TX - Uvalde; Robb Elementary, 19 children and 3 adults killed, shooter dead, 24 MAY 2022 #3

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Officer 1: "Want to jump the f-----g gate or what?"

Officer 2: "What is the safest way to do this? I'm not trying to get clapped out."

Officer 1: "Me neither"

Officer 2: "I called Mike and knows he's SRT. So, I think they got notified so it will be on their way too. But I know that this is like something needs to be done like ASAP. And I also don't like standing right by the windows where we can get shot, bro."

We also showed them to Ari Jimenez, retired Homeland Security Agent in charge and now trains first responders in critical incident management.

Officer: "You're going to put yourself in danger?"

"We know the day that we take that oath that we put on that badge that gun on our hip we know that we are going to put ourselves in danger," says Ari Jimenez.



 
Officer 1: "Want to jump the f-----g gate or what?"

Officer 2: "What is the safest way to do this? I'm not trying to get clapped out."

Officer 1: "Me neither"

Officer 2: "I called Mike and knows he's SRT. So, I think they got notified so it will be on their way too. But I know that this is like something needs to be done like ASAP. And I also don't like standing right by the windows where we can get shot, bro."

We also showed them to Ari Jimenez, retired Homeland Security Agent in charge and now trains first responders in critical incident management.

Officer: "You're going to put yourself in danger?"

"We know the day that we take that oath that we put on that badge that gun on our hip we know that we are going to put ourselves in danger," says Ari Jimenez.



Gosh this situation was so botched by so many.
 
I predicted PA would be fired long before it happened. He ultimately had the responsibility to either lead or hand off leadership. He did neither.

SM, the DPS leader, said he would go if his agency was proven to have failed. I predict he will resign soon now that one of his officers was fired.

I wish someone who works where multiple LE jurisdictions typically respond would weigh in. How was command supposed to work? If not PA handing off then what ????

In this incident, we have PA & DPS on the scene very early - as in minutes - of when the gunman entered the building. More school officers arrive, local PD arrive & the Border Patrol is on scene as well.

I still believe PA is primarily responsible. He knew exactly what the situation was & made a decision to protect himself instead of the children. He could have told BP or DPS or even the local PD to take command at any time & placed himself on the building perimeter.

I think the question of command handoff is the most important question to answer to be able to prevent failure at other mass casualty events where multiple agencies respond.

The reason this incident continues to roil the survivors and roll heads is very clear in my mind. One simple thing could have ended the killing immediately: command handoff. Officers might have died but more children would have survived. Maybe even the teachers, too.
JMO
 
Let's pull out some of this analysis:

County officials said emergency communications were overwhelmed in the rural community, which typically has only two dispatchers answering 911 calls and juggling the transmission of key information to emergency responders.

....a capable incident commander would have realized that the radios were “mostly ineffective” and that responders needed other means of communication to transmit key details such as calls from victims inside the classrooms. The report highlighted that law enforcement is trained to be “prepared to respond effectively without reliable radio communications” and could employ a series of strategies including using “runners” to deliver messages in person.

....some officers knew early on that the gunman was not barricaded alone in the classroom. More indicators, and clear confirmations, would come soon after — yet for much of the response, they would not be heard.

“If a strong unifying command scene was set up quickly, these discrepancies wouldn’t have been necessarily relevant, and there would have been one voice and one command,” Harrison said of the problems with 911 and radio communication.

My conclusion: Dispatch failure. The main persons able to assess what was happening in classrooms 111/112 & find a way to communicate that was dispatch. We don't have all their communications but DELAY in communicating URGENCY is evident & unacceptable. How do you stay on the phone 20+ minutes with a child & not RED FLAG the situation?

I still say PA is 99.9% responsible for the delay in breaching. He was the one responder who should have had enough situational awareness to know if a gunman is in a classroom, you go in NOW.

Resources were thin (other than number of officers on scene). Radios not working, only 2 dispatchers, failure to use cell phones to improve communication....

It's still appalling and always will be.

OPINIONS ARE MY OWN
 
New Uvalde Superintended one-on-one, network exclusive
* starts around 10:45
 
“He’s compassionate, a high level of integrity, he’s very calm, he’s well-spoken but soft-spoken in a way that comes across as always very authentic and genuine,” Toscano said. “Folks just trust him and have a high regard for him because he’s just a good man, solid character.”
Patterson spent 15 years with East Central ISD, retiring in late 2014, and now lives outside Hondo. He has served as an interim superintendent in at least five school districts around the state since retiring, including Round Rock and nearby D’Hanis ISDs, said Roland Toscano, who has led East Central since replacing him there.
 
Four victims — teacher Eva Mireles and three students — had heartbeats when they were rescued from the adjoining classrooms where they had been trapped with the shooter for more than an hour. All four died that day.

