IN - Abby & Libby - The Delphi Murders - Richard Allen Arrested - #171

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I have no way of knowing how the xD came to the conclusion that AW died slowly. I was responding to OP who said there wasn’t enough time to collect blood from a body. I’m telling you there is, that’s all. I have no details as to all the injuries these poor children suffered or how it all went down. I was speaking only to that one point. JMHO


Do you have an opinion on why draining the blood would occur?

Also, what would be done with it?

Would it be possible that after killing 2 kids in an hours time that the killer then lugged around close to 8 pounds of blood unnoticed?
 
Do you have an opinion on why draining the blood would occur?

Also, what would be done with it?

Would it be possible that after killing 2 kids in an hours time that the killer then lugged around close to 8 pounds of blood unnoticed?
Yes, I do. However, I have no way of knowing if it was done in this case so I will refrain from posting about it.
 
Do you have an opinion on why draining the blood would occur?

Also, what would be done with it?

Would it be possible that after killing 2 kids in an hours time that the killer then lugged around close to 8 pounds of blood unnoticed?
To add to @susiQ’s response, IMO it would be harder to commit the murders unnoticed than carry around 8lbs of blood unnoticed. A big bag of dog food is 50lbs, 8lbs wouldn’t even weigh as much as 2 5lb dumbbells.

FTR I don’t think the time of death is accurate and believe the murders likely occurred at night, so that would make it easier too. JMO.
 
IF the transcipt of the meeting in judges chambers proves both B&R verbally withdrew, I’m not so sure there’s be need for a formal hearing to conclude the matter. IIRC within one of R’s later motions filed didn’t he admit they’d both withdrew??

Agreed. If they actually withdrew, then i think it's over.

Regardless B&R should get a say in things. Depending to what extent they‘d consider any public formal reviews or hearings to also constitute a public shaming, if they want the examples of their gross negligence to remain confidential that should be their right (unless further actions involving criminality or bar violations are involved) IMO.

I think it all needs to be on the record. Otherwise as we've seen, conspiracies start up that this was all organised by the prosecution and the judge is in on it.
 
Here are some cases that seems parallel enough to this current situation to shed some light on the legal issues here.

"After appellant and Percy were indicted, Percy had several telephone conversations and at least two meetings with Ralph Gonzalez, appellant's attorney. During these encounters, it was agreed that appellant would pay Percy $10,000. The reason for the payment was in dispute. The transfer of the first payment of $3,000 was completed. Appellant was present during at least one of the meetings, and Marco Vargas, Percy's friend, was present during at least one meeting and was involved in the transfer of the $3,000. Appellant refused to pay the remaining $7,000.

The State moved to disqualify attorney Gonzalez as appellant's counsel under disciplinary rule 3.08[1], because he had personal knowledge bearing directly on the guilt or innocence of his client and the credibility of the State's key witness and was therefore a potential witness whose credibility would be at issue regardless of whether he took the stand."

The allegation was that the D helped to arrange the payment for favorable testimony by P.

In this case:
- State made a formal motion to DQ based in a specific disciplinary statute
- Court held a DQ hearing in which several witnesses were called and D was able to cross examine
- the Court decided, after the hearing, to grant motion to DQ.
- accused was convicted
- accused appealed conviction based on denial of counsel of choice
- case was taken to court of appeals and then court of criminal appeals
- conviction was upheld but several justices dissented, stating that the accused 6th amendment right were violated.
- notably, the DQ'd lawyers were retained not appointed.

BBM: "As long as the basis for the disqualification is adequately shown by the record, the trial judge need not expressly state its consideration of less drastic alternatives in the record.[39] The court of appeals explained why the record showed appellant's first suggestion would not adequately protect the State's interest." (This is referencing Texas precedents)

"In moving to disqualify appellant's counsel of choice, the government bears a heavy burden of establishing that disqualification is justified.[11]"
11. United States v. Washington, 797 F.2d 1461, 1465 (9th Cir.1986).

In United States V Washington, the state formally moved to DQ the accused's chosen attorneys, and the Court granted this and denied the D's request for an evidentiary hearing. The US court of appeals vacated the conviction.
"Because Judge Orrick applied the wrong legal standard in disqualifying Washington's chosen counsel without an evidentiary hearing, we vacate the conviction and remand the case to the district court. See Ogden v. United States, 303 F.2d 724, 737-38 (9th Cir.1962). If the district court determines that the disqualification of Hinckley and Kotoske was justified, the conviction may be reinstated. If, on the other hand, it is ultimately determined that the disqualification of either of his chosen counsel violated Washington's Sixth Amendment rights, he would be entitled to a new trial because denial of a criminal defendant's qualified right to retain counsel of his choice is reversible error regardless whether prejudice is shown."

