Sorry for the long post, but I found this regarding the insanity defense in a Virginia case:
respectfully snipped from:
http://www.courts.state.va.us/opinions/opncavtx/1553974.txt
And Bolded By Me (BBM)
"Instructions on insanity, as other instructions, must be supported by more than a mere scintilla of evidence."
Gibson v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 412, 417, 219 S.E.2d 845, 849 (1975). In determining whether evidence amounts to more than a scintilla, "we must look at the evidence in the light most favorable to [appellant]."
Foster v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 380, 383, 412 S.E.2d 198, 200 (1991).
"[T]he actual M'Naghten test for insanity, stated in the disjunctive, is the rule in Virginia." Price v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 452, 459, 323 S.E.2d 106, 110 (1984). Under the M'Naghten rule,
"it must be clearly proven that, at the time
of the committing of the act, the party
accused was labouring [sic] under such a
defect of reason, from disease of the mind,
as not to know the nature and quality of the
act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that
he did not know he was doing what was wrong."
[ citations ommitted ]
The two facets of the M'Naghten test are the "nature-of-the-act test and right-wrong test," and both facets require a showing of a disease of the mind.
Johnson v. Insurance Co. of North America, 232 Va. 340, 347, 350 S.E.2d 616, 620 (1986). In Price, the Supreme Court of Virginia explained
the application of both facets of the test:
"The first portion of M'Naghten relates to an
accused who is psychotic to an extreme
degree. It assumes an accused who, because
of mental disease, did not know the nature
and quality of his act; he simply did not
know what he was doing. For example, in
crushing the skull of a human being with an
iron bar, he believed that he was smashing a
glass jar. The latter portion of M'Naghten
relates to an accused who knew the nature and
quality of his act. He knew what he was
doing; he knew that he was crushing the skull
of a human being with an iron bar. However,
because of mental disease, he did not know
that what he was doing was wrong. He
believed, for example, that he was carrying
out a command from God."
[citations omitted]
In
Breard v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 68, 84, 445 S.E.2d 670, 679 (1994), the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the phrase "because of mental
disease" is properly included in an insanity jury instruction.
In Virginia, the irresistible impulse defense is available
"where the accused's mind has become 'so impaired by disease that
he is totally deprived of the mental power to control or restrain
his act.'"
Godley v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 249, 251, 343
S.E.2d 368, 370 (1986) (quoting Thompson, 193 Va. at 716, 70
S.E.2d at 292).
Irresistible impulse "'is to be distinguishable from mere passion or overwhelming emotion not growing out of, and connected with, a disease of the mind.'" Thompson, 193 Va. at 717, 70 S.E.2d at 291-92 (quoting 14 Am. Jur. Criminal Law 35, at 793); see also Breard, 248 Va. at 83, 445 S.E.2d at 679 (citing Thompson, 193 Va. at 717, 70 S.E.2d at 291-92) (holding that the diseased mind requirement is properly included in an
"irresistible impulse" jury instruction). In order to prove irresistible impulse, a defendant must show that although understanding his or her actions, the defendant was unable, due to a disease of the mind, to control or restrain these actions. See Thompson, 193 Va. at 718, 70 S.E.2d at 292.
Because both the irresistible impulse test and the M'Naghten
test require a showing of a disease of the mind, a defendant must
present more than a scintilla of evidence of a mental disease in
order to receive a jury instruction. See Gibson, 216 Va. at 417,
219 S.E.2d at 849.
Although lay testimony may support a plea of
insanity, "it is generally recognized that it is advisable to
adduce expert testimony to better
resolve such a complex
problem." Shifflett v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 760, 769, 274
S.E.2d 305, 311 (1981) (citing Alexander v. United States, 380
F.2d 33, 39 (8th Cir. 1967)).