Donnareit
Verified Victim's Advocate
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I noticed in one of the motion hearings KN and JM did a little dance around why the tire-slashing didn't come up until cross, and I thought it was interesting. There's plenty of discussion around Travis' "having a stalker."
I'm not an attorney, but following this case just leads my mind down all kinds of rabbit trails. So:
In State v Klepas, 40 P.3rd 139 they cite Walton v Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 where the court defined "especially cruel" to include if the victim suffered mental anguish because of his uncertainty of his ultimate fate. In that case the victim was shot in the head then left to expire in the desert. Evidence showed he had been revived and stumbled around for some time before dying. Gun firsters might like to read that one.
From there it follows up to State v Spry 973 P.2nd 783 where stalking was found to be insufficiently delineated, which lead to the Kansas legislature taking up the matter so that:
" In response to our decision in Spry, the legislature passed L.1999, ch. 138, sec. 1 (H.B.2440), which amended K.S.A. 21-4636(f) by adding the following language:
"A finding that the victim was aware of such victim's fate or had conscious pain and suffering as a result of the physical trauma that resulted in the victim's death is not necessary to find that the manner in which the defendant killed the victim was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel. In making a determination that the crime was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner, any of the following conduct by the defendant may be considered sufficient:
(1) Prior stalking of or criminal threats to the victim;
* * * "
And finally a second appeal as regarding statutory language in State v Kleypas, 147 P.3rd 1058 where the death sentence was ultimately upheld.
Arizona doesn't have such specific language, but I can't help but wonder if this case might be following in the Kansas' case footprints?
Just throwing it out there for discussion.
I'm not an attorney, but following this case just leads my mind down all kinds of rabbit trails. So:
In State v Klepas, 40 P.3rd 139 they cite Walton v Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 where the court defined "especially cruel" to include if the victim suffered mental anguish because of his uncertainty of his ultimate fate. In that case the victim was shot in the head then left to expire in the desert. Evidence showed he had been revived and stumbled around for some time before dying. Gun firsters might like to read that one.
From there it follows up to State v Spry 973 P.2nd 783 where stalking was found to be insufficiently delineated, which lead to the Kansas legislature taking up the matter so that:
" In response to our decision in Spry, the legislature passed L.1999, ch. 138, sec. 1 (H.B.2440), which amended K.S.A. 21-4636(f) by adding the following language:
"A finding that the victim was aware of such victim's fate or had conscious pain and suffering as a result of the physical trauma that resulted in the victim's death is not necessary to find that the manner in which the defendant killed the victim was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel. In making a determination that the crime was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner, any of the following conduct by the defendant may be considered sufficient:
(1) Prior stalking of or criminal threats to the victim;
* * * "
And finally a second appeal as regarding statutory language in State v Kleypas, 147 P.3rd 1058 where the death sentence was ultimately upheld.
Arizona doesn't have such specific language, but I can't help but wonder if this case might be following in the Kansas' case footprints?
Just throwing it out there for discussion.
lease:
But this could, in theory, be done. The defense team would then have to take into account the ones that are not asked, of course (due to irrelevance, etc.). They could use handwriting similarities in the notes as a double-check that their list is correct.