The Uvalde EMS director, speaking publicly for the first time, says ambulances were on the scene within five minutes of the gunman entering the school but instructed to stage more than an hour. "I know we were ready," he said. Over the next hour, many other medics arrived.

The Texas Rangers have asked Dr. Mark Escott, medical director for the Texas Department of Public Safety and chief medical officer for the city of Austin, to look into the injuries of the victims. In a statement, a city spokesperson said Escott will “lead an analysis of the injuries sustained by the Uvalde shooting victims to determine whether there may have been opportunities to save lives had emergency medical care been provided sooner.”

 
Four victims — teacher Eva Mireles and three students — had heartbeats when they were rescued from the adjoining classrooms where they had been trapped with the shooter for more than an hour. All four died that day.

The Uvalde EMS director, speaking publicly for the first time, says ambulances were on the scene within five minutes of the gunman entering the school but instructed to stage more than an hour. "I know we were ready," he said. Over the next hour, many other medics arrived.

The Texas Rangers have asked Dr. Mark Escott, medical director for the Texas Department of Public Safety and chief medical officer for the city of Austin, to look into the injuries of the victims. In a statement, a city spokesperson said Escott will “lead an analysis of the injuries sustained by the Uvalde shooting victims to determine whether there may have been opportunities to save lives had emergency medical care been provided sooner.”

Good. It’s about time!
 
Four victims — teacher Eva Mireles and three students — had heartbeats when they were rescued from the adjoining classrooms where they had been trapped with the shooter for more than an hour. All four died that day.

The Uvalde EMS director, speaking publicly for the first time, says ambulances were on the scene within five minutes of the gunman entering the school but instructed to stage more than an hour. "I know we were ready," he said. Over the next hour, many other medics arrived.

The Texas Rangers have asked Dr. Mark Escott, medical director for the Texas Department of Public Safety and chief medical officer for the city of Austin, to look into the injuries of the victims. In a statement, a city spokesperson said Escott will “lead an analysis of the injuries sustained by the Uvalde shooting victims to determine whether there may have been opportunities to save lives had emergency medical care been provided sooner.”

Wow, that is very significant. It looks like Texas is very seriously considering criminally charging some of the responding officers.
 
State Investigation Fueled Flawed Understanding of Delays During Police Response in Uvalde

The school police chief was singled out for blame, but a Times visual investigation found that scores of trained officers, including those from an elite Border Patrol unit, took many of the same steps.

The available footage shows high-ranking officers, experienced state troopers, police academy instructors — even federal SWAT specialists — came to the same conclusions and were detoured by the same delays the school police chief has been condemned for causing.

But claims by Mr. McCraw that Mr. Arredondo stymied 360 officers with flawed orders or misinformation are not supported by the available footage, which shows little evidence that commands were issued by the school chief, let alone widely communicated.

The available footage shows the D.P.S. timeline — which Mr. McCraw told lawmakers was corroborated by “frame-by-frame” video analysis — miscast Mr. Arredondo’s role and omitted actions, and inaction, by other officers, especially D.P.S. troopers and federal agents, who were involved earlier or more centrally than it notes.

The Times found discrepancies during three phases of the police response.

Mr. McCraw testified that D.P.S. and federal agents arrived too late, saying that by the time they reached the school, Mr. Arredondo had already derailed the response by deciding the gunman was no longer an active shooter.

But this sequence of events conflicts with visual evidence, which indicates several officers, including state and federal agents, arrived in the same time-frame as Mr. Arredondo, also heard gunfire, yet did not confront the gunman despite their active shooter training.

Footage also captures Sgt. Juan Maldonado of D.P.S. standing outside the north entrance at 11:37 a.m., five minutes before the D.P.S. timeline indicates their first agent arrives on scene.

D.P.S. said Mr. Maldonado drove Mr. Ruiz to the school but was omitted from the timeline because he did not enter the building with him and the other officers.

In the footage, Mr. Maldonado, armed with a rifle and wearing a tactical vest, is holding the door open. When Mr. Canales stumbles outside bleeding and says, “We’ve got to get in there,” Mr. Maldonado does not run toward gunfire as active shooter protocol dictates. Instead he says, “D.P.S. is sending people,” and remains outside.

Even with BORTAC in control, and victims calling from classrooms, no immediate assault is launched. Instead, there’s a discussion about tear gas, gas masks and flash bangs, none of which are used.

Meanwhile, footage shows Mr. Arredondo and officers at the south position appear to miss reports about the 911 calls as they fixate on evacuating Room 109, two doors down from the gunman, where the lock is jammed.


there’s much more at the link above…
 
State Investigation Fueled Flawed Understanding of Delays During Police Response in Uvalde

The school police chief was singled out for blame, but a Times visual investigation found that scores of trained officers, including those from an elite Border Patrol unit, took many of the same steps.

