Oscar Pistorius - Discussion Thread #68 *Appeal Verdict*

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I have just listened to the bail hearing and Nel does not actually verbally agree to the 20 km radius. He wanted 5 to 10 km at the most. When the judge returned to read the conditions he clearly said it was up to him to determine them and he stated a 20 km radius without reference to Nel. The judge continued without interruption to address OP. So, as far as I can see, Nel did not agree (unless it was in chambers) to a 20km radius. It was a fait acomplis.

I did wonder whether the judge actually did mean a 10 km radius but erroneously added two radii together equalling 20 km without realising that by stating 20km he was doubling the radius and thus mistakenly altered Nel's suggested limit of 10km radius from a central point but we shall never know.

BIB: Oh my!

Thanks for reviewing the video... My use of the term "agreed" was not very accurate. Conceded or acquiesced would have been more like it. I thought I recalled a nod of the head from Nel.
 
http://www.nwu.ac.za/sites/www.nwu....uepages/2011volume14no7/2011(14)7 JumaDOC.pdf

Actual or apparent bias
Whether the allegation relates to actual or apprehended bias, it is a serious matter
which strikes at the validity and acceptability of the trial and its outcome. It is for this
reason that once raised it must be dealt with first and foremost. The effect of a
successful claim of bias results in a retrial of the matter.29 Actual bias is not often
found in decided cases and therefore FS v JJ and Another30 should be considered
an exception rather than the rule.
31 However, it has been applied in the following two
fact-situations: (a) where a judge has been influenced by partiality or prejudice in
reaching a decision; and (b) where it has been demonstrated that a judge is actually
prejudiced in favour or against a party.
32 In the case of actual bias the disqualifying
factor exists in fact, whereas in the case of apparent bias it does not. What is
important in apparent bias is that the circumstances surrounding the adjudication are
such that an inference can be drawn that the judge might be disposed towards one
side or another in the matter in court. Case law shows that it is difficult to prove
actual bias,33 apparently because of the subjectivity attendant upon it. That is why it
is often unnecessary to investigate whether or not there was evidence to suggest
that there was actual bias.
34 I


Sorry, I've no time to prove whether the post makes sense enough. :)
 
Do you remember if he was ever asked why he closed the balcony doors if he couldn't sleep because he was so warm? I know he had to create some time for Reeva to conveniently and silently slip out of bed without him noticing, but closing the doors made it even warmer.

yes - exactly

This all made no sense. Why close the doors?

That part was all B-Grade script writer material

"What ever you do don't forget to close the doors before you go to sleep Reeva!"

No prizes to the audience for guessing what will happen when she forgets!

Cue the BIG BAD
 
That part was all B-Grade script writer material

"What ever you do don't forget to close the doors before you go to sleep Reeva!"
snipped -

so true :laugh:

- i can almost see that clip in a media student's dodgy short film
 
Yes, it was. I feel that he wanted to demonstrate his authority by not simply rubber-stamping the agreement. Not a thought for Reeva's parents, sadly.

Unfortunately, there are plenty of judges in the UK who also behave like this.

I've just had a quick look at OP's affidavit. Imo, Roux has done a pretty thorough job by raising lots of queries. One thing that stood out for me is that he is querying the SCA's introduction of a rational component to the intention element of PPD.

This has given me some concern too-- but in looking back at Leach's full judgment, I think he was making the point that it is acceptable for the court to make a rational inference regarding an accused's intent based on all circumstantial evidence, particularly in evaluating foresight with Dolus eventualis. Hence, he referenced Humphreys. (I think it is a different standard than for direct intention with DD if I understand correctly.)

http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/oscar-pistorius-appeal-justice-eric-leachs-judgement-full-1531812

While I think Judge Leach covered the issues of DE really well, from a quick re-reading this morning, it does seem a little vague concerning the lawfulness of his actions under a mistaken PPD-- so perhaps this is why Roux is attempting to exploit this as a possible weakness in the Appeal Judgement.

I don't think it will work though-- I am pretty sure, somewhere the SCA has dealt with whether or not Oscar was entitled to any protection of a lawful PPD claim and it was just dismissed that he was not justified in thinking he had a legal right to use excessive force without being under imminent attack or even identifying his target. I just can't put my fingers on it right now. (Help, anyone!)

