GUILTY AR - Beverly Carter, 49, Little Rock, 25 Sep 2014 - #10

[arkansasmimi]

16)MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE EMAILS AND TEXT MESSAGES ALLEGEDLY
SENT BY AARON LEWIS
1. Defendant is charged with Capital Murder.

2. The State has provided Defendant with text messages and emails allegedly sent by
Matthew Davis.

3. Defendant believes the State intends to introduce text messages and emails
allegedly sent by Defendant in the trial. The State must meet two burdens. First, the State must
meet the authentication requirements under Arkansas Rule of Evidence 901, which is a condition
precedent to admission. Second, the State must also prove they were authored by Defendant or
they should be excluded as hearsay.

4. This Court should preclude the State from introducing any text messages
allegedly sent by Defendant unless the State has provided sufficient authentication under
Arkansas Rule of Evidence 901.

5. "While direct evidence is not required to authenticate a text message or email,
most jurisdictions require something more than just confirmation that the number or email
address belonged to a particular person." State v. Koch, 334 P.3d 280, 288 (Idaho 2014). "When
there has been an objection to admissibility of a text message, the proponent of the evidence
must explain the purpose for which the text message is being offered and provide sufficient
direct or circumstantial corroborating evidence of authorship in order to authenticate the text
message as a condition precedent to its admission." Id.

6. The need for authentication arises in this context because an electronic
communication, such as a Facebook message, an e-mail or a cell phone text
message, could be generated by someone other than the named sender. This is
true even with respect to accounts requiring a unique user name and password,
given that account holders frequently remain logged in to their accounts while
leaving their computers and cell phones unattended. Additionally, passwords and
website security are subject to compromise by hackers. Consequently, proving
only that a message came from a particular account, without further authenticating
evidence, has been held to be inadequate proof of authorship.
State v. Eleck, 23 A.3d 818, 822 (Conn. 2011).

7. Numerous courts have recognized that simply showing the message was sent from
a particular account is insufficient to authenticate the messages. See Rodriguez v. State, 273
P.3d 845 (Nev. 2012) (holding the trial court erred in admitting text messages because the State
could not prove the defendant authored the text messages); State v. Eleck, 23 A.3d 818 (Conn.
2011) (holding that the trial court properly excluded Facebook messages from a witness's
account because it could not be shown she wrote them); Commonwealth v. Williams, 926 N.E.2d
1162 (Mass. 2010) (finding that a MySpace message from the defendant's page should not have
been admitted without evidence that someone else could not have sent the message or additional
evidence that the defendant sent the message); Griffen v. State, 19 A.3d 415 (Md. 2011) (holding
that a printout from a MySpace page was not properly authenticated because someone other than
the purported creator could have posted the comment); Smith v. State, 136 So.3d 424 (Miss.
2014) (holding that Facebook messages allegedly sent by the defendant were not properly
authenticated despite the fact that the Facebook account from which the messages were sent from
purported to the defendant's).

8. Thus, the State should be excluded from introducing emails and text messages
unless they can comply with the authentication requirements for each and every email and text
message.

9. Additionally, Defendant objects on the grounds that the emails/text messages are
hearsay. A.R.E. 801; A.R.E. 802.

10. The State may claim that the text messages allegedly sent by Defendant are nonhearsay
because they are statements by a party-opponent. A.R.E. 801

11. Similar to the aforementioned arguments, the State must prove Defendant sent the
emails/text messages or they are not statements by a party-opponent.
WHEREFORE, Defendant moves this Court to prevent the admission of any emails or
text messages allegedly written by Defendant because the State has not provided sufficient
authentication for the messages and because they are hearsay.
https://contexte.aoc.arkansas.gov/i...resent2?DMS_ID=Y46PU5XETMC9UGSC5M629U2YH6WTE0

 

[arkansasmimi]

17) MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE BASED ON OVERREACHING USE OF
PROSECUTOR'S SUBPOENA POWER
1. Defendant was arrested and charged with capital murder.

