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THE DANGEROUS CLICHES ABOUT THE BACKGROUND OF RIAZ A.
Welt.de
http://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/...lichen-Klischees-zur-Herkunft-von-Riaz-A.html
It is a guessing game that will reveal an entire tragedy in one word: "Faudsch". In Urdu, the national language of Pakistan, this is the army. The Pashtuns use the word too, that people that live in the Hindu Kush on both sides of the Pakistani-Afghan border and who are mostly of Taliban origen.
But on the Afghan side, they says "Fauds", not "Faudsch", and the young attacker of Würzburg used in his confessor video clearly the variant common in Pakistan. Does this mean that the attacker was no Afghan? No teenager who escaped from the Civil War, but a Pakistani who has cheated with a false passport into Germany - perhaps only with the aim to kill?
The indication from the Federal Criminal Police,that the attacker could also have been a Pakistani, seems to paint a completely different political color to the bloodshed in Würzburg. It is no longer simply about refugees who become radicalized, but also about the competence of the German state to distinguish between genuine & false and dangerous & honest immigrants - apparently.
Riaz A. speaks Pashto
In reality, the story of radicalization between Afghanistan and Pakistan is far more complex than can be explained simply by one word. And Europe - especially Germany - is much deeper involved in this story, than most German politicians would like. Exactely this is shown by the details of the young man from Würzburg.
One thing is certain: in the video Riaz A. speaks Pashto, the language of the people of Pashtuns, split between the two countries . Pakistan and Afghanistan - this choice between A and B, not many Pashtuns would accept. The relationship lines of extended families cut across the borders, the biographies of the people also. This is especially the case since the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979 and drove a million Afghan Pashtuns as refugees to Pakistan. Some never returned. There still live almost 1.6 million Afghans in Pakistani refugee camps. Many have both citizenships.
"Especially the last name, the one that the perpetrator uses, seems more Afghan than Pakistani," Thomas Ruttig says. He is co-director of the think tank Afghan Analysts Network in Kabul. "His vocabulary suggests indeed that he has lived at least for a while in Pakistan, but likely he comes at least from a family that originally comes from the Afghan side of the border. Very few Pashtuns in Pakistan use the tribal name of Ahmadsai."
In Afghanistan, however, it is very common, as is the case with the President Ashraf Ghani, who is a Ahmadsai himself. "As such, Ghani campaigned in his home province of Logar in eastern Afghanistan." Ruttig, who studied Pashto at the University and has lived for years in Afghanistan, suggests the family background of the assassin of Würzburg would be here [ in Logar ] or in the neighboring provinces of Paktia and Nangarhar. "He could have gone to school for a long time in Pakistan or even grown up in a Pakistani refugee camp. But his origin appears to have been in Afghanistan."
The background from a refugee camp could indicate something about the path to radicalisation of the young man. The endless tent cities on the Pakistani side were once the most important recruiting reservoir of the Taliban. Here they were born. Their first followers were Afghan teenagers who often grew up without a father in torn family structures and, in exile, came into the care of religious schools.
In the madrassas they were trained for jihad by radical preachers, first only against the Soviets, and later against the victorious Afghan warlords who plunged the country into a bloody mess after the withdrawal of the Russians in 1988. Against these warlords, the movement of the Taliban was formed, the "students" of the madrassas, who oppose the lawlessness since 1994 with iron religious rules - with terrible success.
"The radicalization in Pakistan's refugee camps no longer works today in this way," says Arshad Jusufsai. For years the Pakistani journalist has worked for charities with the fleeing Afghans. Meanwhile, the Pakistani security agencies pursued the operations in the religious schools and mosques much more accurately, he says. But the Würzburg attacker fits in a new form of extremism that Jusufsai notices growing on both sides of the border.
"Here and in Afghanistan the IS strives to recruit followers. Only recently in Afghan refugee camps on the Pakistani side copies of the IS brochure 'al-Fath', the victory were distributed." But unlike the Taliban IS has no designs on helpless religious students, who are often sent to the teachings of the mullahs only because of free school meals.
"With us and in Afghanistan IS appeals especially to the better-educated youth of the middle class. On the one hand they have more access to computers and access to the to the extensive Internet propaganda material of the IS. On the other hand they are also targeted specifically. This is shown by the latest arrest of 14 iS-recruiters in the cities Sialkot and Lahore in Central Pakistan. Among them there were also university graduates and faculty members."
Jusufsais assessment includes another track: Like Ruttig he points to the provinces of Logar, Paktia and Nangarhar as at least the familial origin of the assassin. In Nangarhar IS recently captured several districts temporarily. Also in Afghanistan, the militia appeals especially to the better-educated young people in the cities.
Many of them are demoralized by the lack of progress in the country. After the withdrawal of NATO combat troops at the end of 2014, the Taliban have gained so much ground that they can afford to fight among themselves. The country is more unstable than ever, and in the power vacuum the Islamic State finds their disoriented victims.
"The young man in Würzburg does not look like a poor Koran student," Jusufsai says. "He's far too well-fed."
Apparently the attacker on the regional express is a symbol of a new problem: the young middle class of Afghanistan, rebuilt after the fall of the Taliban in 2001, but being lost after the declining stabilization efforts of the West. This problem does not remain in the Hindu Kush.
BBM
Not in the text, but in the video it is said that Riaz A changed when he heard about the death of his friend on Saturday. This might indicate a rapid radicalisation. However, contradicting a possible rapid radicalisation, in the farewell letter to his father, he writes that he wants to avenge what the unbelievers have done to his muslim brothers, sisters and children.
