I guess because I invested so much time reading all five of his articles, and because the defense has relied on his theory in their ConCourt appeal, Steyn's thesis that an analysis of DE should have a third test for knowledge of unlawfulness is still festering with me.
In a case like Oscar's where the accused seeks to justify a homicide as a legitimate PPD, it would seem to be entirely superfluous.
Bringing a self-defense claim, particularly PPD, automatically triggers an analysis to determine if the accused had reason to believe they were acting lawfully.
If it is determined they could not justify their reasons for thinking they were acting lawfully in self-defense, then they would be found to have acted unlawfully and their PPD claim negated.
There would be no reason to further consider whether the accused thought they were acting lawfully. It would be time to consider culpability in the form of either negligence or Dolus.
Despite the lengthy treatise on the subject, Steyn seems to have neglected to consider this obvious aspect of the legal framework for DE with a self-defense claim.
It took me awhile to sort through it as a layperson, but I would think this would be painfully obvious to a trained legal mind, as many on here have supported.
As I understand it, in a self defence case, knowledge of unlawfulness has always been part of the enquiry into mens rea. Because, to be guilty of murder, there must be unlawful intent. And this must ultimately be a subjective enquiry.
Personally, therefore, from my brief scan of his articles, I don't see anything particularly new or outlandish in what Steyn is saying.
The PPD enquiry deals with knowledge of unlawfulness in terms of the reasonable man. For example, a reasonable man would consider other options and would not not use excessive force. This is an objective assessment.
If the test is not satisfied, IMO, this constitutes prima facie proof that a rational perpetrator knew he was behaving unlawfully. (Rational meaning a person not suffering from a mental disorder).
However, the court must then proceed to examine whether or not there is any evidence to rebut this prima facie proof.
The SCA found no evidence to rebut the prima facie proof that Pistorius knew he was behaving unlawfully. In fact, not only did he fail to fire a warning shot, but, also, they described his testimony as so vacillating and untruthful that it was impossible to know what he was thinking when he pulled the trigger.
So, as far as I can see, the issue of unlawful intent has already been dealt with adequately by the SCA.
And, moreover, we must not forget that Pistorius claimed that he had fired involuntarily as a result of a startle and didn't actually claim that he thought he was acting in lawful self defence. Therefore, given that he was found not to be suffering from a mental disorder, it is arguable that, in relation to the question of knowledge of unlawfulness, the SCA need only have considered the issue of whether or not he was suffering from automatism, to which the answer can only have been a resounding 'no'.