3 At issue in this appeal is whether the alibi defence raised by the accused at trial was properly disclosed to the Crown. As outlined by my colleague, proper disclosure of an alibi has two components: adequacy and timeliness. This principle was recently reiterated in R. v. Letourneau (1994), 1994 CanLII 445 (BC CA), 87 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (B.C.C.A.), where Cumming J.A. wrote for a unanimous court at p. 532:
It is settled law that disclosure of a defence of alibi should meet two requirements:
(a)it should be given in sufficient time to permit the authorities to investigate: see R. v. Mahoney, supra, at p. 387, and R. v. Dunbar and Logan (1982), 68 C.C.C. (2d) 13 at pp. 62-3 ... (Ont. C.A.);
(b)it should be given with sufficient particularity to enable the authorities to meaningfully investigate: see R. v. Ford (1993), 1993 CanLII 843 (BC CA), 78 C.C.C. (3d) 481 at pp. 504-5 ... (B.C.C.A.).
Failure to give notice of alibi does not vitiate the defence, although it may result in a lessening of the weight that the trier of fact will accord it ....
4 As stated above, the consequence of a failure to disclose properly an alibi is that the trier of fact may draw an adverse inference when weighing the alibi evidence heard at trial (Russell v. The King (1936), 67 C.C.C. 28 (S.C.C.), at p. 32). However, improper disclosure can only weaken alibi evidence; it cannot exclude the alibi. My colleague correctly notes that the rule governing diclosure of an alibi is a rule of expediency intended to guard against surprise alibis fabricated in the witness box which the prosecution is almost powerless to challenge. Again as noted by my colleague, the development of the rule since its formulation in Russell shows that the rule has been adapted to conform to Charter norms. As such, disclosure is proper when it allows the prosecution and police to investigate the alibi evidence before trial. The criteria of timeliness and adequacy are thus evaluated on the basis of whether a meaningful investigation could have been undertaken as a result of disclosure. The flexibility of the standard is demonstrated by the fact that neither disclosure at the earliest possible moment, nor disclosure by the accused him- or herself is required in order for the criteria to be met. Third party disclosure is sufficient.