After listening to Lisa's interview with retired Judge Greenland (thank you, Lisa!), I had to go back and read Masipa's decision again after hearing Judge Greenland say that Masipa misapplied the test for Dolus eventualis on the first day (9/11) where she stated Oscar could not be guilty of murder if he thought Reeva was still back in bed. THEN she corrected this oversimplification on the next day (9/12) when she added the phrase "the deceased, or any one else, for that matter." I think these two different statements are a source of confusion for a lot of people who feel she is being misquoted by the legal experts who say she made an error of law in applying the test for DE. However, that's not the only problem with her logic... and I don't even want to think about her rationale for the illegal ammo possession!
https://juror13lw.files.wordpress.com/2014/09/pistorius-trial-judgement.pdf
From the first day of her judgment (Sept. 11, 2014) on page 3327, Line 13, Masipa states:
CC113/2013-mvn 3327 JUDGMENT 2014-09-11
I now deal with dolus eventualis or legal intent. The question is:
1. Did the accused subjectively foresee that it could be the deceased
behind the toilet door and
2. Notwithstanding the foresight did he then fire the shots, thereby
reconciling himself to the possibility that it could be the deceased in
the toilet.
The evidence before this court does not support the states contention
20 that this could be a case of dolus eventualis.
On the contrary the evidence shows that from the onset the
accused believed that, at the time he fired shots into the toilet door, the deceased was in the bedroom while the intruders were in the toilet. This belief was communicated to a number of people shortly after the incident.
However, the next day, September 12th, Judge Masipa came back with the additional language shown below (copied from pages 3347 and 3348, starting with line 25 on page 3347):
CC113/2013-pc 3347 JUDGMENT 2014-09-12
This court has already found that the accused cannot be
CC113/2013-pc 3348 JUDGMENT 2014-09-12
guilty of murder dolus eventualis either, on the basis that from his belief and his conduct, it could not be said that he foresaw that either the deceased or anyone else, for that matter, might be killed when he fired the shots at the toilet door. It also cannot be said that he accepted that possibility into the bargain.
She then goes on to justify her ruling of negligent or culpable homicide (CH) using essentially the same language she used in ruling out Dolus eventualis (DE):
CC113/2013-pc 3349 JUDGMENT 2014-09-12
Evidential material before this court however, show that the accused acted negligently when he fired shots into the toilet door, knowing that there is someone behind the door and that there was very little room in which to manoeuvre.
A reasonable person therefore in the position of the accused, with similar disability would have foreseen that possibility, that whoever was behind the door might be killed by the shots and would have taken steps to avoid the consequences and the accused in this matter failed to
take those consequences.
Not very clear, is it?