Re: the issues of a RATIONAL INFERENCE about his subjective intent/state of mind, I will excerpt a few paragraphs here (sorry for taking up so much page space, but it is just to provide a convenient reference for everyone.)

As this court has pointed out, while the subjective state of mind of an accused person in a case such as this is an issue of fact that can often only be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the infliction of the fatal injury, the inference to be properly drawn must be consistent with all the proved fact. It is thus trite that a trial court must consider the totality of the evidence led to determine whether the essential elements of a crime have been proved. As Nugent J stated in Van der Meyden, a passage oft cited with approval in this court:

'The proper test is that an accused is bound to be convicted if the evidence establishes his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and the logical corollary is that he must be acquitted if it is reasonably possible that he might be innocent. The process of reasoning which is appropriate to the application of that test in any particular case will depend on the nature of the evidence which the court has before it. What must be borne in mind, however, is that the conclusion which is reached (whether it be to convict or to acquit) must account for all the evidence. Some of the evidence might be found to be false; some of it might be found to be unreliable; and some of it might be found to be only possibly false or unreliable; but none of it may simply be ignored.'

The pertinent issue then becomes whether, on the primary facts found proved, considering all of the evidence relevant to the issue, and applying the correct legal test, the inference has to be drawn that the accused acted with dolus eventualis when he fired the fatal shots. In this regard the following observation of Brand JA in Humphreys is to the point:

'[L]ike any other fact, subjective foresight can be proved by inference. Moreover, common sense dictates that the process of inferential reasoning may start out from the premise that, in accordance with common human experience, the possibility of the consequences that ensued would have been obvious to any person of normal intelligence. The next logical step would then be to ask whether, in the light of all the facts and circumstances of this case, there is any reason to think that the appellant would not have shared this foresight, derived from common human experience, with other members of the general population.'

As a matter of common sense, at the time the fatal shots were fired, the possibility of the death of the person behind the door was clearly an obvious result. And in firing not one, but four shots, such a result became even more likely. But that is exactly what the accused did. A court, blessed with the wisdom of hindsight, should always be cautious of determining that because an accused ought to have foreseen a consequence, he or she must have done so. But in the present case that inference is irresistible. A person is far more likely to foresee the possibility of death occurring where the weapon used is a lethal firearm (as in the present case) than, say, a pellet gun unlikely to do serious harm. Indeed, in this court, counsel for the accused, while not conceding that the trial court had erred when it concluded that the accused had not subjectively foreseen the possibility of the death of the person in the toilet, was unable to actively support that finding. In the light of the nature of the firearm and the ammunition used and the extremely limited space into which the shots were fired, his diffidence is understandable.
 
Thanks for that IB.

BIB - I thought OP said he couldn't sleep because it was too warm? Do I have false memory syndrome? :D

He stated that the room was still very warm when he woke up and interestingly said, yet again, "I brought the fans in". So far I have only listened to Roux coaxing him through his story. OP is very hesitant about every point, almost as though he was thinking about exactly what he needed to say. Surely, if his story was true he would not have needed such long silences between his points. I haven't listened to Nel's X yet. Maybe he was asked then.
 
Do you remember if he was ever asked why he closed the balcony doors if he couldn't sleep because he was so warm? I know he had to create some time for Reeva to conveniently and silently slip out of bed without him noticing, but closing the doors made it even warmer.

Also, do you (or anyone) know if a judge can be excused if they are known to be a fan of the killer? I ask because here in the UK, a well-known soap star was up on charges of sexual abuse and the judge told the jury that if any of them couldn't separate the actor from the real person, they should excuse themselves (obviously because they wouldn't be able to be neutral). It struck me that the bail judge went out of his way to make sure OP wasn't punished too harshly, despite a much more serious new verdict of murder.

re: bold
i still think that '[mis]handling timings' formed part of the double-edge in the pistorius version:
1. as you say, he had to create the time for reeva to become 'the intruder opening the window'.
ok, he is the anxious type [easily startled; disability; etc] first thought at three am... intruder!

but, he has the ability to reason, so 1 is very closely followed by [obvious] second thought:
2. time since he last saw reeva = time for reeva to leave the bed, go to bathroom and open window.

therefore... [common sense, or logical 'reasonable person' conclusion - even an anxious one] it was reeva that was making the noise in the bathroom.

conclusion: version damage.
 
