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Because of several recent discussions, I looked into some of the statutes that dealt with the True Bills that had been returned by the Ramsey Grand Jury. I really thought I had found something that would make both of the charges not subject to the Statute of Limitations as has been widely reported in the press. This relates to a discussion on another thread where we talked about complicity. So I decided to ask a friend of mine who is an attorney. Here is what I wrote as I interpreted what I had found on Count VII [Ill address the other True Bill (Count IV), and other issues in later posts.]:
The answer I got tells me that I was confusing the two distinctly different concepts of the word Accomplice as opposed to Accessory. Here is the explanation I received:[FONT="](For reference):[/FONT]
COUNT VII (Accessory to a Crime)There are two possibilities on why the Grand Jury charged each of the Ramseys as accessories and neither as the principal: (1) They couldnt figure out which parent actually committed the act which caused the childs death and decided to leave it to the courts to decide, or (2) the person who actually committed the act which caused her death was unable to be charged.
On or about December 25, and December 26, 1996 in Boulder County, Colorado, John Bennett Ramsey (or alternately, Patricia Paugh Ramsey) did unlawfully, knowingly and feloniously render assistance to a person, with intent to hinder, delay and prevent the discovery, detention, apprehension, prosecution, conviction and punishment of such person for the commission of a crime, knowing the person being assisted has committed and was suspected of the crime of Murder in the First Degree and Child Abuse Resulting in Death.
If the reason is the first, it wouldnt matter who the principal was, because of the concept of complicity as defined in C.R.S. 18-1-603. Essentially that statute states that complicity constitutes guilt of the crime committed. Selected quotes from that statute:Complicity is merely a theory by which a defendant becomes accountable for a criminal offense committed by another. People v. Thompson, 655 P.2d 416 (Colo. 1982); People v. Thurman, 948 P.2d 69 (Colo. App. 1997); People v. Medina, 72 P.3d 405 (Colo. App. 2003).So if the Ramsey Grand Jury thought that one of the Ramsey parents committed the act that caused death and the other was only accessory, it would not be necessary to prove which parent was the principal -- they are each individually held responsible for the death (regardless of intent) with the aggravating crime of Child Abuse Resulting in Death. Therefore this true bill would be for murder in the first degree.
No fine or imprisonment may be imposed for complicity since it is merely a theory of law by which a defendant becomes accountable for a criminal offense committed through the conduct of another, the punishment is imposed for the underlying crime and not for complicity. People v. R.V., 635 P.2d 892 (Colo. 1981).
The acts of the principal are the acts of the accessory, and the accessory may be charged and punished accordingly as a principal. Oaks v. People, 161 Colo. 561, 424 P.2d 115 (1967).
A person who aids, abets, or assists in the perpetration of a criminal offense becomes an accessory to that offense and is chargeable and punishable as a principal. Reed v. People, 171 Colo. 421, 467 P.2d 809 (1970).
An accessory who stands by and aids in the perpetration of a crime may properly be charged as a principal. McGregor v. People, 176 Colo. 309, 490 P.2d 287 (1971).
An accessory charged as a principal for an accessory is deemed and considered a principal, punishable as a principal, and plainly shall be charged as a principal. Fernandez v. People, 176 Colo. 346, 490 P.2d 690 (1971).
In the case of codefendants it is unnecessary to characterize and classify the specific acts of the principal and the accessory. McGregor v. People, 176 Colo. 309, 490 P.2d 287 (1971).
It is ultimately the jury's responsibility to determine the specific role a defendant plays. People v. Scheidt, 182 Colo. 374, 513 P.2d 446 (1973).
The second possibility of the Grand Jurys reasoning could be that they felt another third party was responsible for the act which caused her death, and that individual could not be held criminally responsible. However, the Ramsey parents would still be held ultimately responsible. Obviously, we are speaking here about the possibility that their son Burke committed the act which caused his sisters death. Since at the time of the crime, he was 9 years old, in the eyes of Colorado law he was incapable of forming criminal intent. However, that does not mean that an adult who acts as an accessory cannot be charged. Applicable Annotations from C.R.S. 18-1-801 (Insufficient age) state the following:Although a child under the age of 10 cannot be charged with an offense, it does not necessarily follow that the child cannot violate the law. In enacting the statute, the general assembly determined those persons who could be held responsible for their criminal acts, not that such persons could not commit the acts. People v. Miller, 830 P.2d 1092, (Colo. App. 1991).The reference to People v. Miller, 830 P.2d 1092 (http://www.leagle.com/decision/19911922830P2d1092_11896.xml/PEOPLE v. MILLER) was from a case in which a parent appealed her conviction of Contributing the Delinquency of a Minor because the child was too young to be charged with a crime (theft). No doubt you know this case, but Ill briefly describe it. From that Appeals Court opinion:
Miller first contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion for judgment of acquittal on the charge of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. She asserts that her eight-year-old son was not charged with theft because a child under the age of ten cannot be charged and convicted of any offense. Section 18-1-801, C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8B). Thus, according to Miller, since it was impossible for her son to violate any state law, she cannot be found guilty of contributing to the delinquency of a minor.The Appeals Courts decision states:
Here, the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous. The General Assembly is concerned with adults who encourage children under eighteen to commit crimes. The statute does not require that the minor be charged or convicted of a crime nor does it require the minor to be over the age of ten.And in C.R.S. 18-6-701 (Contributing to the delinquency of a minor), Annotations, it states:
Further, Miller's reliance on § 18-1-801 is misplaced. Although a child under the age of ten cannot be charged with an offense, it does not necessarily follow that the child cannot violate the law. Rather, in enacting § 18-1-801, the General Assembly determined those persons who could be held responsible for their criminal acts. It did not determine that such persons could not commit the acts themselves. Cf. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 108 S.Ct. 2687, 101 L.Ed.2d 702 (1988). We therefore conclude that even though Miller's son was only eight years old at the time of her offense, Miller could be found guilty of contributing to the delinquency of a minor.
