When I viewed the 77-minute video (in 20-minute increments), I was unable to locate and/or identify Chief PA in the entire video!
I suspect during the first 20-minutes, he was standing under the surveillance camera out of view (probably directly behind the "corner wall huggers" at the entrance to the corridor of the subject classroom wing.
We know that Chief PA could not communicate with the later arriving, better trained and equipped officers outside the building because he intentionally left his two police radios behind -- believing they would physically impede his movement.
From the hallway surveillance video, during the first 12-15 minutes when only two officers physically responded to and continued to rush towards the gunfire (beige officer and tall, Uvalde uniform officer), Chief PA could have at any time directed one or more of the corner huggers to go outside and inform one of the better-qualified arriving officers outside the school building to take over as incident commander. At that time, the new incident commander would have quickly known Chief PA's decision of a barricaded shooter was incorrect and could have overruled the Chief's plan which was wasting precious time. (Personally, I can't see the Chief ever relinquishing IC-- he wanted this feather, until he didn't).
I also believe if no other officers responded to Robb Elementary except for the beige officer and the Uvalde uniform cop, both would have likely perished in the first 10 minutes but not before taking down the gunman. And 67 minutes could have been devoted to saving the lives of the injured that likely bled out. MOO
From the link:
The report listed several ways that an
effective incident commander outside the school might have helped: The commander might have noticed that
radios weren’t working well and found a better way to communicate. They might have found a
master key to the school faster to get inside the classroom where the shooter was barricaded — or suggested checking to make sure the door was locked. Or they might have urged officers to find another way to get inside the classroom.
But
Arredondo told The Texas Tribune in June that he did not consider himself the incident commander after he was one of the first officers to arrive inside the school. He said he assumed another officer outside would fill that role.
The
committee did not find this argument persuasive. It cited the school district’s active shooter response plan, co-authored by Arredondo, which states the chief will “become the person in control of the efforts of all law enforcement and first responders that arrive at the scene.” The school district last month placed him on administrative leave.
But blame for the flawed police response extends far beyond the school district police chief of a six-officer department, the report concludes.
The report criticized other officers and law enforcement agencies, many of them better trained, for failing to fill the leadership vacuum left by Arredondo’s inaction.
“In this crisis, no responder seized the initiative to establish an incident command post,” the committee wrote. “Despite an obvious atmosphere of chaos, the ranking officers of other responding agencies did not approach the Uvalde CISD chief of police or anyone else perceived to be in command to point out the lack of and need for a command post, or to offer that specific assistance.”