She did lack confidence, that was obvious with all the sidebars she allowed.
However, all judges run into situations on the bench where they are not sure what is the best way to rule, even some very experienced ones have to take the time to look things up. Stephens should have researched this properly before ruling, perhaps asked a more experienced cohort for clarification or about whether she was interpreting the law properly. As it was, she looked weak and indecisive; she never should have let that defendant call the shots...that's how it looked to me and if I saw it that way I am sure other citizens did, too.
I agree that the October 30th ruling in particular, but also the great latitude she gave to the DT all along, made her seem weak, even defense-favoring, to a great many trial observers.
I don’t think she was either of those things, just that she seemed uncertain at times, and had no problem with secrecy---which helps explain why her first, last, and only response to the that day wasn’t H-LL NO.
I also think she genuinely didn’t understand that the ’s constitutional right to “fully actualize her mitigation” did NOT, no matter how many times Nurmi said it, trump the public and media’s rights absent some extraordinarily exigent circumstance, the ’s wanting to control public perceptions of herself not exactly meeting that grave standard.
Why she thought the ’s very active choice to refuse to abide by the rules of court could even conceivably be viewed as “involuntary” is beyond me.
To use a trivializing analogy. The DT’s argument was like saying—a child has an absolute and guaranteed right to eat cake, and a child’s teachers aren’t allowed to interfere with a child’s eating of cake whenever she wants, even if her eating cake in class is disruptive, thus violating the rights of her classmate, because a child’s right to eat cake trumps the school’s right to impose rules on when a child may eat cake.
In reality, though, that while societal and legal consensus holds that children should be allowed to eat cake whenever they want, there are restrictions on that right, because the right of others not to allow children to eat cake at any time is, as a matter of law, superior to the right of children to eat cake whenever they want. The school's right to dictate cake eating, as a matter of law, trumps her right to eat cake as she pleases, and the only exception to the school’s cake eating rule is that a child may eat cake if she’s experiencing a medical emergency that requires a slice of cake to be consumed.
A child, knowing the school prohibits eating cake any time other than lunch, tells her teacher- “I want cake, and I want it now.” The teacher asks her—“are you having a medical emergency that requires a slice of cake be consumed? “
The child replies-“no.” The teacher tells her-“then no, you may not have cake.” The child persists, repeats: “I said I want my cake NOW,” and stomps her feet. The teacher tells her again that she may not eat cake, and that she’ll be given a reprimand if she decides to eat the cake anyway. The child eats the cake anyway. The child receives a reprimand.
School rules about eating cake existed. The child chose not to follow the rules. Deciding to eat the cake, in disregard of the rules and whatever consequences, was a voluntary decision.
As was the ’s decision to not fully actualize her lies on the stand, in full view of a constitutionally mandated open court.