2. In the course of the investigation, prosecutor subpoenas were sent to multiple
companies, including AT&T and Google.

3. The law is clear that this was an illegal use of a prosecutor's subpoena.

4. "The police do not have the power to issue subpoenas." State v. Hamzy, 288 Ark.
561, 709 S.W.2d 397 (1986).

5. The prosecutor does have subpoena power under A.C.A. 16-43-212; however,
"the prosecutor's power to subpoena . . . must be used only for a prosecutor's investigation." Id.
(citing Duckett v. State, 268 Ark. 687, 600 S.W.2d 18 (Ark. App. 1980).

6. In Hamzy, the prosecutor subpoenaed telephone records that were produced to the
police department. Hamzy, supra. "That information, in turn, was used to obtain warrants for
the search of two of appellees' homes where the gambling paraphernalia were seized." Id.

7. The court found, "the prosecutor abused his power to subpoena when he
commanded that records be produced for the police. Such a misuse of the subpoena power
effectively gave the subpoena power to the police." Id.

8. The prosecutor subpoenas issued in this investigation were issued for the law
enforcement investigation and not for the prosecutor's investigation. This Court should suppress
the information discovered as a result. Multiple decisions have held that evidence obtained by an
abuse of the prosecutor's subpoena should be suppressed. Cook v. State, 274 Ark. 244, 623
S.W.2d 820 (1981); Foster v. State, 285 Ark. 363, 687 S.W.2d 829 (1985).
WHEREFORE, the defendant requests this Court to suppress and exclude all evidence
obtained as a result of the overreaching use of the prosecutor's subpoena.
https://contexte.aoc.arkansas.gov/i...resent2?DMS_ID=CWJ8CZB48F5OHJQ63MRK6S1GAG6DAM

 

[arkansasmimi]

18) MOTION TO CORRECT OR QUASH THE FELONY INFORMATION

COMES NOW, the Defendant, Aaron Lewis, by and through counsel, the James Law
Firm, and for the Defendant’s motion to correct or quash the felony information, states:

1. Defendant is charged with capital felony murder.

2. The capital felony murder statute requires that the offense be committed "under
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life."

3. Felony information is routinely read to jurors prior the beginning of the case and the
defense does not want the jurors to be under the impression throughout the trial that the
aforementioned is not an element of the offense. To correct this, Defendant would request that
this Court order the amending of the felony information to conform with the requirement of the law.

WHEREFORE, the Defendant moves this Court to require the State to amend the felony
information or quash the information.
https://contexte.aoc.arkansas.gov/i...resent2?DMS_ID=X5UN2RTW5F9TQ2QHCDQ81D21MQ63EV

 

[arkansasmimi]

19) MOTION TO DISMISS THE CHARGE OF CAPITAL MURDER WITH THE
UNDERLYING FELONY OF KIDNAPPING

1. The State charged Defendant with one count of capital felony murder with the
underlying felony of kidnapping, as well as kidnapping and possession of firearms by certain
persons.

2. Under the State's theory, kidnapping is an improper underlying felony for the
capital murder charge.

3. The State's theory on the kidnapping is that Beverly Carter was taken for ransom
or reward.

4. The State's theory from the file appears to be that Defendant kidnapped Beverly
Carter and then killed her.

5. To prove felony capital murder, the State would be prevented from demonstrating
that the kidnapping was in furtherance of the homicide; rather, the State would have to prove
homicide somehow furthered the kidnapping, which is illogical with the current set of facts. It
seems absolutely illogical to suggest that one would kill someone to gain a ransom or reward.

6. Arkansas appellate courts have issued multiple decisions holding that a felony
murder charge is improper where the underlying felony was in furtherance of the homicide. See
Allen v. State, 310 Ark. 384, 838 S.W.2d 346 (1992); Sellers v. State, 295 Ark. 489, 749 S.W.2d
669 (1988); Craig v. State, 70 Ark. App. 71, 14 S.W.3d 893 (2000).