Another interesting part of the dissent opinion in Gonzalez V State, it seems clear IMO that if RA insists on his attorneys he cannot claim ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal, I don't think there is really any danger of that at all. (BBM):
"Appellant, of course, waived his right to complain about any of this prejudice in either a motion for mistrial or in support of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim since appellant insisted on his retained lawyer representing him despite the potential for the lawyer's violation of the advocate/witness rule. If appellant wanted to hire a lawyer who would compromise appellant's case by testifying at trial, then that was appellant's choice, a choice backed up by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.[5]"
"[5] It is, of course, well settled that a defendant who cannot afford to hire a lawyer does not have the "right to counsel of his own choosing." See Buntion v. Harmon, 827 S.W.2d 945, 949 (Tex.Cr.App.1992)."

Footnote 5 references a Write of Mandamus decision where a judge replaced appointed trial counsel in order to have a new attorney represent the defendant for an appeal, the defendant requested to have the appointed counsel reinstated. The court basically told the judge to present actual principled reasoning, rather than her preferences.
BBM
"Given the fundamental nature of an accused's right to counsel, we cannot agree that a trial judge's discretion to replace appointed trial counsel over the objection of both counsel and defendant extends to a situation where the only justification for such replacement is the trial judge's personal "feelings" and "preferences."[4] See Stearnes, supra. There must be some principled reason, apparent from the record, to justify a trial judge's sua sponte replacement of appointed counsel under these circumstances. Because no such principled reason is evident in the instant case, we find that relator has satisfied the second prerequisite to mandamus relief.[5]"
"[4] According to the record, respondent's action in no way reflected a particularized belief that appointed counsel would be unable to adequately represent relator on appeal. Neither did the record reflect any evidence of a potential conflict of interest on the part of Kiernan or Scardino. Respondent's "practice," "experience," "feelings," and "preference" were the only explanations given."

Another Texas Writ of Mandamus decision requested the judge vacate order removing appointed counsel of the defendant's preference:
BBM "Fletcher informed the court that he prefers to continue to be represented by Willey, his counsel of over one year. The complaint about the general conditions of working as court-appointed counsel, without inquiry about how those conditions would create a conflict here, cannot override Fletcher's Sixth Amendment right to be "defended by the counsel he believes to be best." See Gonzalez-Lopez , 548 U.S. at 146, 126 S.Ct. 2557. And, even if the trial judge thought the course of events reflected on Willey's competency, as shown above, those concerns did not authorize Willey's removal over his and Fletcher's objections. See Harling , 387 A.2d at 1106.
The issue must be case-specific and appear in the record. Cf. United States v. Smith , 895 F.3d 410, 421 (5th Cir.), cert. denied , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 495, 202 L.Ed.2d 387 (2018)."


Another US appeal court decision regarding right to appointed counsel:
In this one, the appeals court upheld decision to DQ counsel at the very beginning of pre-trial, which was done due to potential for the attorney to testify in the trial for the prosecution. They outline factors relating to someone's appointed right to counsel:
"In Daniels, the Sixth Circuit addressed a similar argument and concluded that no Sixth Amendment violation occurred when, over objection, the trial judge removed a defendant’s appointed counsel. The court surmised, "[t]he replacement of court-appointed counsel might violate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to adequate representation . . . if the replacement prejudices the defendant-e.g., if a court replaced a defendant’s lawyer hours before trial or arbitrarily removed a skilled lawyer and replaced him with an unskilled one. "Daniels, 501 F.3d at 740.
In this case, Littlejohn and Monckton were removed during the "infancy" of the proceeding (J.A. at 3403)—there were another sixteen months until jury selection began—and Basham’s replacement counsel was Jack Swerling and Gregory Harris, two extremely experienced members of the South Carolina defense bar. Swerling, in particular, is well-known for his representation in homicide and death penalty cases. See, e.g., Sims v. Brown, 425 F.3d 560, 582 n. 14 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting Swerling’s experience at the time included 100 homicide cases, four of which involved the death penalty). Basham does little to argue that this substitution was prejudicial, merely noting that Littlejohn and Monckton had filed a competency motion, which Swerling later withdrew, indicating that those attorneys were pursuing a different strategy than the one Swerling and Harris ultimately implemented. This sort of speculation, we believe, cannot meet the burden of showing prejudice.
In sum, Basham, as an indigent defendant, had the right to effective assistance of counsel, but not to counsel of his own choosing. He thus must point to some type of prejudice suffered because of the removal of Littlejohn and Monckton which, given the time of their removal and the replacement counsel Basham received, we do not believe he can do. Accordingly, the district court did not commit reversible error in disqualifying Littlejohn and Monckton prior to trial."