re: bold
i still think that '[mis]handling timings' formed part of the double-edge in the pistorius version:
1. as you say, he had to create the time for reeva to become 'the intruder opening the window'.
ok, he is the anxious type [easily startled; disability; etc] first thought at three am... intruder!

but, he has the ability to reason, so 1 is very closely followed by [obvious] second thought:
2. time since he last saw reeva = time for reeva to leave the bed, go to bathroom and open window.

therefore... [common sense, or logical 'reasonable person' conclusion - even an anxious one] it was reeva that was making the noise in the bathroom.

conclusion: version damage.
I also think the most obvious reaction for anyone, disabled, anxious, not disabled, not anxious, would still be to ask "Did you hear that?". Reeva's a few feet away from him and on his version (hmm) has just talked to him for goodness sake. I think a reasonable inference from that part of his story is that it also never happened. It defies any logic. It would be an automatic reaction. Even if it didn't cross his mind to say anything, what are the odds of Reeva also not saying anything? It's just so obviously a massive lie.
 
This has given me some concern too-- but in looking back at Leach's full judgment, I think he was making the point that it is acceptable for the court to make a rational inference regarding an accused's intent based on all circumstantial evidence, particularly in evaluating foresight with Dolus eventualis. Hence, he referenced Humphreys. (I think it is a different standard than for direct intention with DD if I understand correctly.)

http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/oscar-pistorius-appeal-justice-eric-leachs-judgement-full-1531812

While I think Judge Leach covered the issues of DE really well, from a quick re-reading this morning, it does seem a little vague concerning the lawfulness of his actions under a mistaken PPD-- so perhaps this is why Roux is attempting to exploit this as a possible weakness in the Appeal Judgement.

I don't think it will work though-- I am pretty sure, somewhere the SCA has dealt with whether or not Oscar was entitled to any protection of a lawful PPD claim and it was just dismissed that he was not justified in thinking he had a legal right to use excessive force without being under imminent attack or even identifying his target. I just can't put my fingers on it right now. (Help, anyone!)

Re: the issues of a RATIONAL INFERENCE about his subjective intent/state of mind, I will excerpt a few paragraphs here (sorry for taking up so much page space, but it is just to provide a convenient reference for everyone.)

re bold

http://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/gauteng-dpp-vs-oscar-pistorius-sca-judgement

ppd section is paras 52-54.
 
I just thought I'd share with you a photo of the frail, gaunt and broken man that is still grieving for his beloved Reeva.

Yvette van Schalkwyk, the social worker, said “From the first second I saw a man who was heartbroken about the loss, he cried, he was in mourning. He suffered emotionally. He loved her.”

Johan Stander said he was “really crying. He was in pain. He was torn apart, broken, desperate, pleading”.

Kevin Lerena said, “He just sounded so lonely and sad. He has obviously been completely broken by it. He told me how much he loved Reeva and how much he still missed her. He really sounded in pain about it. He said he thought about her all the time”.

When the time comes, and it will come, we'll be :gathering: here shouting :yesss: and watching as the :copcar: takes you to :jail:

We hope you enjoy the comfy bed Correctional Services got just for you ... because you're special. Maybe you can play with a :rubberducky: while you luxuriate in the :bath: that they also got especially for you while you're :behindbar:

:seeya: you loser. I just can't wait to see that smirk wiped off your face.
 

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I also think the most obvious reaction for anyone, disabled, anxious, not disabled, not anxious, would still be to ask "Did you hear that?". Reeva's a few feet away from him and on his version (hmm) has just talked to him for goodness sake. I think a reasonable inference from that part of his story is that it also never happened. It defies any logic. It would be an automatic reaction. Even if it didn't cross his mind to say anything, what are the odds of Reeva also not saying anything? It's just so obviously a massive lie.


re: bold
i agree, even more so for an anxious person.


under the pistorius version, at that stage, pistorius couldn't pose questions to reeva [as they would require an answer]. he could only whisper or shout requests and orders [that could conceivably require no reply from reeva].
 