7. In Sellers, the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed and remanded the defendant's
conviction for capital felony murder because the burglary was committed to facilitate the
homicide, not the other way around. Sellers, supra.

8. In Allen, the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed and remanded the defendant's
conviction for first degree felony murder.
The proof showed that appellant fired a pistol when he killed the victim. At trial,
the State contended that firing the pistol constituted the underlying felony of
aggravated assault, and on that basis the trial court gave the felony-murder
instruction. That was a misconstruction of the felony-murder statute. Under the
first degree felony-murder statute, "a person commits murder in the first degree if
. . . he commits . . . a felony, and in the course of and in the furtherance of the
felony . . . causes the death of any person . . . ." Ark. Code Ann. 5-10-102 (Supp.
1991). The assault in this case was only in the furtherance of the murder, not of
some other felony. . . . In sum, under the proof, the appellant would not be guilty
of felony-murder even if he were so charged.
Craig v. State, 70 Ark. App. 71, 80 (Ark. Ct. App. 2000) (quoting Allen, 310 Ark. at 388,
838 S.W.2d at 348).

9. While Allen involved an aggravated assault, we similarly here have an alleged
kidnapping, both of which culminated in death. Similar to the Supreme Court in Allen, this
Court should hold that the State may not convict Lewis of capital felony murder with the
underlying felony being kidnapping because it is logically impossible that the murder of Carter
would have facilitated a ransom or reward.

WHEREFORE, the defendant moves this Court to dismiss the charge of felony capital
murder with the underlying felony of kidnapping.
https://contexte.aoc.arkansas.gov/i...resent2?DMS_ID=AKVW7SAAE8USBQIHL0UHCV9AT2WU64

 

[arkansasmimi]

The standard governing expert testimony>> Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993) is a United States Supreme Court case determining the standard for admitting expert testimony in federal courts. The Daubert Court held that the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence implicitly overturned the Frye standard; the standard that the Court articulated is referred to as the Daubert standard.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daubert_v._Merrell_Dow_Pharmaceuticals,_Inc.

 

[arkansasmimi]

20) MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE TESTIMONY ABOUT CEMENT DUST
PURSUANT TO DAUBERT V. MERRELL DOW PHARMACEUTICALS

1. Defendant is currently charged with Capital Murder.

2. In the discovery provided by the State there exists an assertion that the alleged
victim had cement dust on her shoes, thus, she walked around at the location she was found.

3. Defendant objects to any to the introduction of any testimony claiming to be able
to discern whether the alleged victim had cement dust on her shoes because it does not meet the
threshold for a scientific testimony.

4. In Daubert, which was adopted in Arkansas in Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of
Arkansas, Inc. v. Foote, 341 Ark. 105, 14 S.W.3d 512 (2000), the court held that the judge “must
ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but
reliable.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993).

5. “Its overarching subject is the scientific validity -- and thus the evidentiary
relevance and reliability -- of the principles that underlie a proposed submission. The focus, of
course, must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they
generate.” Id. at 594-95.

6. The proponent of the evidence bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of
the evidence that the conditions of admissibility exist. See Farm Bureau, 341 Ark. at 117, 14
S.W.3d at 520.

7. Daubert set forth four non-exclusive factors to guide the trial court in determining
whether the expert evidence is reliable: (1) whether the technique employed or relied upon by the
expert has been tested; (2) whether the technique has been subjected to peer review and
publication; (3) the technique’s rate of error, if known; and (4) whether the technique is generally
accepted by the scientific community. See id., 341 Ark. at 116, 14 S.W.3d at 519.

8. None of the factors above have been disclosed.

9. This Court is being asked to prevent the State from eliciting any testimony that
the alleged victim had cement dust on her shoes unless this Court finds that it meets the
standards set forth in Daubert.

