Yes. DA Stanley is indeed not cut for the political arena!
And knowing the baby decision by Judge Kaitlin Turner falls on the heels of Turner reducing the first degree charges of the son (J Tippet) who confessed he murdered his father, to second degree murder-- within only weeks following his arrest, for late discovery, it becomes all so obvious.
To be clear, Tippet's sanction was levied even before the preliminary hearing where there was no prejudice to the defendant!
In other words, Turner used her discretion to impose the most severe sanction available -- let a first degree killer off, seemingly, to deter future discovery violations by the DA's office!
To quote CO Supreme Court Justice Samour:
I worry about the optics of that sanction under the circumstances in which it was imposed. And I worry about the precedent today’s decision may inadvertently set.
IMO, as should the public be worried.
Just as
@mrjitty documented the discovery violation allegations on BM's case were not as IE and MSN reported, anybody who reads beyond the headlines knows what happened with the baby killer too.
In the Tippet decision, three dissenting Supreme Court Justices (Boatright, Marquez, Samour) were so taken back at the Magistrates action to impose a sever sanction for a case that was clearly in it's infancy, that they wrote 10 pages saying as much, and titled it
"the rest of the story."
Personally, I very much appreciated that these Justices also took the opportunity to similarly throw professional shade at the
decision to strike an expert as sanctions.
From 2023 CO 61:
They [Turner] were looking for an opportunity to impose a severe sanction.
Having sat on a trial court for many years, I understand their frustration. But that doesn’t justify the severe sanction handed out here, which seems capricious and forced.
¶91 I worry about the optics of that sanction under the circumstances in which it was imposed. And I worry about the precedent today’s decision may inadvertently set.
Because there was no finding that the prosecution failed to comply with the March 29 deadline, the charge of murder in the first degree should not have been reduced. This is especially so given that defense counsel didn’t actively advocate for a sanction on March 29; instead, he left the matter in the court’s discretion, explaining that he finally had all the discovery covered by Crim. P. 16, that he and the prosecutor had just had a very productive conversation about the case, and that he was feeling optimistic about how the case would proceed moving forward.
Why the magistrate didn’t simply vacate the placeholder sanctions hearing at that point in time is not clear from the record.
¶92 The severe sanction imposed here was particularly improper given that this case is in its infancy. As the district court judge herself recognizes in the brief before us, our cases approving severe sanctions deal with late-breaking violations—whether shortly before trial or during trial—that are very prejudicial to the defendant.
Contrary to the district court judge’s contention, our legal framework doesn’t “overlook[] early-stage discovery obligations.” Rather, we haven’t seen fit to affirm severe sanctions for violations of early discovery obligations because such violations are generally not prejudicial to a defendant.
¶93 Our jurisprudence makes clear that a severe sanction like reduction of charges should rarely be imposed—and should be imposed only when absolutely necessary. See People v. Dist. Ct., 793 P.2d 163, 168 (Colo. 1990) (“When a party violates Rule 16, we believe the court should impose the least severe sanction that will ensure that there is full compliance with the court’s discovery orders.”); People v. Roan, 685 P.2d 1369, 1371 (Colo. 1984) (comparing “reduction of the charges” to “dismissal,” stating that it is a “drastic” sanction, and holding that it was “more severe than was necessary”); Kallas v. Spinozzi, 2014 COA 164, ¶¶ 16, 37, 342 P.3d 607, 610, 613 (noting that a “severe sanction,” such as “striking [an] expert,” should only be imposed in “rare cases with extreme circumstances”).
This type of sanction, while aimed at the District Attorney’s Office, actually punishes the victims—unfairly so—because it robs them of their right to seek justice for the alleged crime. It also stymies the mission of our criminal justice system to hold accountable those who commit crimes. Inasmuch as the prosecution obviously believes that Tippet committed the crime of murder in the first degree, he ought to stand charged of murder in the first degree. He shouldn’t get a freebie by having the charge lowered to murder in the second degree, especially when the District Attorney’s Office appears to have complied with the final discovery deadline imposed by the magistrate.
¶94 Don’t get me wrong—sanctions have a place in our criminal justice system, including for discovery violations. But here, the magistrate told the prosecution that it had until March 29 to comply with its discovery obligations or sanctions could be imposed, and the prosecution appears to have met that deadline. Therefore, it was clearly an abuse of discretion for the court to impose sanctions.
¶95 This sanction was utterly unjust. I therefore respectfully dissent.
¶96 “And now you know the rest of the story.” I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE BOATRIGHT and JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ join in this dissent.
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