Titanic tourist sub goes missing in Atlantic Ocean, June 2023 #4

[I am not Sherlock H.]

I've been listening to today's testimony.

The first witness was Guillermo Sohnlein, the co-founder who left in 2013. Mostly his testimony was a lot of self-justification and claims about the value of OceanGate's mission. Nothing of any real value.

Second was Roy Thomas, a naval engineer who works for ABS, one of the classification agencies. I was very impressed with him. He did a presentation on submersibles and went through the issues with building one with carbon fiber. He obviously knew this stuff backwards and forwards. He was able to recite all kinds of scientific details just from memory.

Third was Phil Brooks, the former OceanGate Director of Engineering. He joined OG with a degree in computer science and no previous experience in marine engineering. He was involved in building the acoustic monitoring system, but it's clear that he had no idea how to interpret the sounds, and basically relied on what Rush told him. Nor did he know anything about sub building, a stark contrast from the previous witness. He told a ridiculous story about snapping a mechanical pencil to test the viability of the carbon fiber acoustic monitoring.

I think Brooks was basically Stockton Rush's patsy. It kind of reminds me of Hannah-Gutierrez Reed, the armorer for Rust. The production team just needed someone to fill the armorer role to tick a box, and they didn't care if she was competent. Same here, with the Director of Engineering role.

Yikes @ch_13 …. that is amazing. And portions of it frightening perhaps IMO? In light of the context of deep sea exploration in crafts constructed from differing and dissimilar materials. And in particular this piece:

“He told a ridiculous story about snapping a mechanical pencil to test the viability of the carbon fiber acoustic monitoring.”

Qualifying that I am not current or familiar in the field now days but have some chemistry background and industrial experience. I strongly expect that any processing and heating temperatures, times, duration, and cycling of them is quite different for a mechanical pencil lead - contrasted with synthetic carbon fiber (produced from polyacrylonitrile (PAN) fiber).

A quick search comparison shows IMO considerable differences likely between their conditioning and processing. Just as in the far reaches of space exploration one would expect to utilize carefully controlled, monitored, and reproducible quality control and specification conditions. The same should apply at the depths of the sea IMO. MOO

 

[iamshadow21]

OceanGate’s submarine relied on ‘idiotic’ Excel spreadsheet

Former employees tell hearing into sub’s implosion last year that they raised safety concerns

www.independent.co.uk

 

[MsMarple]

OceanGate’s submarine relied on ‘idiotic’ Excel spreadsheet

Former employees tell hearing into sub’s implosion last year that they raised safety concerns

www.independent.co.uk

The equipment listed in my post upthread was capable of automatically tracking Titan’s position— with the right software on board. Sheesh. Another shortcut to save money?

 

[I am not Sherlock H.]

CNN September 24, 2024 online article by Dakin Andone and Graham Hurley entitled ‘OceanGate asked workers to forego paychecks, former employees tell investigators probing Titan implosion’.

Of note in the article; per the title OceanGate asked employees to forgo pay at the beginning of 2023 apparently due to financial difficulties. Also paying passengers were supposedly called ‘mission specialists’; some see that IIUC as a means to circumvent US maritime regulations that would apply to passengers. MOO

https://www.cnn.com/2024/09/24/us/oceangate-employee-paychecks-titan-submersible/index.html

 

[ch_13]

Watching the presentation from the NTSB materials science specialist was a giant yikes.

• The carbon fiber was unevenly applied and there was visible waviness, wrinkles, porosity and voids, and the resulting "layers" had obvious weak points
• OceanGate had to sand down the ends of the hull in order to make them fit into the titanium rings (which were originally built for the first sub and were slightly too small for the second one)
• At least three of the acoustic sensors weren't working (it seems no one at OceanGate realized it)
• The event on dive 80 that caused the loud bang had a permanent effect on the hull's operating characteristics, which is apparent from looking at the strain gauges (which apparently no one at OceanGate ever did)
• OceanGate was mis-plotting the strain data, looking at strain vs time instead of strain changes vs depth, which would have given a much clearer indication of what was happening to the hull
• The hull delaminated into three layers when it imploded -- see the image in the below slide, you can see how the layers are lying separately on the ocean floor.

For me, one of the surprising things to come out of these hearings is that the monitoring systems that had been installed on the Titan had provided warnings that the hull was failing. Previously, I had been under the impression that the implosion was completely unforeseen.

OceanGate had plenty of opportunities to investigate and remediate the issues, but they either ignored or did not understand the data they were collecting.

 

[I am not Sherlock H.]

Watching the presentation from the NTSB materials science specialist was a giant yikes.