WHEREFORE, Defendant, Aaron Lewis, respectfully requests this Court to prevent the
State from eliciting any testimony about the alleged victim having cement dust on her shoes
unless this Court finds that it meets the standards set forth in Daubert.
https://contexte.aoc.arkansas.gov/i...resent2?DMS_ID=0888IQC2PKO2IE4BHOXRIEVUBS01FK

 

[arkansasmimi]

21) MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE TESTIMONY ABOUT TOWER PINGS
PURSUANT TO DAUBERT V. MERRELL DOW PHARMACEUTICALS

1. Defendant is currently charged with Capital Murder.

2. In the discovery provided by the State there exists a number of assertions about
the location of people/phones based on tower pings.

3. Defendant objects to any to the introduction of any testimony claiming to be able
to discern the location of the phone at various times because it does not meet the threshold for a
scientific testimony.

4. In Daubert, which was adopted in Arkansas in Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of
Arkansas, Inc. v. Foote, 341 Ark. 105, 14 S.W.3d 512 (2000), the court held that the judge “must
ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but
reliable.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993).

5. “Its overarching subject is the scientific validity -- and thus the evidentiary
relevance and reliability -- of the principles that underlie a proposed submission. The focus, of
course, must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they
generate.” Id. at 594-95.

6. The proponent of the evidence bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of
the evidence that the conditions of admissibility exist. See Farm Bureau, 341 Ark. at 117, 14
S.W.3d at 520.

7. Daubert set forth four non-exclusive factors to guide the trial court in determining
whether the expert evidence is reliable: (1) whether the technique employed or relied upon by the
expert has been tested; (2) whether the technique has been subjected to peer review and
publication; (3) the technique’s rate of error, if known; and (4) whether the technique is generally
accepted by the scientific community. See id., 341 Ark. at 116, 14 S.W.3d at 519.

8. None of the factors above have been disclosed.

9. This Court is being asked to prevent the State from eliciting any testimony that
about the location of a particular phone at a particular time unless this Court finds that it meets
the standards set forth in Daubert.

WHEREFORE, Defendant, Aaron Lewis, respectfully requests this Court to prevent the
State from eliciting any testimony about the location of a particular phone/person at a particular
time unless this Court finds that it meets the standards set forth in Daubert
https://contexte.aoc.arkansas.gov/i...resent2?DMS_ID=TMKKU14GJ10LK55A35GN7O19X0SQR9

 

[arkansasmimi]

22)MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE ANY TESTIMONY BY CRYSTAL LOWERY
CONCERNING COMMUNICATION BETWEEN DEFENDANT AND LOWERY
1. Defendant is currently charged with Capital Murder.

2. In the discovery provided by the State there exists a number of statements
allegedly made by Defendant to Lowery that, if made, were intended to be confidential.

3. Defendant and Lowery were married when all relevant communication was made.

4. In Arkansas, confidential communication made between married individuals is
privileged from disclosure at trial. See A.R.E. 504.

5. Defendant seeks to enforce his privilege.

6. Defendant requests a hearing on this motion to decide whether each and every
statement, whether oral or written, allegedly made by Defendant or Lowery that the State intends *** REQUESTS A HEARING
to use at trial would be subject to the marital privilege.

WHEREFORE, Defendant, Aaron Lewis, respectfully requests this Court to hold a
hearing on the issue of whether statements made by Defendant or Lowery were privileged, and,
ultimately, to prevent the State from eliciting privileged communication.
https://contexte.aoc.arkansas.gov/i...resent2?DMS_ID=XIXJDH5IUIQ9N0HTDTUIWL65VLVPE1

 

[arkansasmimi]

Affirmative Defense
A defense in which the defendant introduces evidence, which, if found to be credible, will negate criminal or civil liability, even if it is proven that the defendant committed the alleged acts. Self-defense, entrapment, insanity, and necessity are some examples of affirmative defenses. See, e.g. Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410 (1998). https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/affirmative_defense


Affirmative Defense
A new fact or set of facts that operates to defeat a claim even if the facts supporting that claim are true.