Here's Daniels v Lafler described above:

Harling v. United States, District of Columbia Court of Appeals, relating to appointed counsel
"We conclude, however, that once an attorney is serving under a valid appointment by the court and an attorney-client relationship has been established, the court may not arbitrarily remove the attorney, over the objections of both the defendant and his counsel. "[O]nce counsel has been chosen, whether by the court or the accused, the accused is entitled to the assistance of that counsel at trial." English v. State,"

Here's some cases sited by the 2nd Writ of Mandamus:
US v Gearhardt, 7th circuit US appeals, regarding appointed counsel
BBM "The Sixth Amendment protects a criminal defendant's right to a fair opportunity to secure the counsel of his choice. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932); United States v. O'Malley, 786 F.2d 786, 789 (7th Cir. 1986). This right to choose one's counsel, in turn, implies the right to continuous representation by the counsel of one's choice. See Anne Bowen Poulin, Strengthening the Criminal Defendant's Right to Counsel, 28 Cardozo L. Rev. 1213, 1249 (2006). Thus, disqualification of defense counsel should be a measure of last resort, and "the government bears a heavy burden of establishing that disqualification is justified." United States v. Diozzi, 807 F.2d 10, 12 (1st Cir. 1986).
Applying these principles, we have held that the disqualification of a defendant's counsel of choice can in principle pose a Sixth Amendment problem. O'Malley, 786 F.2d at 789; cf. Diozzi, 807 F.2d at 11 (finding a Sixth Amendment violation in attorney's disqualification where the defendant was willing to stipulate to the evidence giving rise to the conflict); United States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064, 1073 (2d Cir. 1982) (finding a Sixth Amendment violation in attorney's disqualification because the defendant agreed to limit his attorney's cross-examination of the witness whose testimony gave rise to the conflict)."


Despite outlining the right to continued counsel, this court found that "the government's interest in proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt outweighed Gearhart's interest in continuity of counsel in this case."

Stearnes v. Clinton, Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, Writ of Mandamus relating to court appointed counsel
BBM "The judge also suggests that McLarty may have engaged in unlawful conduct while interviewing Hanson. If that occurred McLarty should be prosecuted under the appropriate penal code provision. On the other hand, Judge Clinton's apparently unfounded speculation cannot be deemed as a valid basis for counsel's removal."
"While we acknowledge that an indigent defendant has no right under the Federal or State Constitutions to have counsel of his choosing, the right-to-counsel provisions of the respective constitutions prevents the trial court from unreasonably interfering with the counsel duly appointed. Once a valid appointment has been made, the trial court cannot arbitrarily remove him as attorney of record over the objections of the defendant and counsel."

Lane v. State, Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama, relating to appointed counsel (DQed because counsel may need to be called as state's witness)
"With respect to continued representation, however, there is no distinction between indigent defendants and nonindigent defendants. See, e.g., State v. Huskey, 82 S.W.3d 297, 305 (Tenn.Crim.App.2002) (" [A]ny meaningful distinction between indigent and non-indigent defendants' right to representation by counsel ends once a valid appointment of counsel has been made." ). See also Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 23 n. 5, 103 S.Ct. 1610, 75 L.Ed.2d 610 (1983)"
"Although Gonzalez-Lopez involved retained counsel, as noted above there is no difference between retained counsel and appointed counsel when it comes to the right to continued representation by counsel of choice. Therefore, we believe the analysis in Gonzalez-Lopez is applicable in this case. Because Lane was wrongly denied his right to counsel of choice under the Sixth Amendment, we must reverse his convictions and his sentence of death and remand this case for a new trial."


Finkelstein v. State, District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District, regarding appointed counsel
BBM "We conclude that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law when it removed Howard Finkelstein as public defender representing petitioner John Fogelman. The court could have ordered Finkelstein to proceed, and suggested the possibility of contempt proceedings against him if he were to fail to do so. However, it did not entertain that option. Removal of counsel without even allowing an opportunity for objection and argument is and should be perceived as a threat to the independence of the bar as well as an abuse of discretion."