Worth quoting these

[52] As a final counter to the State’s case, it was argued that although the accused had not acted in private or so called ‘self-defence’ ─ there had in fact been no attack upon him that he had acted to ward off ─ he had genuinely but erroneously believed that his life was in danger when he fired the fatal shots. As opposed to what is commonly known as self-defence, this is so-called ‘putative’ private or self-defence. The principles relevant to these two defences were authoritatively dealt with by this court in De Oliveira,[29] and were explained by Smalberger JA as follows:
‘The test for private defence is objective ─ would a reasonable man in the position of the accused have acted in the same way (S v Ntuli 1975 (1) SA 429 (A) at 436E). In putative private defence it is not lawfulness that is in issue but culpability (‘skuld’). If an accused honestly believes his life or property to be in danger, but objectively viewed they are not, the defensive steps he takes cannot constitute private defence. If in those circumstances he kills someone his conduct is unlawful. His erroneous belief that his life or property was in danger may well (depending upon the precise circumstances) exclude dolus in which case liability for the person’s death based on intention will also be excluded; at worst for him he can then be convicted of culpable homicide.
On appeal the unlawfulness of the appellant’s conduct was not in issue. Accordingly the only issue was whether the State had proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the appellant subjectively had the necessary intent to commit the crimes of which he was convicted, in other words, that he did not entertain an honest belief that he was entitled to act in private defence . . .’

[53] The immediate difficulty that I have with the accused’s reliance upon putative private defence is that when he testified, he stated that he had not intended to shoot the person whom he felt was an intruder. This immediately placed himself beyond the ambit of the defence, although as I have said, his evidence is so contradictory that one does just not know his true explanation for firing the weapon. His counsel argued that it had to be inferred that he must have viewed whoever was in the toilet as a danger. But as was pointed out in De Oliviera,[30] the defence of putative private defence implies rational but mistaken thought. Even if the accused believed that there was someone else in the toilet, his expressed fear that such a person was a danger to his life was not the product of any rational thought. The person concerned was behind a door and although the accused stated that he had heard a noise which he thought might be caused by the door being opened, it did not open. Thus not only did he not know who was behind the door, he did not know whether that person in fact constituted any threat to him. In these circumstances, although he may have been anxious, it is inconceivable that a rational person could have believed he was entitled to fire at this person with a heavy calibre firearm, without taking even that most elementary precaution of firing a warning shot (which the accused said he elected not to fire as he thought the ricochet might harm him). This constituted prima facie proof that the accused did not entertain an honest and genuine belief that he was acting lawfully, which was in no way disturbed by his vacillating and untruthful evidence in regard to his state of mind when he fired his weapon.[31]

[54] In order to disturb the natural inference that a person intends the probable consequences of his actions, the accused was required to establish at least a factual foundation for his alleged genuine belief of an imminent attack upon him. This the accused did not do. Consequently, although frightened, the accused armed himself to shoot if there was someone in the bathroom and when there was, he did. In doing so he must have foreseen, and therefore did foresee that the person he was firing at behind the door might be fatally injured, yet he fired without having a rational or genuine fear that his life was in danger. The defence of putative private or self-defence cannot be sustained and is no bar to a finding that he acted with dolus eventualis in causing the death of the deceased.

I think we have to go back and read De Oliveira
 
For me there are two main points

1. The defence of PPD could not apply as the accused did not come up to brief on the stand

2. There is insufficient basis to infer the belief (i.e. acting in self defence) was honest and genuine

This constituted prima facie proof that the accused did not entertain an honest and genuine belief that he was acting lawfully
 

Thank you Sleuth-d! This is a much better link to the full judgement too.

Here are those paragraphs you referenced:

[52] As a final counter to the State’s case, it was argued that although the accused had not acted in private or so called ‘self-defence’ ─ there had in fact been no attack upon him that he had acted to ward off ─ he had genuinely but erroneously believed that his life was in danger when he fired the fatal shots. As opposed to what is commonly known as self-defence, this is so-called ‘putative’ private or self-defence. The principles relevant to these two defences were authoritatively dealt with by this court in De Oliveira,[29] and were explained by Smalberger JA as follows:
‘The test for private defence is objective ─ would a reasonable man in the position of the accused have acted in the same way (S v Ntuli 1975 (1) SA 429 (A) at 436E). In putative private defence it is not lawfulness that is in issue but culpability (‘skuld’). If an accused honestly believes his life or property to be in danger, but objectively viewed they are not, the defensive steps he takes cannot constitute private defence. If in those circumstances he kills someone his conduct is unlawful. His erroneous belief that his life or property was in danger may well (depending upon the precise circumstances) exclude dolus in which case liability for the person’s death based on intention will also be excluded; at worst for him he can then be convicted of culpable homicide.
On appeal the unlawfulness of the appellant’s conduct was not in issue. Accordingly the only issue was whether the State had proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the appellant subjectively had the necessary intent to commit the crimes of which he was convicted, in other words, that he did not entertain an honest belief that he was entitled to act in private defence . . .’

