schoenhorn an easier commute. He may be hoping for Hartford, but maybe any other venue would be closer than Stamford.

Yes, it would-but he is getting paid for commuting time-I wonder if the Troconis family are too cheap to pay for it?

 

[Cloudydiamond]

Expert Witness Christine Ruva

 

[Jmoose]

Did MT end up having her court date today, or not? Does anybody know?

 

[Seattle1]

Does Colorado have individual voir dire, as Ct does?

Yup. The parties decide on juror questions and mail them out to prospective jurors in advance. I listened to voir dire (via WebEx) for juror selection for Letecia Stauch's trial -- with probably the best Judge presiding I've ever witnessed (Gregory Werner). He had the final say on the pre-emptive strikes and denied several of the strikes requested by the parties. I remember the first day, they spent 7 hours trimming a group of 75 down to 20 potential jurors.

In this case, Stauch's defense also requested a change of venue but ultimately didn't pursue it -- probably going with the devil they knew.

The judge touched on what to expect for jury selection, saying the process will take as long as it needs to until they have successfully found a panel of 70+ qualified people, before narrowing that number down to 16 jurors - 12 who make the final decision, and 4 alternates.

Only audio will be live streamed.

The judge is looking at a 4-page questionnaire for potential jurors with both generic questions, and questions specific to Stauch's case.

Rule 47 - Jurors, Colo. R. Civ. P. 47 | Casetext Search + Citator

Letecia Stauch appears in court again, 2 years after Gannon Stauch was reported missing

Two years after the disappearance of Gannon Stauch, Letecia Stauch appeared in court for a Motions hearing.

www.koaa.com

 

[Seattle1]

https://www.ctinsider.com/news/article/jennifer-dulos-michelle-troconis-cellphone-18300666.php

8/17/23

STAMFORD — The attorney representing Michelle Troconis in the death and disappearance of Jennifer Dulos is expected to present testimony Thursday to get cellphone evidence thrown out in the case.

Attorney Jon Schoenhorn has filed a series of motions while representing Troconis since February 2020. On Wednesday, Schoenhorn elicited testimony from an expert on the influence of media coverage on jurors in an attempt to get trial proceedings moved to the Superior Court of Hartford in the county where his client lived at the time of the death and disappearance.

[..]

Schoenhorn contends his client will not get a fair trial in Fairfield County where Jennifer Dulos is believed to have been attacked and killed at her New Canaan home because of the extensive publicity surrounding the case.

Her mother, Gloria Farber, attended Wednesday's proceedings. It was the first time Farber has appeared in court since the proceedings began about a week after her daughter vanished in 2019. Farber's attorney Richard Weinstein declined to comment Thursday morning.

On Thursday, the court will hear testimony on a different motion Schoenhorn filed last month seeking the suppression of major chunks of cellphone tower data gathered by police in the days after Jennifer Dulos went missing on May 24, 2019.

Stamford Superior Court Judge Kevin A. Randolph said previously he does not expect to rule on the motion heard Wednesday, or the several other motions filed in the case, until September.

 

[waldojabba]

Expert witness: Media painted negative picture of Michelle Troconis

Michelle Troconis is the former girlfriend of Fotis Dulos, who was accused of killing his estranged wife Jennifer Dulos.

connecticut.news12.com

Expert witness: Media painted negative picture of Michelle Troconis​

Aug 16, 2023, 7:50pmUpdated 18h ago
By: Mark Sudol


"
Troconis is facing charges in connection to the death and disappearance of Jennifer Dulos. Attorney Jon Schoenhorn has filed two motions.
One of them was heard Wednesday. Schoenhorn says he wants to move his client’s case from Stamford to Hartford.
Troconis is the former girlfriend of Fotis Dulos, who was accused of killing his estranged wife. She listened as the court heard arguments for hours today on moving this case to a different jurisdiction.
Schoenhorn brought in Dr. Christine Ruva, the chair of psychology at the University of South Florida today to testify. "

EDIT : There is mention in the video in the article from the reporter that the trial is scheduled to start next month? Is this true ? If yes I must have missed this JMO

 

[waldojabba]

https://www.ctinsider.com/news/article/jennifer-dulos-michelle-troconis-cellphone-18300666.php

8/17/23

STAMFORD — The attorney representing Michelle Troconis in the death and disappearance of Jennifer Dulos is expected to present testimony Thursday to get cellphone evidence thrown out in the case.

Attorney Jon Schoenhorn has filed a series of motions while representing Troconis since February 2020. On Wednesday, Schoenhorn elicited testimony from an expert on the influence of media coverage on jurors in an attempt to get trial proceedings moved to the Superior Court of Hartford in the county where his client lived at the time of the death and disappearance.

[..]

Schoenhorn contends his client will not get a fair trial in Fairfield County where Jennifer Dulos is believed to have been attacked and killed at her New Canaan home because of the extensive publicity surrounding the case.

Her mother, Gloria Farber, attended Wednesday's proceedings. It was the first time Farber has appeared in court since the proceedings began about a week after her daughter vanished in 2019. Farber's attorney Richard Weinstein declined to comment Thursday morning.

On Thursday, the court will hear testimony on a different motion Schoenhorn filed last month seeking the suppression of major chunks of cellphone tower data gathered by police in the days after Jennifer Dulos went missing on May 24, 2019.

Stamford Superior Court Judge Kevin A. Randolph said previously he does not expect to rule on the motion heard Wednesday, or the several other motions filed in the case, until September.

Very interested to see that the Mom of the deceased attended.
IMO I am not really concerned about venue. I am worried about all the constant delays. Maybe another court can expedite ? jmo

" Her mother, Gloria Farber, attended Wednesday's proceedings. It was the first time Farber has appeared in court since the proceedings began about a week after her daughter vanished in 2019. Farber's attorney Richard Weinstein declined to comment Thursday morning."