It seems that the question of prejudice and principled evidentiary/reasoning basis will come into play in the SC, with factors such as:
- no evidentiary hearing was held
- no formal motions were filed
- whether the reasons given for gross negligence were sufficient for removal
- content of the Oct 19th in-chambers discussion and whether it indicates prejudice or demonstrates reasonableness of the DQ
- JG appointing an attorney she knows rather than following the established process for finding a public defender, and whether that indicates prejudice
- whether the offer of pro-bono representation overrides lack of protection for appointed counsel of choice
- whether DQing the attorneys who have been working on the case for 11.5 months and have pending motions is seen as causing harm to RA's defense

The more of these cases I read, the more it seems straightforward to me that the SC will at the very least order an evidentiary hearing to be held prior to dismissal of B&R.
In addition, IMO even if you are disgusted by B&R you should want this hearing to happen because the last thing you want to see is this putting a conviction of RA in danger on appeal, as did happen in multiple cases above.

IANAL this is JMHO
 
To add to @susiQ’s response, IMO it would be harder to commit the murders unnoticed than carry around 8lbs of blood unnoticed. A big bag of dog food is 50lbs, 8lbs wouldn’t even weigh as much as 2 5lb dumbbells.

FTR I don’t think the time of death is accurate and believe the murders likely occurred at night, so that would make it easier too. JMO.


Wow! So you believe that the killer then held the girls there until night time, then murdered them as many people searched throughout the night.
Then proceeded to drain one of the bodies, in the dark? After which collected the drained blood for .............. something..... took the blood and slipped away in the night with it for .... something?

I would like to hear your opinions!


JMO
 
Wow! So you believe that the killer then held the girls there until night time, then murdered them as many people searched throughout the night.
Then proceeded to drain one of the bodies, in the dark? After which collected the drained blood for .............. something..... took the blood and slipped away in the night with it for .... something?

I would like to hear your opinions!


JMO
At night doesn’t mean no light source.
 
Here are some cases that seems parallel enough to this current situation to shed some light on the legal issues here.

"After appellant and Percy were indicted, Percy had several telephone conversations and at least two meetings with Ralph Gonzalez, appellant's attorney. During these encounters, it was agreed that appellant would pay Percy $10,000. The reason for the payment was in dispute. The transfer of the first payment of $3,000 was completed. Appellant was present during at least one of the meetings, and Marco Vargas, Percy's friend, was present during at least one meeting and was involved in the transfer of the $3,000. Appellant refused to pay the remaining $7,000.

The State moved to disqualify attorney Gonzalez as appellant's counsel under disciplinary rule 3.08[1], because he had personal knowledge bearing directly on the guilt or innocence of his client and the credibility of the State's key witness and was therefore a potential witness whose credibility would be at issue regardless of whether he took the stand."

The allegation was that the D helped to arrange the payment for favorable testimony by P.

In this case:
- State made a formal motion to DQ based in a specific disciplinary statute
- Court held a DQ hearing in which several witnesses were called and D was able to cross examine
- the Court decided, after the hearing, to grant motion to DQ.
- accused was convicted
- accused appealed conviction based on denial of counsel of choice
- case was taken to court of appeals and then court of criminal appeals
- conviction was upheld but several justices dissented, stating that the accused 6th amendment right were violated.
- notably, the DQ'd lawyers were retained not appointed.

BBM: "As long as the basis for the disqualification is adequately shown by the record, the trial judge need not expressly state its consideration of less drastic alternatives in the record.[39] The court of appeals explained why the record showed appellant's first suggestion would not adequately protect the State's interest." (This is referencing Texas precedents)

"In moving to disqualify appellant's counsel of choice, the government bears a heavy burden of establishing that disqualification is justified.[11]"
11. United States v. Washington, 797 F.2d 1461, 1465 (9th Cir.1986).

In United States V Washington, the state formally moved to DQ the accused's chosen attorneys, and the Court granted this and denied the D's request for an evidentiary hearing. The US court of appeals vacated the conviction.
"Because Judge Orrick applied the wrong legal standard in disqualifying Washington's chosen counsel without an evidentiary hearing, we vacate the conviction and remand the case to the district court. See Ogden v. United States, 303 F.2d 724, 737-38 (9th Cir.1962). If the district court determines that the disqualification of Hinckley and Kotoske was justified, the conviction may be reinstated. If, on the other hand, it is ultimately determined that the disqualification of either of his chosen counsel violated Washington's Sixth Amendment rights, he would be entitled to a new trial because denial of a criminal defendant's qualified right to retain counsel of his choice is reversible error regardless whether prejudice is shown."

