That doesn't stand for what you imply it does.
Evidence is not a fact. Fact is determined by the jury. Evidence is provided to the jury from which they are to determine the facts.
Evidence is subject to the "competent, substantial" standard, not a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. To suggest otherwise is patently ridiculous. If what you suggest were true, a trial would be unending, having to show each little thing beyond a reasonable doubt. How do we know this is Amy testifying? Do we spend a day analyzing her identification, put on several witnesses including the obstetrician that delivered her?
The trier of fact, the jury in the instant case, determines the weight of the evidence and whether each fact is proven. Each piece of evidence used to support the facts established in the case is subject to the "competent and substantial" standard.
When interpreting case law, one should always review other cases to fully understand the application and implication. If one memorizes every statute, they are not equipped to practice law; indeed, "the law" is the interplay between statute, precedent and rules. And context really helps.
(yet again, HTH)
To put your quote in context:
...
As we said in Speiser v. Randall, supra, at 525-526: "There is always in litigation a margin of error, representing error in factfinding, which both parties must take into account. Where one party has at stake an interest of transcending value -- as a criminal defendant his liberty -- this margin of error is reduced as to him by the process of placing on the other party the burden of . . . persuading the factfinder at the conclusion of the trial of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Due process commands that no man shall lose his liberty unless the Government has borne the burden of . . . convincing the factfinder of his guilt." To this end, the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable, for it "impresses on the trier of fact the necessity of reaching a subjective state of certitude of the facts in issue." Dorsen & Rezneck, In Re Gault and the Future of Juvenile Law, 1 Family Law Quarterly, No. 4, pp. 1, 26 (1967).
Moreover, use of the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the community in applications of the criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. It is also important in our free society that every individual going about his ordinary affairs have confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty.
Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged."
Please note the date of the following:
Excerpted from Barber v. State, Case No. 5D06-3529 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009):
"Because this is a purely circumstantial evidence case, a special standard of review applies to our analysis.
...
The question of whether the evidence fails to exclude all reasonable hypotheses of innocence is for the jury to determine, and where there is substantial, competent evidence to support the jury verdict, we will not reverse." Darling v. State, 808 So. 2d 145, 155 (Fla.) (quoting State v. Law, 559 So. 2d 187, 188 (Fla. 1989)), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 848 (2002). In meeting its burden, the State is not required to "rebut conclusively, every possible variation of events" which could be inferred from the evidence, but must introduce competent evidence which is inconsistent with the defendant's theory of events. Darling, 808 So. 2d at 156 (quoting Law, 559 So. 2d at 189).
Once the State meets this threshold burden, it becomes the jury's duty to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
This Court does not have to determine that every reasonable hypothesis of innocence was excluded in this case. The sole determination we must make is whether there was competent, substantial evidence for the jury to make such a determination. See Darling, 808 So. 2d at 156 (citing Law, 559 So. 2d at 188-89)."
(emphasis added)
Excerpted from Jenkins v. State, No. 3D07-1211 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2009)
"[This] special standard of review of the sufficiency of the evidence applies where a conviction is wholly based on circumstantial evidence. Where the only proof of guilt is circumstantial, no matter how strongly the evidence may suggest guilt, a conviction cannot be sustained unless the evidence is inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The question of whether the evidence fails to exclude all reasonable hypotheses of innocence is for the jury to determine, and where there is substantial, competent evidence to support the jury verdict, we will not reverse."
(emphasis added)