• The carbon fiber was unevenly applied and there was visible waviness, wrinkles, porosity and voids, and the resulting "layers" had obvious weak points
• OceanGate had to sand down the ends of the hull in order to make them fit into the titanium rings (which were originally built for the first sub and were slightly too small for the second one)
• At least three of the acoustic sensors weren't working (it seems no one at OceanGate realized it)
• The event on dive 80 that caused the loud bang had a permanent effect on the hull's operating characteristics, which is apparent from looking at the strain gauges (which apparently no one at OceanGate ever did)
• OceanGate was mis-plotting the strain data, looking at strain vs time instead of strain changes vs depth, which would have given a much clearer indication of what was happening to the hull
• The hull delaminated into three layers when it imploded -- see the image in the below slide, you can see how the layers are lying separately on the ocean floor.

View attachment 533337


For me, one of the surprising things to come out of these hearings is that the monitoring systems that had been installed on the Titan had provided warnings that the hull was failing. Previously, I had been under the impression that the implosion was completely unforeseen.

OceanGate had plenty of opportunities to investigate and remediate the issues, but they either ignored or did not understand the data they were collecting.

Yikes @ch_13 !!!! I feared something like that with respect to the carbon fiber and its use here. Not to mention use of dissimilar materials and the need to attach them securely and soundly. IIUC, with carbon fiber layups, laminates, and windings…. there can be concern including with processing, voids, whether the material is fully saturated with the curing compounds and uniform and proper cure and orientation of the layup materials. IIRC epoxies are often used. And not to mention if the quality control with the carbon fiber itself (produced from PAN (polyacrylonitrile)) is not properly specified and prepared. There are a lot of variables. IIUC some large winding applications can utilize large automated cylindrical winding apparatus.

I believe there are reports of some difficulties even with aeronautical use of carbon fiber and difficulties in monitoring integrity, stress, cracks, voids, defects etc. in aircraft ongoing use. Non destructive methods are usually needed. Paint and other component additions, drilling, and fasteners also complicate analysis and evaluation. One also has to consider the tensile and sheer strength, etc. of the materials and the cured material. Use over time and exposure to heat, cold, pressure, stresses, etc. need to be assessed. Below are a couple of links on the subject.

It is most unfortunate the case of this submersible seems to have arrived at this conclusion IMO. I am not an engineer, yet looking at some of the pictures of the imploded pieces on the ocean floor…… the outer shell or skin….. that sure IMO seemed rather thin. Perhaps it was simply more of a decorative covering…. but I suspect that would not be the case. MOO

NASA Technology Transfer Program online article entitled ‘Manufacturing
System for In-situ Defect Detection in Composites During Cure (LAR-TOPS-327)’:

System for In-situ Defect Detection in Composites During Cure | T2 Portal

technology.nasa.gov

Zetec, Inc. online article on Non Destructive Testing (NDT) of carbon fiber entitled ‘Understanding NDT of Carbon Fiber’:

Understanding NDT of Carbon Fiber | Zetec

Advanced NDT techniques for testing carbon fiber allow analysts to detect internal cracking and other flaws with impressive efficiency and precision.

www.zetec.com

 

[LinasK]

Watching the presentation from the NTSB materials science specialist was a giant yikes.

• The carbon fiber was unevenly applied and there was visible waviness, wrinkles, porosity and voids, and the resulting "layers" had obvious weak points
• OceanGate had to sand down the ends of the hull in order to make them fit into the titanium rings (which were originally built for the first sub and were slightly too small for the second one)
• At least three of the acoustic sensors weren't working (it seems no one at OceanGate realized it)
• The event on dive 80 that caused the loud bang had a permanent effect on the hull's operating characteristics, which is apparent from looking at the strain gauges (which apparently no one at OceanGate ever did)
• OceanGate was mis-plotting the strain data, looking at strain vs time instead of strain changes vs depth, which would have given a much clearer indication of what was happening to the hull
• The hull delaminated into three layers when it imploded -- see the image in the below slide, you can see how the layers are lying separately on the ocean floor.

View attachment 533337


For me, one of the surprising things to come out of these hearings is that the monitoring systems that had been installed on the Titan had provided warnings that the hull was failing. Previously, I had been under the impression that the implosion was completely unforeseen.

OceanGate had plenty of opportunities to investigate and remediate the issues, but they either ignored or did not understand the data they were collecting.

Rush knew. He ignored anything negative that was warned to him about the craft. I doubt the Pakistani father and son knew the risks.