Another interesting part of the dissent opinion in Gonzalez V State, it seems clear IMO that if RA insists on his attorneys he cannot claim ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal, I don't think there is really any danger of that at all. (BBM):
"Appellant, of course, waived his right to complain about any of this prejudice in either a motion for mistrial or in support of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim since appellant insisted on his retained lawyer representing him despite the potential for the lawyer's violation of the advocate/witness rule. If appellant wanted to hire a lawyer who would compromise appellant's case by testifying at trial, then that was appellant's choice, a choice backed up by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.[5]"
"[5] It is, of course, well settled that a defendant who cannot afford to hire a lawyer does not have the "right to counsel of his own choosing." See Buntion v. Harmon, 827 S.W.2d 945, 949 (Tex.Cr.App.1992)."

Footnote 5 references a Write of Mandamus decision where a judge replaced appointed trial counsel in order to have a new attorney represent the defendant for an appeal, the defendant requested to have the appointed counsel reinstated. The court basically told the judge to present actual principled reasoning, rather than her preferences.
BBM
"Given the fundamental nature of an accused's right to counsel, we cannot agree that a trial judge's discretion to replace appointed trial counsel over the objection of both counsel and defendant extends to a situation where the only justification for such replacement is the trial judge's personal "feelings" and "preferences."[4] See Stearnes, supra. There must be some principled reason, apparent from the record, to justify a trial judge's sua sponte replacement of appointed counsel under these circumstances. Because no such principled reason is evident in the instant case, we find that relator has satisfied the second prerequisite to mandamus relief.[5]"
"[4] According to the record, respondent's action in no way reflected a particularized belief that appointed counsel would be unable to adequately represent relator on appeal. Neither did the record reflect any evidence of a potential conflict of interest on the part of Kiernan or Scardino. Respondent's "practice," "experience," "feelings," and "preference" were the only explanations given."

Another Texas Writ of Mandamus decision requested the judge vacate order removing appointed counsel of the defendant's preference:
BBM "Fletcher informed the court that he prefers to continue to be represented by Willey, his counsel of over one year. The complaint about the general conditions of working as court-appointed counsel, without inquiry about how those conditions would create a conflict here, cannot override Fletcher's Sixth Amendment right to be "defended by the counsel he believes to be best." See Gonzalez-Lopez , 548 U.S. at 146, 126 S.Ct. 2557. And, even if the trial judge thought the course of events reflected on Willey's competency, as shown above, those concerns did not authorize Willey's removal over his and Fletcher's objections. See Harling , 387 A.2d at 1106.
The issue must be case-specific and appear in the record. Cf. United States v. Smith , 895 F.3d 410, 421 (5th Cir.), cert. denied , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 495, 202 L.Ed.2d 387 (2018)."


Another US appeal court decision regarding right to appointed counsel:
In this one, the appeals court upheld decision to DQ counsel at the very beginning of pre-trial, which was done due to potential for the attorney to testify in the trial for the prosecution. They outline factors relating to someone's appointed right to counsel:
"In Daniels, the Sixth Circuit addressed a similar argument and concluded that no Sixth Amendment violation occurred when, over objection, the trial judge removed a defendant’s appointed counsel. The court surmised, "[t]he replacement of court-appointed counsel might violate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to adequate representation . . . if the replacement prejudices the defendant-e.g., if a court replaced a defendant’s lawyer hours before trial or arbitrarily removed a skilled lawyer and replaced him with an unskilled one. "Daniels, 501 F.3d at 740.
In this case, Littlejohn and Monckton were removed during the "infancy" of the proceeding (J.A. at 3403)—there were another sixteen months until jury selection began—and Basham’s replacement counsel was Jack Swerling and Gregory Harris, two extremely experienced members of the South Carolina defense bar. Swerling, in particular, is well-known for his representation in homicide and death penalty cases. See, e.g., Sims v. Brown, 425 F.3d 560, 582 n. 14 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting Swerling’s experience at the time included 100 homicide cases, four of which involved the death penalty). Basham does little to argue that this substitution was prejudicial, merely noting that Littlejohn and Monckton had filed a competency motion, which Swerling later withdrew, indicating that those attorneys were pursuing a different strategy than the one Swerling and Harris ultimately implemented. This sort of speculation, we believe, cannot meet the burden of showing prejudice.
In sum, Basham, as an indigent defendant, had the right to effective assistance of counsel, but not to counsel of his own choosing. He thus must point to some type of prejudice suffered because of the removal of Littlejohn and Monckton which, given the time of their removal and the replacement counsel Basham received, we do not believe he can do. Accordingly, the district court did not commit reversible error in disqualifying Littlejohn and Monckton prior to trial."