The available footage shows high-ranking officers, experienced state troopers, police academy instructors — even federal SWAT specialists — came to the same conclusions and were detoured by the same delays the school police chief has been condemned for causing.

But claims by Mr. McCraw that Mr. Arredondo stymied 360 officers with flawed orders or misinformation are not supported by the available footage, which shows little evidence that commands were issued by the school chief, let alone widely communicated.

The available footage shows the D.P.S. timeline — which Mr. McCraw told lawmakers was corroborated by “frame-by-frame” video analysis — miscast Mr. Arredondo’s role and omitted actions, and inaction, by other officers, especially D.P.S. troopers and federal agents, who were involved earlier or more centrally than it notes.

The Times found discrepancies during three phases of the police response.

Mr. McCraw testified that D.P.S. and federal agents arrived too late, saying that by the time they reached the school, Mr. Arredondo had already derailed the response by deciding the gunman was no longer an active shooter.

But this sequence of events conflicts with visual evidence, which indicates several officers, including state and federal agents, arrived in the same time-frame as Mr. Arredondo, also heard gunfire, yet did not confront the gunman despite their active shooter training.

Footage also captures Sgt. Juan Maldonado of D.P.S. standing outside the north entrance at 11:37 a.m., five minutes before the D.P.S. timeline indicates their first agent arrives on scene.

D.P.S. said Mr. Maldonado drove Mr. Ruiz to the school but was omitted from the timeline because he did not enter the building with him and the other officers.

In the footage, Mr. Maldonado, armed with a rifle and wearing a tactical vest, is holding the door open. When Mr. Canales stumbles outside bleeding and says, “We’ve got to get in there,” Mr. Maldonado does not run toward gunfire as active shooter protocol dictates. Instead he says, “D.P.S. is sending people,” and remains outside.

Even with BORTAC in control, and victims calling from classrooms, no immediate assault is launched. Instead, there’s a discussion about tear gas, gas masks and flash bangs, none of which are used.

Meanwhile, footage shows Mr. Arredondo and officers at the south position appear to miss reports about the 911 calls as they fixate on evacuating Room 109, two doors down from the gunman, where the lock is jammed.


there’s much more at the link above…
Arredondo was the commander on scene that day. No matter who else responded at the same time, the failure to take command or devise a centralized command is his failure.

All of the responders know you don't just run in on your own unless you want to take friendly fire & create more chaos.

I don't think any video review by external parties who have their own built-in biases will give the answers we seek.

The problem to me was diffuse command. They actually had too many responders to effectively set up a central command without PA - whose only job was to protect lives at the school - taking the lead. Certainly a high ranking officer from another agency there could have done so. But I'm not convinced that is a reasonable expectation.

I appreciate analysis but at this point, the most important lesson is for school shooting protocols to make clear when multi jurisdictions are likely to respond just how command will be established.

Let's consolidate the findings into recommendations that will prevent or better triage the next incident like this. And do that quickly. Because another mass shooting at a Texas school is coming. And the ultimate lesson here is being debated while the clock ticks.

Police are trained to follow command for very good reasons. To expect them to suddenly abandon that training and go rogue is unrealistic and dangerous in dynamic situations.

It cost lives this time. Shouldn't the focus be on reducing the potential for casualties in future events, not in continual finger pointing and blame?

ACTION to ensure response protocols are laser focused on what we know was missing in Uvalde is the only thing that will make the future better.

You can fire every responder on campus that day but it will not enact the change needed.

JMVHO
 
Arredondo was the commander on scene that day. No matter who else responded at the same time, the failure to take command or devise a centralized command is his failure.

All of the responders know you don't just run in on your own unless you want to take friendly fire & create more chaos.

I don't think any video review by external parties who have their own built-in biases will give the answers we seek.

The problem to me was diffuse command. They actually had too many responders to effectively set up a central command without PA - whose only job was to protect lives at the school - taking the lead. Certainly a high ranking officer from another agency there could have done so. But I'm not convinced that is a reasonable expectation.

I appreciate analysis but at this point, the most important lesson is for school shooting protocols to make clear when multi jurisdictions are likely to respond just how command will be established.

Let's consolidate the findings into recommendations that will prevent or better triage the next incident like this. And do that quickly. Because another mass shooting at a Texas school is coming. And the ultimate lesson here is being debated while the clock ticks.

Police are trained to follow command for very good reasons. To expect them to suddenly abandon that training and go rogue is unrealistic and dangerous in dynamic situations.

It cost lives this time. Shouldn't the focus be on reducing the potential for casualties in future events, not in continual finger pointing and blame?

ACTION to ensure response protocols are laser focused on what we know was missing in Uvalde is the only thing that will make the future better.

You can fire every responder on campus that day but it will not enact the change needed.

JMVHO
Oh, I totally agree. I just thought I’d share.
 

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