I. BACKGROUND[SUP]1[/SUP]
The Plaintiffs assert that on a date shortly prior to October 13, 1999, the Grand Jury voted in favor of an indictment of JonBenét Ramsey’s parents, John Ramsey and Patsy Ramsey, for the crime of child abuse resulting in death, a Class 2 felony pursuant to § 18-6-401(7)(a)(I), C.R.S. The Plaintiffs also assert that a written indictment (the “Indictment”

was prepared for and signed by the Grand Jury foreperson but
that Hunter elected not to sign the Indictment, and not to present it to the District Court, but to keep the Indictment secret from the general public. Since members of the Grand Jury and others surrounding the investigation were sworn to secrecy, it appears that this information, if accurate must have been provided in violation of that oath.
On October 13, 1999, the Grand Jury investigating the death of JonBenét Ramsey was discharged, and Hunter announced we “believe we do not have sufficient evidence to warrant a filing of charges against anyone who has been investigated at this time.”
The Plaintiffs assert that this announcement left the public with the clear impression that the Grand Jury had determined not to indict anyone in connection with the death of JonBenét Ramsey.
[SUP]1[/SUP] This summary is undisputed and is in large part taken from the Plaintiff’s Complaint District Court, Boulder County, State of Colorado
II. DISCUSSION
There is no precedent in Colorado regarding the question of whether a purported “indictment” signed by the foreman of a Grand Jury but unsigned by the District Attorney is subject to disclosure to the general public, either through presentment before the court pursuant to C.R.Crim.P. 7(a)(1), or through a release as an “official action” pursuant to §24-72-301 et seq. However, in Dresner v. County Court, 540 P.2d 1085 (Colo. 1975), a divided Colorado Supreme Court held that an indictment issued by a grand jury is ineffective to commence a criminal proceeding unless it is signed by the prosecutor. This case involved a district attorney disregarding the Grand Jury’s indictment for a lesser offense and charging a more serious offense by the filing of an information.
The Court, in this very short opinion, did not address the issue of whether the action by a Grand Jury constitutes an “indictment” but rather focused on the issue of whether an order requiring a district attorney to prosecute an action would interfere with the district attorney’s discretion and would violate the doctrine of separation of powers. Id. at 1087. Likewise, the Court did not address the issue of whether the “indictment”, unsigned by the district attorney, should be “presented in open court”, as stated in C.R.Crim.P. 7(a)(1).
The Dresner court cited a federal case, United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5thCir. 1965) as authority for its narrow conclusion. Although not cited for more than the narrow issue of whether the district attorney should be required to prosecute the Grand Jury’s “indictment”, the Cox case stands for a broader proposition that this court finds persuasive. In that case, five of the seven member court held that the prosecutor is required to assist the grand jury in preparing an indictment, and that an indictment in which the prosecutor does not join should be prepared and made public in open court along with the prosecutor’s decision. Although some of the Cox judges took the position that the government attorney should sign the indictment and could then refuse to go forward, all five of these judges expressed their belief that transparency was important in order to expose the difference in view between the prosecutor and grand jurors.
This court agrees that transparency of a prosecutor’s decision not to proceed with an indictment from the Grand Jury is in the public interest. Under the rationale of the prevailing opinions in Cox, the term “record of official action” in the form of an “indictment” should include the completed work of the grand jury, even if the district attorney has declined to sign it.
This court agrees that the fact of this official action should not happen in secret in circumstances that give the public an impression that the grand jury has declined to act. Recognizing that the Grand Jury’s “indictment” is not required to be supported by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, but that the district attorney cannot proceed with a prosecution unless he has a reasonable belief that he can obtain a conviction,
the process followed in this case offered citizens no opportunity to consider the conflict between the decisions of the prosecutor and the grand jury.
Although a contrary view was express by Judge Finesilver in In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Special Grand Jury 89-2, 813 F. Supp. 1451 (D. Colo. 1993), in which he concluded that an indictment is not an indictment for any purpose, including public disclosure, unless and until it is signed by the prosecuting attorney,
this court concludes that the better view is that expressed in Cox, supra. This view is also supported by C.R.Crim.P. 6.6 (a), which states that “presentation of an indictment in open court by a grand jury may be accomplished by the foreman of the grand jury, the full grand jury, or by the prosecutor acting under instructions of the grand jury.” It appears clear from this provision that the power of the presentment lies with the grand jury.
Finally, the court concludes that the secrecy required in the Grand Jury process set forth in C.R.Crim.P. 7 is not compromised through a process that requires the presentment of the indictment in open court. Under this procedure there is no breach of the secrecy and confidentiality expected in Grand Jury proceedings.
The Colorado Supreme Court has declared that the reasons for grand jury secrecy that it sought to protect in promulgating Colo. R. Crim. P. 6.2 are: (1) to prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be contemplated; (2) to prevent disclosure of derogatory information presented to the grand jury against someone who has not been indicted; (3) to encourage witnesses to come before the grand jury and speak freely with respect to commission of crimes; (4) to encourage grand jurors in uninhibited investigation of and deliberation of suspected criminal activity. In re P.R. v. Dist. Ct., 637 P.2d 346, 350 n.6 (Colo. 1981).
In this case, the only factor that may be implicated is the prevention of derogatory information being released against someone who has not been indicted. This factor is important where a Grand Jury concludes its investigation with suspicions but without sufficient evidence to cause them to vote to indict. In this case, assuming as asserted by the Plaintiffs that the Grand Jury voted to indict Mr. and Mrs. Ramsey, the evidence rose to a level in the minds of the grand jurors justifying an indictment.
III. ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Defendant show cause why he should not be required disclose the requested documents.
Dated: October 18, 2013
J. Robert Lowenbach
Senior District Court Judge