An adult may be charged with violating this statute regardless of whether the minor was actually charged with or convicted of a crime or whether the minor was old enough to be charged with or convicted of a crime. People v. Miller, 830 P.2d 1092 (Colo. App. 1991).This all indicates to me that, if the Grand Jury believed Burke was the person actually responsible for the act which caused JonBenets death, as accessories to the crime, both John and Patsy Ramsey could be charged with murder in the first degree.
So either way, whoever it is that the Grand Jury felt committed the act which caused her death (whether the principal was the other parent, or it was Burke, a minor), Count VII (Accessory to a Crime) is still murder in the first degree.
C.R.S. 18-3-102 (Murder in the first degree) states:(1) A person commits the crime of murder in the first degree if:Please let me know if you agree or if I am missing something that makes my conclusions wrong. It seems to me that both true bill counts IV(a) and VII are actually for first degree murder and therefore have no statute of limitation. C.R.S. 18-6-401.1 (Child abuse - limitation for commencing proceedings - evidence - statutory privilege) defines lesser degrees of Child Abuse which would limit prosecution to ten and five years after commission of the offense. But those lesser degrees are specifically defined and would not apply in cases where death or injury results.
(b) Acting either alone or with one or more persons, he or she commits or attempts to commit arson, robbery, burglary, kidnapping, sexual assault as prohibited by section 18-3-402, sexual assault in the first or second degree as prohibited by section 18-3-402 or 18-3-403 as those sections existed prior to July 1, 2000, or a class 3 felony for sexual assault on a child as provided in section 18-3-405 (2), or the crime of escape as provided in section 18-8-208, and, in the course of or in furtherance of the crime that he or she is committing or attempting to commit, or of immediate flight therefrom, the death of a person, other than one of the participants, is caused by anyone;
Ill address the other True Bill (Count IV) in another post when I get a more detailed explanation. But there is one more piece of information I did get that was in response to this question of mine:The law of complicity is as you say, that the accomplice is guilty of the same crime as the principal.
In the old common-law language of the law of crimes, those who contributed to the commission of a crime ("aiders and abettors") were called accessories before the fact. Aiding and abetting included (and still does) not only material aid, but help with planning a crime or even mere encouragement of the crime. There were varieties of accessories before the fact, depending on whether they were present at the scene of the crime or not, but today these distinctions are unimportant and we treat them all as accomplices, whose guilt is equal to that of the principal. (There may be a few occasions, unimportant here, when the accomplice and the principal are guilty of different degrees of the crime, but no matter for our purposes).
But the GJ did not charge John and Patsy as accomplices to the actual killing. They are charged instead as accessories after the fact. (In Colorado this crime is called simply Accessory to Crime; the statute is CRS 18-8-105; you will see that its language matches the language of those counts of the indictment.) This is different from complicity, and carries different (and milder) penalties from the principal's crime. Being an accessory after the fact requires helping the principal criminal escape, or hide, or evade prosecution things that happen after the crime is committed. Now if someone promises to provide these after-the-fact services with knowledge of the crime that is planned, then they may be accomplices (or in the old term, accessories before the fact), because by promising their post-crime aid they have contributed to the planning of the crime, or encouraged it. So the charge of accessory after the fact suggests that (the GJ believed) those who were charged with it (John and Patsy) had no advance knowledge that the crime was going to be committed, but once they learned of it, they took steps to protect the criminal from detection, prosecution, and conviction. Since it is unthinkable to me that the Ramseys would have done such a thing for a stranger or intruder, or indeed for anyone except their other child, I conclude that the GJ believed that the criminal whom the two adults took steps to protect was Burke.
Interestingly, the GJ says that the crime to which J&P were accessories after the fact was murder in the first degree. Putting aside highly unlikely forms of first-degree murder, I believe this means the GJ believed that the crime was either deliberate (planned) by Burke, or that it occurred while Burke was sexually assaulting his sister. (The latter seems to me much more likely.) Felony-murder (that is, killing while in the course of committing a felony) is first-degree murder in Colorado. There are a few felonies other than sexual assault that would support a felony-murder charge in theory (burglary, robbery), but none of them fits the facts as we (think we) understand them.
Since Alex Hunter chose to not sign and process the true bills in open court having them dismissed due to a lack of evidence (in his opinion), this leaves open the possibility that any current or future District Attorney could still pursue the charges that were presented by the Grand Jury. Correct?
You are correct, however, that nothing in the procedural history of this matter prevents the current DA from charging John Ramsey with murder, which has no limitation period. I believe Stan Garnett simply thinks there is not enough evidence to convict and thinks a trial would not be a good use of his office's resources, but of course I have no access to his reasons or his thinking process.