 

[Seattle1]

“In criminal cases, defendants do not have an inherent right to a change in venue. ‘In requesting a change of venue, a defendant bears the burden of showing that he could not otherwise receive a fair and impartial trial.

^^rsbm

Burden is on the defense.

This request for a change of venue is truly Shoenhorn's last effort to get the case to Hartford after failing every other attempt in various courts over two years.

I trust the prosecution will bring up these previous efforts if in fact the defense truly believed there was legitimate cause for a change of venue (i.e., prejudicial pretrial publicity). This isn't something that happens overnight (or since MT started tweeting)!

What is it -- Stamford to Hartford, maybe two hours north?

 

[waldojabba]

^^rsbm

Burden is on the defense.

This request for a change of venue is truly Shoenhorn's last effort to get the case to Hartford after failing every other attempt in various courts over two years.

I trust the prosecution will bring up these previous efforts if in fact the defense truly believed there was legitimate cause for a change of venue (i.e., prejudicial pretrial publicity). This isn't something that happens overnight (or since MT started tweeting)!

What is it -- Stamford to Hartford, maybe two hours north?

I don't live in Ct anymore but visit a lot. Ideally Hartford to Stamford is not even two hours - but if you add in traffic - that drive can truly be a nightmare and it could be longer than 2 hours once school is back is session. There are regularly backups on rt 95 and the Merritt due to normal traffic - add in construction and fender benders and that snarls things up even further. When I travel there for business I will not schedule a meeting for first thing unless I get to town the night before. JMO

 

[Seattle1]

I don't live in Ct anymore but visit a lot. Ideally Hartford to Stamford is not even two hours - but if you add in traffic - that drive can truly be a nightmare and it could be longer than 2 hours once school is back is session. There are regularly backups on rt 95 and the Merritt due to normal traffic - add in construction and fender benders and that snarls things up even further. When I travel there for business I will not schedule a meeting for first thing unless I get to town the night before. JMO

Thanks, @waldojabba for your local perspective. In your opinion, do you think the publicity on this case has been less in the Hartford area than in Stamford?

All I can think of is that Stamford is closer to NY -- where GF and the children reside. Nonetheless, a family that's remained very quiet and private -- versus the defendant. JMO

 

[waldojabba]

Thanks, @waldojabba for your local perspective. In your opinion, do you think the publicity on this case has been less in the Hartford area than in Stamford?

All I can think of is that Stamford is closer to NY -- where GF and the children reside. Nonetheless, a family that's remained very quiet and private -- versus the defendant. JMO

Good question : Connecticut is a small state - Stamford and Hartford are two separate media markets but with the way everything is on line now there is so much overlap that I think it blends together. How many people get the local paper and how many people watch the 6 oclock news anymore? In my world not many but maybe the older demographic. I don't know how you would measure to truly indicate with confidence where the coverage has been more saturated.
For instance - I subscribe to Hearst and that pretty well gets me into most media in CT online and I am in another state.
Any national media died down a long time ago but that is accessible everywhere.
I would also argue that it has been four years. Lots of people movement physically over the those four years during covid.
So my opinion - coverage nets out equal between the two.

If I were the judge I would not change the venue. But that's obvi just me. JMO

 

[Jmoose]

Good question : Connecticut is a small state - Stamford and Hartford are two separate media markets but with the way everything is on line now there is so much overlap that I think it blends together. How many people get the local paper and how many people watch the 6 oclock news anymore? In my world not many but maybe the older demographic. I don't know how you would measure to truly indicate with confidence where the coverage has been more saturated.
For instance - I subscribe to Hearst and that pretty well gets me into most media in CT online and I am in another state.
Any national media died down a long time ago but that is accessible everywhere.
I would also argue that it has been four years. Lots of people movement physically over the those four years during covid.
So my opinion - coverage nets out equal between the two.

If I were the judge I would not change the venue. But that's obvi just me. JMO

I absolutely agree with this; CT is not so big that moving the trial from Stamford to Hartford could possibly make a difference. Besides, I’m quite sure that there was just as much interest in the Dulos case in Hartford as there was in Fairfield County-and news in Stamford is also news in Hartford. It’s not like news in NYC, v. news way upstate in New York. It can only be for the convenience of JS, and maybe just to exhibit a “win”, the same way Troconis and her defense portrayed the removal of the ankle monitor. It solves virtually none of the problem they have, of seating a jury that has not yet already formed an opinion about this case-in Farmington, where part of the Hartford jury pool lies, I imagine there are people who actually knew the Duloses, Michelle Troconis, or Kent Mawhinney. They might actually be better off with a Fairfield County jury.

 

[sds71]

An attorney representing Michelle Troconis in the death and disappearance of Jennifer Dulos argued on Thursday that police investigators violated his client’s Fourth Amendment rights when they seized cellphone data using an “outrageously broad” search warrant.

In defense of his motion to suppress major chunks of cellphone tower datagathered by police, Schoenhorn called telecommunications consultant Baw Chng to the stand Thursday to testify on the types of information gathered from what police call “cellphone tower data dumps.”

“The witness today, Mr. Chng, made clear that the amount of data that can be obtained from this tower dump is very specific and can be location-specific,” Schoenhorn said, arguing that police needed a much more “narrowly tailored” warrant to get this sort of information.

Assistant State’s Attorney Sean McGuinness, however, argued that Schoenhorn “utterly failed to establish the standing” to ask the court to suppress such evidence. He contended that the defense didn’t put any evidence on the record during Thursday’s hearing of what data of Troconis’s was allegedly obtained by police.

https://www.stamfordadvocate.com/news/article/jennifer-dulos-michelle-troconis-cellphone-18300666.php