A plaintiff sets forth a claim in a civil action by making statements in the document called the complaint. These statements must be sufficient to warrant relief from the court. The defendant responds to the plaintiff's claims by preparing an answer in which the defendant may deny the truth of the plaintiff's allegations or assert that there are additional facts that constitute a defense to the plaintiff's action. For example, a plaintiff may demand compensation for damage done to his or her vehicle in an automobile accident. Without denying responsibility for the accident, the defendant may claim to have an affirmative defense, such as the plain-tiff's contributory negligence or expiration of the statute of limitations.

An affirmative defense is also allowed under rules of Criminal Procedure. For example, a defendant accused of assault may claim to have been intoxicated or insane, to have struck out in self-defense, or to have had an alibi for the night in question. Any one of these affirmative defenses must be asserted by showing that there are facts in addition to the ones in the indictment or information charging the defendant and that those additional facts are legally sufficient to excuse the defendant.

The rules that govern pleading in most courts require a defendant to raise all affirmative defenses when first responding to the civil claim or criminal charges against him or her. Failure to do so may preclude assertion of that kind of defense later in the trial.
http://lawbrain.com/wiki/Affirmative_Defense

 

[arkansasmimi]

23) NOTICE OF INTENT TO RAISE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

1. Defendant is charged with capital felony murder.

2. Defendant does intend to raise the affirmative defense as provided in A.C.A. 5-10-101(b)
as a defense to the above-referenced charge in addition to general denial
https://contexte.aoc.arkansas.gov/i...resent2?DMS_ID=JU6PN44SZ77F1ZRA1C3FDMI5E19ZDK

 

[arkansasmimi]

24) FORMAL NOTICE OF INTENT TO EXAMINE STATE’S WITNESSES
The State of Arkansas is hereby put on notice that the Defendant herein requests the
presence and intends to reserve the right to cross-examine any witnesses, expert or otherwise, that may submit reports regarding evidence in this case. Specifically, the Defendant intends to preserve all rights under Ark. Code Ann. §12-12-313 and any other enactment of law requiring a notice in order to preserve the rights to confront and cross examine witnesses.
https://contexte.aoc.arkansas.gov/i...resent2?DMS_ID=6Z3E1J47GFFO3IA7EP8QKDWPN5I6LY

 

[arkansasmimi]

Subchapter 3 - State Crime Laboratory
§ 12-12-313 - Records as evidence -- Analyst's testimony.

12-12-313. Records as evidence -- Analyst's testimony.

(a) The records and reports of autopsies, evidence analyses, drug analyses, and any investigations made by the State Crime Laboratory under the authority of this subchapter shall be received as competent evidence as to the matters contained therein in the courts of this state subject to the applicable rules of criminal procedure when duly attested to by the Executive Director of the State Crime Laboratory or his or her assistants, associates, or deputies.

(b) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to abrogate a defendant's right of cross-examination if notice of intention to cross-examine is given prior to the date of a hearing or trial pursuant to the applicable rules of criminal procedure.

(c) The testimony of the appropriate analyst may be compelled by the issuance of a proper subpoena, in which case the records and reports shall be admissible through the analyst who shall be subject to cross-examination by the defendant or his or her counsel, either in person or via two-way closed-circuit or satellite-transmitted television pursuant to subsection (e) of this section.

(d) (1) All records and reports of an evidence analysis of the laboratory shall be received as competent evidence as to the facts in any court or other proceeding when duly attested to by the analyst who performed the analysis.

(2) The defendant shall give at least ten (10) days' notice prior to the proceedings that he or she requests the presence of the analyst of the laboratory who performed the analysis for the purpose of cross-examination.

(3) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to abrogate the defendant's right to cross-examine.