[53] The immediate difficulty that I have with the accused’s reliance upon putative private defence is that when he testified, he stated that he had not intended to shoot the person whom he felt was an intruder. This immediately placed himself beyond the ambit of the defence, although as I have said, his evidence is so contradictory that one does just not know his true explanation for firing the weapon. His counsel argued that it had to be inferred that he must have viewed whoever was in the toilet as a danger. But as was pointed out in De Oliviera,[30] the defence of putative private defence implies rational but mistaken thought. Even if the accused believed that there was someone else in the toilet, his expressed fear that such a person was a danger to his life was not the product of any rational thought. The person concerned was behind a door and although the accused stated that he had heard a noise which he thought might be caused by the door being opened, it did not open. Thus not only did he not know who was behind the door, he did not know whether that person in fact constituted any threat to him. In these circumstances, although he may have been anxious, it is inconceivable that a rational person could have believed he was entitled to fire at this person with a heavy calibre firearm, without taking even that most elementary precaution of firing a warning shot (which the accused said he elected not to fire as he thought the ricochet might harm him). This constituted prima facie proof that the accused did not entertain an honest and genuine belief that he was acting lawfully, which was in no way disturbed by his vacillating and untruthful evidence in regard to his state of mind when he fired his weapon.[31]

[54] In order to disturb the natural inference that a person intends the probable consequences of his actions, the accused was required to establish at least a factual foundation for his alleged genuine belief of an imminent attack upon him. This the accused did not do. Consequently, although frightened, the accused armed himself to shoot if there was someone in the bathroom and when there was, he did. In doing so he must have foreseen, and therefore did foresee that the person he was firing at behind the door might be fatally injured, yet he fired without having a rational or genuine fear that his life was in danger. The defence of putative private or self-defence cannot be sustained and is no bar to a finding that he acted with dolus eventualis in causing the death of the deceased.

ETA: just noticed Mr. Jitty posted these too, but I will leave mine as well. They may end up on a different page.
 
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZASCA/1993/62.html

These are the relevant bits of the De Oliveira, decision not already quoted by Justice Leach

There was, however, no indication that any attack on the house or its occupants had commenced or was imminent. The appellant was in a situation of comparative safety in his bedroom, in a secure and burglar-proofed house and armed with a pistol. In those circumstances it is inconceivable that a reasonable man could have believed that he was entitled to fire at or in the direction of the persons outside in defence of his life or property (and that without even a warning shot).

One would normally impute to a person in the position of the appellant (in the absence of any evidence by such person as to his state of mind at the relevant time) a state of mind akin to that of a reasonable man. In a given case, however, proved facts or circumstances may exist which would justify a different conclusion. In the present instance there are none. This is so even if it is permissible to have regard, when dealing with the convictions, to the evidence led on the appellant's behalf in mitigation of sentence (a matter on which I refrain from expressing any view), which led the learned trial Judge to hold that the appellant has "a marked dullness of intellect" and "has not been blessed with more than a comparatively low level of intelligence". Even from someone with the appellant's limited intellectual capacity one would prima facie not expect a reaction different from that of the reasonable man, having regard to the particular circumstances of the present matter.

In the circumstances there was prima facie proof that the appellant could not have entertained an honest belief that he was entitled to act in private defence. The appellant failed to testify as to his state of mind and to refute this prima facie proof.

So you can see Leach has adopted the same approach.

On the proven facts, no attack had commenced. Therefore this is prima facie proof that the belief was not honestly entertained.

Nothing in OP's testimony changes that
 
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZASCA/1993/62.html

These are the relevant bits of the De Oliveira, decision not already quoted by Justice Leach



So you can see Leach has adopted the same approach.

On the proven facts, no attack had commenced. Therefore this is prima facie proof that the belief was not honestly entertained.

Nothing in OP's testimony changes that


And all Masipa came up with was that the window was indeed open and this was sufficient to confirm Oscar's suspicion of intruders.