 

[IceIce9]

"It's worse than I thought," retired Navy Capt. Alfred Scott McLaren, a former submarine commander, tells PEOPLE.


“There's all kinds of things here that would alarm the hell out of you. Anybody that was an experienced submersible pilot or submariner like myself ... I don't even know where to start," adds the 92-year-old president emeritus of The Explorers Club, which lost two members — Hamish Hardingand Paul-Henri Nargeolet — as a result of the implosion during the Titan's final dive.

Titanic Lovers and Deep-Sea Divers React to Titan Implosion Revelations with Alarm: 'Worse Than I Thought' (Exclusive)

As new details and revelations continue to emerge from the U.S. Coast Guard’s ongoing investigation into the Titan tragedy, experts within the deep-sea diving community are reacting with concern — and even outrage

people.com

 

[IceIce9]

Also from the above linked article:

G. Michael Harris, an explorer who has led dives to the Titanic 17 times, suggested to PEOPLE that the hearing has been “so damn disturbing” because it underlines how so many members of the community told Rush the his company’s plan for diving — described as cutting-edge but, since the implosion, intensely scrutinized — “made no sense."

“I told Stockton, ‘You want to kill yourself, knock yourself out, but don't take anybody with you.’ His answer to me was, ‘Well, Mike, I've been down to the Titanic twice already.’ And I said, 'Well, great. A broken clock is right twice a day as well,' ” says Harris, 60, the founder and former CEO of RMS Titanic Inc., which has led numerous research and recovery expeditions to the shipwreck.


“He called me an old gray-haired man. He had young, young guys. I said, 'You know what you call an old gray-haired man with 35 years experience? Experienced,' " Harris adds, noting that the conversation ended when Rush hung up on him.

 

[rockthecasbah]

Also from the above linked article:

G. Michael Harris, an explorer who has led dives to the Titanic 17 times, suggested to PEOPLE that the hearing has been “so damn disturbing” because it underlines how so many members of the community told Rush the his company’s plan for diving — described as cutting-edge but, since the implosion, intensely scrutinized — “made no sense."

“I told Stockton, ‘You want to kill yourself, knock yourself out, but don't take anybody with you.’ His answer to me was, ‘Well, Mike, I've been down to the Titanic twice already.’ And I said, 'Well, great. A broken clock is right twice a day as well,' ” says Harris, 60, the founder and former CEO of RMS Titanic Inc., which has led numerous research and recovery expeditions to the shipwreck.


“He called me an old gray-haired man. He had young, young guys. I said, 'You know what you call an old gray-haired man with 35 years experience? Experienced,' " Harris adds, noting that the conversation ended when Rush hung up on him.

I'm increasingly surprised that it did any successful dives at all

 

[I am not Sherlock H.]

CNN online September 27, 2024 article by Caroline Jaime entitled ‘Former OceanGate employee testifies CEO said he would ‘buy a congressman’ if the Coast Guard blocked Titan expedition’:

https://www.cnn.com/2024/09/27/us/former-oceangate-employee-titan-submersible-hearing/index.html

After reading that, and reflecting on the details on this thread, my hope is that any estates and individuals that have cause can recover any monies or materials or property remaining of OceanGate or monies owed them (if any exists). And to effectively shut down and close any last remaining operations of it. I’ve not attempted to see if any patents are held by the firm, but would have to question them if such exists.

It is hard not to conclude that unfortunately it seems to have been run with a rather cavalier and unbridled management that did not adequately address the risks faced by its creations IMO. MOO

 

[Charlot123]

Yikes @ch_13 …. that is amazing. And portions of it frightening perhaps IMO? In light of the context of deep sea exploration in crafts constructed from differing and dissimilar materials. And in particular this piece:

“He told a ridiculous story about snapping a mechanical pencil to test the viability of the carbon fiber acoustic monitoring.”

Qualifying that I am not current or familiar in the field now days but have some chemistry background and industrial experience. I strongly expect that any processing and heating temperatures, times, duration, and cycling of them is quite different for a mechanical pencil lead - contrasted with synthetic carbon fiber (produced from polyacrylonitrile (PAN) fiber).

A quick search comparison shows IMO considerable differences likely between their conditioning and processing. Just as in the far reaches of space exploration one would expect to utilize carefully controlled, monitored, and reproducible quality control and specification conditions. The same should apply at the depths of the sea IMO. MOO

That’s so odd. Did he mean, the qualities of graphite in pencils can represent all carbons? Why not use diamonds then/s?