Here's Daniels v Lafler described above:

Harling v. United States, District of Columbia Court of Appeals, relating to appointed counsel
"We conclude, however, that once an attorney is serving under a valid appointment by the court and an attorney-client relationship has been established, the court may not arbitrarily remove the attorney, over the objections of both the defendant and his counsel. "[O]nce counsel has been chosen, whether by the court or the accused, the accused is entitled to the assistance of that counsel at trial." English v. State,"

Here's some cases sited by the 2nd Writ of Mandamus:
US v Gearhardt, 7th circuit US appeals, regarding appointed counsel
BBM "The Sixth Amendment protects a criminal defendant's right to a fair opportunity to secure the counsel of his choice. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932); United States v. O'Malley, 786 F.2d 786, 789 (7th Cir. 1986). This right to choose one's counsel, in turn, implies the right to continuous representation by the counsel of one's choice. See Anne Bowen Poulin, Strengthening the Criminal Defendant's Right to Counsel, 28 Cardozo L. Rev. 1213, 1249 (2006). Thus, disqualification of defense counsel should be a measure of last resort, and "the government bears a heavy burden of establishing that disqualification is justified." United States v. Diozzi, 807 F.2d 10, 12 (1st Cir. 1986).
Applying these principles, we have held that the disqualification of a defendant's counsel of choice can in principle pose a Sixth Amendment problem. O'Malley, 786 F.2d at 789; cf. Diozzi, 807 F.2d at 11 (finding a Sixth Amendment violation in attorney's disqualification where the defendant was willing to stipulate to the evidence giving rise to the conflict); United States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064, 1073 (2d Cir. 1982) (finding a Sixth Amendment violation in attorney's disqualification because the defendant agreed to limit his attorney's cross-examination of the witness whose testimony gave rise to the conflict)."


Despite outlining the right to continued counsel, this court found that "the government's interest in proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt outweighed Gearhart's interest in continuity of counsel in this case."

Stearnes v. Clinton, Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, Writ of Mandamus relating to court appointed counsel
BBM "The judge also suggests that McLarty may have engaged in unlawful conduct while interviewing Hanson. If that occurred McLarty should be prosecuted under the appropriate penal code provision. On the other hand, Judge Clinton's apparently unfounded speculation cannot be deemed as a valid basis for counsel's removal."
"While we acknowledge that an indigent defendant has no right under the Federal or State Constitutions to have counsel of his choosing, the right-to-counsel provisions of the respective constitutions prevents the trial court from unreasonably interfering with the counsel duly appointed. Once a valid appointment has been made, the trial court cannot arbitrarily remove him as attorney of record over the objections of the defendant and counsel."

Lane v. State, Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama, relating to appointed counsel (DQed because counsel may need to be called as state's witness)
"With respect to continued representation, however, there is no distinction between indigent defendants and nonindigent defendants. See, e.g., State v. Huskey, 82 S.W.3d 297, 305 (Tenn.Crim.App.2002) (" [A]ny meaningful distinction between indigent and non-indigent defendants' right to representation by counsel ends once a valid appointment of counsel has been made." ). See also Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 23 n. 5, 103 S.Ct. 1610, 75 L.Ed.2d 610 (1983)"
"Although Gonzalez-Lopez involved retained counsel, as noted above there is no difference between retained counsel and appointed counsel when it comes to the right to continued representation by counsel of choice. Therefore, we believe the analysis in Gonzalez-Lopez is applicable in this case. Because Lane was wrongly denied his right to counsel of choice under the Sixth Amendment, we must reverse his convictions and his sentence of death and remand this case for a new trial."


