If Roof is going to represent himself in the penalty phase, should he lose is he able to appeal because of "ineffective assistance of counsel" .... or does the fact that legal assistance is there on "standby" cover that?
I don't know the answer to that, so I did a little research...:facepalm:.. and here's what I was able to find about
pro se and appeals: (it's a lot to read tho')
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First some ineffective of counsel articles for background, if anyone is interested
§12 Claim for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
CRIMINAL DEFENDANT’S HANDBOOK
"...The “defendant need not show that counsel’s deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome of the case,” Strickland, at 693, but rather “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different.” Strickland, at 695-96.
Prejudice requirement does not require petitioner to prove that he would not have been found guilty. Prejudice in pro se motions is not strictly construed. In cases which “counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing,” ineffectiveness will be presumed under United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 80 L.Ed.2d.657, 140 S.Ct. 2039 (1984)..."
https://libertyinternational.wordpr...-claim-for-ineffective-assistance-of-counsel/
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Strickland v. Washington
"Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), was a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States that established the standard for determining when a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel is violated by that counsel's inadequate performance.[1]
The Court, in a decision by Justice O'Connor, established a two-part test for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim: a criminal defendant must show two things:
Counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
Counsel's performance gives rise to a reasonable probability that if counsel had performed adequately, the result would have been different...
Marshall took issue with the Court's conclusion that the same standard for ineffectiveness should apply in a capital sentencing proceeding that applies at an ordinary trial. The capital sentencing process is intended to be especially reliable, and "reliability in the imposition of the death sentence can be approximated only if the sentencer is fully informed of all possible relevant information about the individual defendant whose fate it must determine." The defendant's attorney is responsible for doing that. That and in light of the "severity and irrevocability of the sanction at stake," the standard for effective assistance in capital sentencing proceedings must be especially stringent. Accordingly, Marshall believed that a person on death row seeking relief from his death sentence on grounds of ineffective assistance should not have to show a reasonable probability that he would not have received a death sentence if counsel had presented more mitigating evidence..."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strickland_v._Washington
More detailed:
Strickland v. Washington
466 U.S. 668 (1984)
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/466/668/case.html
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Some articles to read, about pro se/appeals, if you are interested:
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
"...An inmate who represents himself is not entitled to claim ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal..."
https://californiainnocenceproject.org/issues-we-face/ineffective-assistance-of-counsel/
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Self-Representation and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: How Trial Judges Can Find Their Way Through
"...A defendant’s technical legal knowledge is irrelevant to determining whether his or her waiver is knowing and intelligent...
...once a trial judge determines that a defendant’s waiver is knowing and intelligent, the judge may not proceed to inquire into whether there are other “unusual circumstances” which would deny a fair trial to a defendant who represents himself or herself...
...a trial judge may properly deny self-representation based on “unusual circumstances” such as the state of the defendant’s health, as long as the “unusual circumstance” is something other than lack of legal knowledge...
Hybrid Representation
Often a defendant seeking self-representation will request that standby counsel be appointed to assist the defendant in conducting the defense. The appointment of standby counsel under Faretta is constitutionally permissible, but not constitutionally required. Standby counsel may be denied when the defendant refuses to cooperate with the trial court or with court-appointed counsel in their efforts to provide legal assistance.21 But a judge should use caution in denying standby counsel, because a defendant may waive the right to self-representation if the defendant later abandons his or her initial request to proceed
pro se...
Even if standby counsel is appointed, the defendant must be permitted to control the organization and content of his or her defense, make motions, argue points of law, participate in voir dire, question witnesses, and address the court and the jury at appropriate points. The defendant has the entire responsibility for his or her own defense...
...the judge must not permit standby counsel’s participation over the defendant’s objection to substantially interfere with any significant tactical decisions, or to control the questioning of witnesses, or to speak on any matter of importance. Outside the presence of the jury, the defendant must be freely permitted to address the court on his or her own behalf...
...A defendant does not have the right to partially represent himself or herself and at the same time be partially represented by counsel. Neither does a defendant have a constitutional right to choreograph the attorney’s appearance...
It is understandable that trial judges might be inclined to resist allowing a defendant to represent himself or herself at trial. To allow such pro se representation requires an exorbitant amount of patience and vigilance on the part of the judge as well as the prosecutor. It can also generate tremendous anxiety in victims of violent crimes at the prospect of being subjected to questioning by their attackers. Even so, the Sixth Amendment has guaranteed that a defendant who makes a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel has the right to represent himself or herself. This is true even though it “seems to cut against the grain of [the United States Supreme Court]’s decisions holding that the Constitution requires that no accused can be convicted and imprisoned unless he has been accorded the right to assistance of counsel."
https://www.floridabar.org/divcom/jn/jnjournal01.nsf/Author/1B521E5F44DFD27385256ADB005D616A
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Pro Se Defendants and Ineffective Assistance of “Counsel”
"Can a defendant who chooses to represent himself subsequently argue that he received ineffective assistance of “counsel”? No, as illustrated by the recent case of State v. Brunson, __ N.C. App. __ (2012). The defendant in Brunson elected to represent himself. He was convicted of sexually abusing his stepdaughter. He appealed, arguing in part that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The court of appeals rejected this argument, citing State v. Petrick, 186 N.C. App. 597 (2007), for the proposition that “a defendant who elects to represent himself cannot thereafter complain that the quality of his own defense amounted to a denial of effective assistance of counsel.” The rule expressed in Brunson and Petrick is universal. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975) (“[A] defendant who elects to represent himself cannot thereafter complain that the quality of his own defense amounted to a denial of ‘effective assistance of counsel.”’
40 Geo. L.J. Ann. Rev. Crim. Proc. 515 n. 1601 (2011) (collecting cases from multiple jurisdictions, all of which support the statement that
“a pro se defendant may not claim his or her own ineffectiveness as a ground for appeal”.
The basic rationale for this rule is twofold. First, courts reason that a defendant who has made his bed (by electing to represent himself and thereby retaining direct control over his defense) must lie in it (by accepting the consequences of his decision). Second, courts worry that allowing pro se defendants to claim ineffective assistance would give defendants an incentive to sabotage their own trials..."
http://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/pro-se-defendants-and-ineffective-assistance-of-counsel/
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Dylann Roof Will Represent Himself In Charleston Church Shooting Trial
"...
A common question that comes up in cases like this is whether a Defendant may use the fact that they represented themselves and made errors during the trial that arguably amount to ineffective assistance of counsel in any appeal of a guilty verdict. The short answer to that question is no. In both Ferretta and other cases, the Supreme Court, along with numerous lower courts. ruled that one price the Defendant pays for choosing to represent themselves is that they will be assumed to be as aware of the relevant laws and procedures as any licensed attorney and that they will be held to the same standards of conduct as such an attorney. For this reason, a Judge who allows a Defendant to represent themselves in a case that would otherwise require counsel will often give the Defendant an extensive speech on the record explaining the consequences of waiving the right of representation, part of which includes waiving the right to raise ‘ineffective assistance’ on appeal. This is similar to the rules that establish that an attorney representing a criminal defendant cannot raise this issue on appeal if it appears from the record that the trial attorney was deliberately acting in a manner that would create an ‘ineffective assistance’ defense on appeal, nor can a self-represented defendant raise as an error on appeal the fact that the Court granted his request for self-representation unless it appears from the record that the request should not have been granted because the Defendant was not competent at the time of trial..."
http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/dy...-himself-in-charleston-church-shooting-trial/
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BUTTTT: Bruck represented Roof in the guilt phase of the trial, so, in reality, I assume, he can say, if he wanted to, for whatever reason, that he was ineffectively assisted in that phase.