I have a feeling that instead of having AP classes, we have to bring core curriculum in middle and high school. Like, language, math, chemistry, physics, biology, geography. Otherwise one can skip physics or chemistry in school and in college, get a degree in computer science and think he can work as an engineer. Having no clue about such things as crystalline lattice vs amorphous structures, which is probably chemistry 101.

This is just plain odd. I always thought Stockton’s main problem was hubris. Now I think that the hubris was on top, and the underlying factor was profound lack of systematic education. Or maybe, inability to understand things?

JMO. I don’t care how the lawsuit ends. I think that someone in education area should make conclusions, though. I understand that Princeton owed Stocktons. But I am starting to think that Stockton Rush was not accepted into an astronautical program and would have not made a pilot for an obvious reason: both professions carry a lot of responsibility and he wasn’t that good. So he went into aeronautical engineering to be around aerospace but couldn’t make a good engineer either. He tried to make a career in McDonnell-Douglas but couldn’t compete with other engineers. Tried venture capitalism but wasn’t lucky I guess. And then a person who - am I right? - didn’t have an engineering mind but at least got some education in aerospace engineering, left the field, made own company where he did not face constant competition and positioned himself as a maverick in deep-sea technologies.

Is it horrible to say that Rush probably had the talent to run a quilt shop on Etsy but presented themselves as Coco Chanel? And of course the results were dire, the project was barely able to get off the ground when that sub imploded. OK, let the lawyers now decide who could have stopped Rush since he obviously was a litigious person and probably, colleagues were afraid of him.

 

[I am not Sherlock H.]

That’s so odd. Did he mean, the qualities of graphite in pencils can represent all carbons? Why not use diamonds then/s?

I have a feeling that instead of having AP classes, we have to bring core curriculum in middle and high school. Like, language, math, chemistry, physics, biology, geography. Otherwise one can skip physics or chemistry in school and in college, get a degree in computer science and think he can work as an engineer. Having no clue about such things as crystalline lattice vs amorphous structures, which is probably chemistry 101.

This is just plain odd. I always thought Stockton’s main problem was hubris. Now I think that the hubris was on top, and the underlying factor was profound lack of systematic education. Or maybe, inability to understand things?

JMO. I don’t care how the lawsuit ends. I think that someone in education area should make conclusions, though. I understand that Princeton owed Stocktons. But I am starting to think that Stockton Rush was not accepted into an astronautical program and would have not made a pilot for an obvious reason: both professions carry a lot of responsibility and he wasn’t that good. So he went into aeronautical engineering to be around aerospace but couldn’t make a good engineer either. He tried to make a career in McDonnell-Douglas but couldn’t compete with other engineers. Tried venture capitalism but wasn’t lucky I guess. And then a person who - am I right? - didn’t have an engineering mind but at least got some education in aerospace engineering, left the field, made own company where he did not face constant competition and positioned himself as a maverick in deep-sea technologies.

Is it horrible to say that Rush probably had the talent to run a quilt shop on Etsy but presented themselves as Coco Chanel? And of course the results were dire, the project was barely able to get off the ground when that sub imploded. OK, let the lawyers now decide who could have stopped Rush since he obviously was a litigious person and probably, colleagues were afraid of him.

Very astute analysis @Charlot123 …. and I have to agree.

And it is so unfortunate that many had to unsuspectingly pay with their lives on that dive. I don’t know, but have to wonder how many times that OceanGate Titan vehicle dove to suitable depths…. and was then brought back up? How many cycles and the conditions it experienced? And can’t help but wonder now, why it wasn’t sent unmanned enough times to assure its worthiness at the depths and confines sought? IIRC there were some reports that in certain dives those in the craft had heard sounds coming from the structure adjusting or compensating perhaps for increasingly severe conditions. Article below confirming this on one of the prototype vehicles, first paragraph. MOO

ABC News online September 24, 2024 article by Meredith Deliso entitled ‘Submersible expert who went on early Titan dive: 'OceanGate came very, very close to killing me'’:

Submersible expert who went on early Titan dive: 'OceanGate came very, very close to killing me'

Karl Stanley, the owner of the Honduras-based deep-sea diving expedition company, testified on Tuesday during the U.S. Coast Guard hearing on the Titan implosion.

abcnews.go.com

 

[ch_13]

One thing about Rush is that he was 61 when he died. He had spent the last 15 years trying to get OceanGate up and running. If the company folded, I don't think he'd be able to pursue another opportunity, at least not in the outdoorsman/explorer space. This was his last chance to make a mark.

From everything we know about him, it's clear he felt a need to live up to his father, grandfather and famous ancestors. Age is supposed to bring wisdom, but I wonder if a younger Rush who thought he had more time on his side would not have acted as recklessly as he did.