Finkelstein v. State, District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District, regarding appointed counsel
BBM "We conclude that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law when it removed Howard Finkelstein as public defender representing petitioner John Fogelman. The court could have ordered Finkelstein to proceed, and suggested the possibility of contempt proceedings against him if he were to fail to do so. However, it did not entertain that option. Removal of counsel without even allowing an opportunity for objection and argument is and should be perceived as a threat to the independence of the bar as well as an abuse of discretion."

It seems that the question of prejudice and principled evidentiary/reasoning basis will come into play in the SC, with factors such as:
- no evidentiary hearing was held
- no formal motions were filed
- whether the reasons given for gross negligence were sufficient for removal
- content of the Oct 19th in-chambers discussion and whether it indicates prejudice or demonstrates reasonableness of the DQ
- JG appointing an attorney she knows rather than following the established process for finding a public defender, and whether that indicates prejudice
- whether the offer of pro-bono representation overrides lack of protection for appointed counsel of choice
- whether DQing the attorneys who have been working on the case for 11.5 months and have pending motions is seen as causing harm to RA's defense

The more of these cases I read, the more it seems straightforward to me that the SC will at the very least order an evidentiary hearing to be held prior to dismissal of B&R.
In addition, IMO even if you are disgusted by B&R you should want this hearing to happen because the last thing you want to see is this putting a conviction of RA in danger on appeal, as did happen in multiple cases above.

IANAL this is JMHO
Thank you @Ward Thisperer !!
 
Wow! So you believe that the killer then held the girls there until night time, then murdered them as many people searched throughout the night.
Then proceeded to drain one of the bodies, in the dark? After which collected the drained blood for .............. something..... took the blood and slipped away in the night with it for .... something?

I would like to hear your opinions!


JMO
I'm more prone to believe that they were taken somewhere else and killed at that location, and dumped back in the woods early in the morning.

Reasons this could be plausible:
- phone pinged in the area at 2:30am after not pinging for hours
- the bodies are said to have been moved from the location they were killed
- it is not a long walk from the road or various houses, through the woods to the areas the bodies were found, or to either side of the MHB
- the timeline to commit a kidnapping and murder, move bodies, cross a freezing cold creek, and leave before being seen by searchers is very tight, and very risky if we're to believe the murderer decided to walk well-known trails and park in plain sight before/after the murders
 
Do you have an opinion on why draining the blood would occur?

Also, what would be done with it?

Would it be possible that after killing 2 kids in an hours time that the killer then lugged around close to 8 pounds of blood unnoticed?
Respectfully, you asked me three different questions. I prefer not to get into all the specifics on why and what would be done with it. It’s already been questioned by OP, “Why are we even discussing something so preposterous at this point?”

It’s possible the blood was drained and collected, however, I don’t know if that’s what happened here.

FTR, I didn’t begin the discussion. It began with @TheVisual in post #691, which was responded to by @katydid23 in post #908, to which I responded. And, here we are! There’s that! :)
 
Hi Ms Tedytamer - this was a pleasure to read, thank you.
I bet other Websleuths get fed up with my point of view it still hasn’t changed.

Justice for Abby and Libby but RA needs a fair trial and his guilt be judged on the evidence against him in that trial.
we want the verdict to stick ... for the victims and their family
1. It’s shady the Judge is not making an open record of her decisions and the procedures in her Court.
i know, right? shady/lazy/shady/lazy it's a toss-up.
2. I still believe the removal of RA defense counsel was done in an unlawful way. Defense councils have a right to be zealous in defending their client and they have been. Yes the leak needs to be openly investigated and from that an open record of any disciplinary action put forward by the Judge with RA present instead of the secrecy and forced removal the Judge did.
There's just no excuse for her goofy "saving face off the record" exercise. I mean, if she really didn't know how to handle all the chaos with a suicide on top, she should have called a friend. In the Judiciary. She's been doing this judge stuff a long time, been promoted even. So ... this leans shady.
3. Several times it has been indicated that further arrests for this crime could be made. They have RA waiting trial so why do they keep saying this. Surely they have evidence after all this time and have a definite idea of what happened. Just sounds shady to me.
I'm very curious about this. The D will have to be given this info ... there's that last round of discovery and b/c the P told Gull "yes I'll give it to the D first week of Nov" ... I've wondered if the info was about to be given to the D, and that somehow played into Gull "finding" that she has to cut this leaky D loose. It's twisty. Also could be entirely irrelevant.
I hope the secrecy and shady decisions get fixed so it’s fair and everything is recorded in an open way as it should be in Court.