That's it folks, nothing more to see here. Move along now. Factual finding.
 
Hello again. Gosh, April came around quick, didn't it?! :)

Following on from your discussion about the inherent improbabilities of his "version", I think it's always worth highlighting them so that the Pistorians are in no doubt of why it is, exactly, that we don't believe him:

A) Is the first thing you say to someone who's been asleep for 5 hours (not rousing even when you nip downstairs for a late, late, lonely supper) "Can't you sleep, Baba?"

B) If it's so humid that it wakes you up, is your first thought to close the windows, blinds and curtains and then position the fans so that only the person on the right of the bed (Reeva) gets the benefit of them?

C) Who slips off their slippers, positions them neatly pointing at and next to the top of the bed, then walks round to get in the other side?

D) I currently have a frozen shoulder (my right), certain positions at night can be uncomfortable. Changing my side of the bed would make no difference to anything and it has not even occured to me to do so.

E) If Reeva took her phone as a light source she would only have done so if it really was pitch black - so the curtains must already have been closed when she got up. In a very dark room, a lit up phone screen is as bright as a torch. I know it is because I often use mine to find my keys in my bag on a dark door step. The room WOULD have got lighter overall and then darker again as she went into the bathroom. Back turned or not, it is impossible for Pistorius not to have been aware of the two events....the room lightening then darkening again.

F) The biggest and most glaring improbability of all......absolutely NOBODY would have stood frozen in fear at a noise and said nothing to the person a few feet away. If she was asleep, OK, but she was awake and had been talking to him. In his fear, he would have wanted reassurance that he wasn't alone, some moral if not physical support. Some confirmation that he wasn't hearing things. His dash to get the gun would have to have been accompanied by a garbled explanation - SOMETHING to alert her to the potentially life threatening situation they were in.

G) As he stood there, "frozen in fear" - what's the best, best bit of news Pistorius could have had at that moment? What would have taken his fear from 100 to 0 in less than a second? Realising that it was Reeva. There's no way that a frightened mind wouldn't have spent a moment or two hoping for this....but no. He didn't even glance at her. Rationalising it away as "Well, he knew she was in bed" does not work....he knew she was in bed a minute ago and hadn't seen or spoken to her since. His first though would HAVE to be, "I hope that's Reeva". It wasn't. Impossible to explain.

H) Why was he too scared to speak above a hush yet seconds later begins screaming so loudly fairly distant neighbours could hear him....let alone someone in his en suite bathroom. Why wait until he is actually out of the bedroom (and away from Reeva) to start screaming?

I) Why was he screaming, exactly? It's dark, he cannot see and he's also unstable on his stumps - he needs every clue he can get of what the "intruders" are doing. He also won't want them to know exactly where he is because this would make him a target. So screaming has the effect of blocking out any sounds that the intruders make (which he needs to hear) and metaphorically pinning a glowing target sign on his chest.

J) Wasn't thinking? Yes, he was. He made a decision to shut up when he got to the bathroom door so they "wouldn't know where he was". If this consideration was EVER in his mind it would have been much, much sooner. In fact, it would have stopped him screaming at all.

K) What was it about the empty bathroom that made him start screaming again? The window being open? Confirmation that there was someone there? So, suddenly, it didn't matter anymore if they knew where he was? He's in more danger now than ever, and yet he pins that glowing target back on his chest?

L) He doesn't warn them he has a gun, in case it exacerbates the situation and makes the intruders come out and shoot him. Surely to goodness, it's if they DON'T think he has a gun that is more likely to make them come out and shoot him. They are trapped in the toilet...and he doesn't want them to know that the screaming householder outside of it has a gun? It's better to let them think he is unarmed?

M) He screams at them to "get out" knowing that they can't without opening the toilet door. It was the bathroom window they came in by, not the toilet, so that's not where the "ladder" is. The toilet window is high, small and with a long drop to the ground. "Get out"? How? Why does he not tell them to stay exactly where they are...he has a gun and the police are coming.

N) Nothing from Reeva as her boyfriend stands screaming just feet away. She knows there's no one in the bathroom except her...so who is she hiding from and terrified of? Herself? All of the screams are directed at her...and yet she doesn't want to know what it is in the bathroom that Pistorius is screaming at? She knows she's the only one there....and she'd have heard someone coming in the window when she was using the toilet because she had the door open. And the screams are coming in her direction, towards the toilet, so why doesn't she do the only thing she can to protect herself from whatever and get the hell away from the one place she's vulnerable to attack from....the door.