IMHO this indicates that his plan were a long time coming.
Welt.de
http://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/...lichen-Klischees-zur-Herkunft-von-Riaz-A.html
It is a guessing game that will reveal an entire tragedy in one word: "Faudsch". In Urdu, the national language of Pakistan, this is the army. The Pashtuns use the word too, that people that live in the Hindu Kush on both sides of the Pakistani-Afghan border and who are mostly of Taliban origen.
But on the Afghan side, they says "Fauds", not "Faudsch", and the young attacker of Würzburg used in his confessor video clearly the variant common in Pakistan. Does this mean that the attacker was no Afghan? No teenager who escaped from the Civil War, but a Pakistani who has cheated with a false passport into Germany - perhaps only with the aim to kill?
The indication from the Federal Criminal Police,that the attacker could also have been a Pakistani, seems to paint a completely different political color to the bloodshed in Würzburg. It is no longer simply about refugees who become radicalized, but also about the competence of the German state to distinguish between genuine & false and dangerous & honest immigrants - apparently.
Riaz A. speaks Pashto
In reality, the story of radicalization between Afghanistan and Pakistan is far more complex than can be explained simply by one word. And Europe - especially Germany - is much deeper involved in this story, than most German politicians would like. Exactely this is shown by the details of the young man from Würzburg.
One thing is certain: in the video Riaz A. speaks Pashto, the language of the people of Pashtuns, split between the two countries . Pakistan and Afghanistan - this choice between A and B, not many Pashtuns would accept. The relationship lines of extended families cut across the borders, the biographies of the people also. This is especially the case since the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979 and drove a million Afghan Pashtuns as refugees to Pakistan. Some never returned. There still live almost 1.6 million Afghans in Pakistani refugee camps. Many have both citizenships.
"Especially the last name, the one that the perpetrator uses, seems more Afghan than Pakistani," Thomas Ruttig says. He is co-director of the think tank Afghan Analysts Network in Kabul. "His vocabulary suggests indeed that he has lived at least for a while in Pakistan, but likely he comes at least from a family that originally comes from the Afghan side of the border. Very few Pashtuns in Pakistan use the tribal name of Ahmadsai."
In Afghanistan, however, it is very common, as is the case with the President Ashraf Ghani, who is a Ahmadsai himself. "As such, Ghani campaigned in his home province of Logar in eastern Afghanistan." Ruttig, who studied Pashto at the University and has lived for years in Afghanistan, suggests the family background of the assassin of Würzburg would be here [ in Logar ] or in the neighboring provinces of Paktia and Nangarhar. "He could have gone to school for a long time in Pakistan or even grown up in a Pakistani refugee camp. But his origin appears to have been in Afghanistan."
The background from a refugee camp could indicate something about the path to radicalisation of the young man. The endless tent cities on the Pakistani side were once the most important recruiting reservoir of the Taliban. Here they were born. Their first followers were Afghan teenagers who often grew up without a father in torn family structures and, in exile, came into the care of religious schools.
In the madrassas they were trained for jihad by radical preachers, first only against the Soviets, and later against the victorious Afghan warlords who plunged the country into a bloody mess after the withdrawal of the Russians in 1988. Against these warlords, the movement of the Taliban was formed, the "students" of the madrassas, who oppose the lawlessness since 1994 with iron religious rules - with terrible success.
"The radicalization in Pakistan's refugee camps no longer works today in this way," says Arshad Jusufsai. For years the Pakistani journalist has worked for charities with the fleeing Afghans. Meanwhile, the Pakistani security agencies pursued the operations in the religious schools and mosques much more accurately, he says. But the Würzburg attacker fits in a new form of extremism that Jusufsai notices growing on both sides of the border.
"Here and in Afghanistan the IS strives to recruit followers. Only recently in Afghan refugee camps on the Pakistani side copies of the IS brochure 'al-Fath', the victory were distributed." But unlike the Taliban IS has no designs on helpless religious students, who are often sent to the teachings of the mullahs only because of free school meals.
"With us and in Afghanistan IS appeals especially to the better-educated youth of the middle class. On the one hand they have more access to computers and access to the to the extensive Internet propaganda material of the IS. On the other hand they are also targeted specifically. This is shown by the latest arrest of 14 iS-recruiters in the cities Sialkot and Lahore in Central Pakistan. Among them there were also university graduates and faculty members."
Jusufsais assessment includes another track: Like Ruttig he points to the provinces of Logar, Paktia and Nangarhar as at least the familial origin of the assassin. In Nangarhar IS recently captured several districts temporarily. Also in Afghanistan, the militia appeals especially to the better-educated young people in the cities.
Many of them are demoralized by the lack of progress in the country. After the withdrawal of NATO combat troops at the end of 2014, the Taliban have gained so much ground that they can afford to fight among themselves. The country is more unstable than ever, and in the power vacuum the Islamic State finds their disoriented victims.
"The young man in Würzburg does not look like a poor Koran student," Jusufsai says. "He's far too well-fed."
Apparently the attacker on the regional express is a symbol of a new problem: the young middle class of Afghanistan, rebuilt after the fall of the Taliban in 2001, but being lost after the declining stabilization efforts of the West. This problem does not remain in the Hindu Kush.
BBM
Not in the text, but in the video it is said that Riaz A changed when he heard about the death of his friend on Saturday. This might indicate a rapid radicalisation. However, contradicting a possible rapid radicalisation, in the farewell letter to his father, he writes that he wants to avenge what the unbelievers have done to his muslim brothers, sisters and children.
IMHO this indicates that his plan were a long time coming.