I want RA to have a fair trial. I want him to be judged on the evidence. If the evidence shows he is guilty then I hope he rots in jail but until then let’s have a fair trial. Having a fair trial that follows the rules means it won’t end up a constant Appeal fest.
agree!
 
Reasons this could be plausible:
- phone pinged in the area at 2:30am after not pinging for hours
- the bodies are said to have been moved from the location they were killed
- it is not a long walk from the road or various houses, through the woods to the areas the bodies were found, or to either side of the MHB
- the timeline to commit a kidnapping and murder, move bodies, cross a freezing cold creek, and leave before being seen by searchers is very tight, and very risky if we're to believe the murderer decided to walk well-known trails and park in plain sight before/after the murders
RSBM
I'm more prone to believe that they were taken somewhere else and killed at that location, and dumped back in the woods early in the morning
^This.

The timeline doesn’t make sense to me. Personally I would like timestamps via phone pings from all those in the area at the time to believe the given timeline. JMO.
 
I'm more prone to believe that they were taken somewhere else and killed at that location, and dumped back in the woods early in the morning.

Reasons this could be plausible:
- phone pinged in the area at 2:30am after not pinging for hours
- the bodies are said to have been moved from the location they were killed
- it is not a long walk from the road or various houses, through the woods to the areas the bodies were found, or to either side of the MHB
- the timeline to commit a kidnapping and murder, move bodies, cross a freezing cold creek, and leave before being seen by searchers is very tight, and very risky if we're to believe the murderer decided to walk well-known trails and park in plain sight before/after the murders

Q. It has been stated in a press conference that “it was all over by 3:30 on Feb 13.” This statement was based on what information?

A. Evidence. I do not recall a specific time though but rather a time line.

Q. Has it been determined the girls were killed where they were found?

A. Based on information known, yes.

Q. Do you know if the girls were found where they were killed or if they were moved post mortem?

A. Answered previously. Found where they were killed.

Q. Do you know how the murderer was able to gain control of both girls at once?

A. It is believed by manipulation and intimidation factors.
 
JG has responded!! With 20 pages...
11/16/2023
Brief - Respondent
Certificate of Service- Electronically Served 11/16/23
Attorney:
Stake, Christopher S.
Attorney:
Gutwein, Matthew R
Party:
Gull, Frances M. Cutino
File Stamp:
11/16/2023
11/16/2023Record of Proceedings (Original Action)
(Supplemental) Certificate of Service- Electronically Served 11/16/23
Party:
Gull, Frances M. Cutino
File Stamp:
11/16/2023

 
Here are the newly unsealed documents I was inquiring about earlier.
(on reporter Angela Ganote's FB)



I believe it is safe to say RA was being abused and mistreated. Presumably this inmate gained nothing for blowing the whistle on this (or since he feels unsafe himself, maybe he felt if something happened to him it would be on record).

Why would any judge with integrity, refuse to move RA after being alerted/having knowledge of this mistreatment? Why refuse transport even without these letters, even at the suggestion the prisoner was being mistreated? Especially when he hasn’t even had a trial? This screams corruption. JMO.
 
Q. It has been stated in a press conference that “it was all over by 3:30 on Feb 13.” This statement was based on what information?

A. Evidence. I do not recall a specific time though but rather a time line.
I don't have enough confidence in LE to buy into their timeline based on what I know currently.
Q. Has it been determined the girls were killed where they were found?

A. Based on information known, yes.

Q. Do you know if the girls were found where they were killed or if they were moved post mortem?

A. Answered previously. Found where they were killed.

Q. Do you know how the murderer was able to gain control of both girls at once?

A. It is believed by manipulation and intimidation factors.
"In documents later released, an FBI agent noted that pieces of clothing from one of the victims were missing and that it "appeared the girls' bodies were moved and staged." There were no visible signs of a struggle or fight."
 
JG has responded!! With 20 pages...
11/16/2023
Brief - Respondent
Certificate of Service- Electronically Served 11/16/23
Attorney:
Stake, Christopher S.
Attorney:
Gutwein, Matthew R
Party:
Gull, Frances M. Cutino
File Stamp:
11/16/2023
11/16/2023Record of Proceedings (Original Action)
(Supplemental) Certificate of Service- Electronically Served 11/16/23
Party:
Gull, Frances M. Cutino
File Stamp:
11/16/2023


Wow very thorough and professional. What a drastic contrast in writing style to the D’s memo supporting the Frank’s motion, the writer/s of that might consider seeking mentorship from Gutwein. :)
 
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