O) Whatever the reason Pistorius screamed "Get out" was, it wasn't because that's what he wanted or expected them to do. The moment the intruder seemed to be complying with that demand, he shot them four times.

P) Knowing, as we do, exactly where Reeva was standing when she was shot....how did she manage to make the magazine rack move a milisecond before he shot her? It was against the back wall which was only a couple of feet but would need a large stride to take her from there back to the door...and there wasn't time for that. We know the noise was not the door opening or the handle moving, and it is impossible for it to have been Reeva nudging the magazine rack...so what was it?

Q) Why did Pistorius expect to see Reeva still sitting up in bed when he went back to the bedroom? Isn't the very first thing any unarmed person would do when hearing gunshots in the next room is flee out of the door and the house? Where was Reeva's fight or flight response? If Reeva was not, at first sight, in the bedroom when he got back his very first assumption would be that she'd left the room. And he'd be wanting to join her. But no...he never even checked to see if the door was open. Fair enough if he looked and it was still closed with the cricket bat, but he DIDN'T EVEN CHECK. This is, quite literally, impossible.

It was apparently the fact that she wasn't still in the bedroom that took him from "Must be a terrifying intruder" to "Might be Reeva" - and yet, the LEAST likely place Reeva would be is in the bedroom.

Even worse - when he ran to fetch the cricket bat, he took no note of the fact that the door was still locked and closed, almost as if he fully expected it to be. Why?

There's more, of course..but when looked at together, the "inherent improbabilities" become impossibilities.

That he's lying is impossible to escape. He is lying.

And I don't care how many examples of people accidentally shooting friends and familiy the Pistorians come up with....not a single one of them comes with the list of extremely unlikely circumstances that this one does.

If Pistorius ultimately escapes jail, then he will have escaped justice. The man is a lying murderer. Nothing less.

(Sorry for the essay!)
 
I also think the most obvious reaction for anyone, disabled, anxious, not disabled, not anxious, would still be to ask "Did you hear that?". Reeva's a few feet away from him and on his version (hmm) has just talked to him for goodness sake. I think a reasonable inference from that part of his story is that it also never happened. It defies any logic. It would be an automatic reaction. Even if it didn't cross his mind to say anything, what are the odds of Reeva also not saying anything? It's just so obviously a massive lie.

BIB, it's easy for all of us from the comforts of our homes to say that he should have acted in such and such a manner and that this is what he should have done.

However, to address this correctly, we need to put ourselves in Oscar's mind at that very moment and look at the situation through his eyes. I can genuinely see him as believing every step he took was a lawful action.

This is backed up by Dr. Steyn

[video=youtube;afE9FmznuQI]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=afE9FmznuQI[/video]
 
I just thought I'd share with you a photo of the frail, gaunt and broken man that is still grieving for his beloved Reeva.

Yvette van Schalkwyk, the social worker, said “From the first second I saw a man who was heartbroken about the loss, he cried, he was in mourning. He suffered emotionally. He loved her.”

Johan Stander said he was “really crying. He was in pain. He was torn apart, broken, desperate, pleading”.

Kevin Lerena said, “He just sounded so lonely and sad. He has obviously been completely broken by it. He told me how much he loved Reeva and how much he still missed her. He really sounded in pain about it. He said he thought about her all the time”.

When the time comes, and it will come, we'll be :gathering: here shouting :yesss: and watching as the :copcar: takes you to :jail:

We hope you enjoy the comfy bed Correctional Services got just for you ... because you're special. Maybe you can play with a :rubberducky: while you luxuriate in the :bath: that they also got especially for you while you're :behindbar:

:seeya: you loser. I just can't wait to see that smirk wiped off your face.

I'm more of the view that when April rolls around, we'll see OP doing the :happydance::happydance::happydance: telling Roux and his defence team, :loveyou:for all the work you have put in on this case. :yourock:

No longer will I have to worry about being sent back to :jail: again unjustly as I have done my time and it is time society accepts me back into their fold. I recognize that some will :gasp:when the CC vindicates me, but it's time for me to get lots of :bed::bed:in my bed and :party:

For now though, I'm going to gather around the :christmastree: and spend time with my family that has supported me through all of this.
 
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