(e) Except trials in which the defendant is charged with capital murder, 5-10-101, or murder in the first degree, 5-10-102, in all criminal trials upon motion of the prosecutor the court may allow the prosecutor to present the testimony of the appropriate analyst by contemporaneous transmission from a laboratory facility via two-way closed-circuit or satellite-transmitted television which shall allow the examination and cross-examination of the analyst to proceed as though the analyst were testifying in the courtroom:

(1) After notice to the defendant;

(2) Upon proper showing of good cause and sufficient safeguards to satisfy all state and federal constitutional requirements of oath, confrontation, cross-examination, and observation of the witness's demeanor and testimony by the defendant, the court, and the jury; and

(3) Absent a showing of prejudice by the defendant.
Disclaimer: These codes may not be the most recent version. Arkansas may have more current or accurate information. We make no warranties or guarantees about the accuracy, completeness, or adequacy of the information contained on this site or the information linked to on the state site. Please check official sources.
http://law.justia.com/codes/arkansas/2010/title-12/subtitle-2/chapter-12/subchapter-3/12-12-313

 

[arkansasmimi]

25)DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY OF RULE 404(b) EVIDENCE
(Request for Prior Bad Acts)

COMES NOW, the Defendant, Aaron Lewis, by and through counsel, the James Law
Firm, and for the Defendant’s Request for Discovery hereby requests:

1. That all evidence the prosecution anticipates will be used against the Defendant
pertaining to character and to that of other crimes, wrongful conduct, or acts,
including, but not limited to, evidence allowed under Rule 404(1) and 404(3)(b) of
the Arkansas Rules of Evidence, be produced pursuant to Rule 17.1 of the Arkansas
Rules of Criminal Procedure.

WHEREFORE, the Defendant requests that this Court direct the State to provide prior to
trial a list of evidence of other crimes, wrong, or acts which the state intends to offer under
404(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence, so that the Court may determine the admissibility of
such proffered evidence prior to trial.
https://contexte.aoc.arkansas.gov/i...resent2?DMS_ID=SHCFFKBS0Z4A2O5GWYXSXILK7P0JZP

 

[arkansasmimi]

Rule 17.1. Prosecuting Attorney'S Obligations.

(a) Subject to the provisions of Rules 17.5 and 19.4, the prosecuting attorney shall disclose to defense counsel, upon timely request, the following material and information which is or may come within the possession, control, or knowledge of the prosecuting attorney:

(i) the names and addresses of persons whom the prosecuting attorney intends to call as witnesses at any hearing or at trial;

(ii) any written or recorded statements and the substance of any oral statements made by the defendant or a codefendant;

(iii) those portions of grand jury minutes containing testimony of the defendant;

(iv) any reports or statements of experts, made in connection with the particular case, including results of physical or mental examinations, scientific tests, experiments or comparisons;

(v) any books, papers, documents, photographs or tangible objects, which the prosecuting attorney intends to use in any hearing or at trial or which were obtained from or belong to the defendant; and

(vi) any record of prior criminal convictions of persons whom the prosecuting attorney intends to call as witnesses at any hearing or at trial, if the prosecuting attorney has such information.

(b) The prosecuting attorney shall, upon timely request, inform defense counsel of:

(i) the substance of any relevant grand jury testimony;

(ii) whether, in connection with the particular case, there has been any electronic surveillance of the defendant's premises or of conversations to which he was a party;

(iii) the relationship to the prosecuting authority of persons whom the prosecuting attorney intends to call as witnesses.

(c) The prosecuting attorney shall, upon timely request, disclose and permit inspection, testing, copying, and photocopying of any relevant material regarding:

(i) any specific searches and seizures;

(ii) the acquisition of specified statements from the defendant.

(d) Subject to the provisions of Rule 19.4, the prosecuting attorney shall, promptly upon discovering the matter, disclose to defense counsel any material or information within his knowledge, possession, or control, which tends to negate the guilt of the defendant as to the offense charged or would tend to reduce the punishment therefor.

Associated Court Rules:
Rules of Criminal Procedure
Group Title:
Article V. Pretrial Procedures: Discovery.
https://courts.arkansas.gov/rules-a...es/rule-171-prosecuting-attorneys-obligations

 

[arkansasmimi]

Rule 401. Definition Of "Relevant Evidence".
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.

Rule 404. Character Evidence Not Admissible To Prove Conduct, Exceptions - Other Crimes

Rules text
(a) Character Evidence Generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of his character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same;

(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor;

(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
https://courts.arkansas.gov/rules-and-administrative-orders/arkansas-rules-of-evidence

 

[arkansasmimi]

26)DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR DISCLOSURE OF CRIMINAL HISTORY OF
POTENTIAL JURORS

COMES NOW, the Defendant, Aaron Lewis, by and through counsel, the James Law
Firm, hereby requests that any record of criminal history obtained by the State of any potential
juror be produced to the Defendant.
WHEREFORE, the Defendant requests that this Court direct the State to disclose prior to
trial the criminal history of potential jurors.
https://contexte.aoc.arkansas.gov/i...resent2?DMS_ID=FVGQ262T4OQILNZ2ZW701N4BWIWMQ2

 

[arkansasmimi]

27) REQUEST FOR DISCLOSURE OF STATEMENTS AND HEARING ON THE
ADMISSIBILITY OF STATEMENTS

1. Pursuant to Rule 17.1(b)(ii) of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
Prosecuting Attorney should disclose the substance of any written or oral information
provided or statement made by the Defendant.

2. Said disclosure should include all information given by the Defendant directly to a
law enforcement officer or a third party, regardless of whether the information was
gathered through a formal ‘interrogation’, an ‘investigatory’ stop, or a routine
questionnaire, and regardless of whether or not the Prosecuting Attorney intends to
use this information at trial.

3. The Defendant requests a hearing to determine the admissibility of any statements
attributed to him that are used at trial by the State. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S.
385 (1978); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975); Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471 (1965); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964)

WHEREFORE, the Defendant moves the Court to grant this request for disclosure and
grant the Defendant’s request for a hearing to determine the admissibility of any statement.
https://contexte.aoc.arkansas.gov/i...resent2?DMS_ID=3RDHAE4THEWNSSK03HT4FP86KQ9QK0

 

[arkansasmimi]

Rule 17.1(b)(ii) of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure

(b) The prosecuting attorney shall, upon timely request, inform defense counsel of:

(ii) whether, in connection with the particular case, there has been any electronic surveillance of the defendant's premises or of conversations to which he was a party;
https://courts.arkansas.gov/rules-a...es/rule-171-prosecuting-attorneys-obligations

 

[arkansasmimi]

28) MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION
COMES NOW, the Defendant, Aaron Lewis, by and through counsel, the James Law
Firm, and for the Defendant’s motion for clarification, states:

1. Defendant is charged with capital felony murder.

2. Crystal Lowery, co-defendant, plead guilty to murder in the first degree.

3. Lowery is expected to testify and will likely be questioned regarding her deal with the
State of Arkansas.

4. Defendant seeks clarification as to the whether the murder in the first degree was
felony murder in the first degree or purposeful murder in the first degree.

5. Additionally, it appears on the speed letter and plea form that Lowery pled guilty
to kidnapping as well; however, the sentencing order states that the offense was nolle prossed.
Defendant seeks clarification on this matter as well.

WHEREFORE, the Defendant moves this Court require the State to provide clarification
necessary for cross-examination and an understanding of the plea agreement between the State
and Crystal Lowery.
https://contexte.aoc.arkansas.gov/i...resent2?DMS_ID=UI70SV2ANQEJ8QMCFDDC60AWRXINH7

 

[arkansasmimi]

:thinking:
nolle pros or nol pros (nŏl′ prŏs&#8242
tr.v. nolle prossed, nolle pros·sing, nolle pros·ses or nol prossed or nol pros·sing or nol pros·ses Law
To drop (charges) against the accused by entering a nolle prosequi in court: The prosecutor nolle prossed the charges.
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/Nolle+prossed