WA WA - D.B. Cooper hijacking mystery, 24 Nov 1971 - #3

[MrShutter45]

:notgood: probably like giving birth to an 8 pound baby... now THAT is pain!! :lol:

Hope you feel better MrShutter!! eace:

well, I'm not sure if the stone came out or not? pain is gone but is the stone?

anyway I am doing my first test run on the first leg of the flight path this weekend, I will be recording it and posting it soon. hopefully I will have the wind, temp etc all correct and we will see what happens lease:

 

[Niner]

well, I'm not sure if the stone came out or not? pain is gone but is the stone?

anyway I am doing my first test run on the first leg of the flight path this weekend, I will be recording it and posting it soon. hopefully I will have the wind, temp etc all correct and we will see what happens lease:

Cool! I hope all goes well!! :rocker:

 

[MrShutter45]

well not much was done in the form of video for this weekends simulation:blushing:

once I uploaded all of the weather data into the system the plane flew a lot different than I expected, this caused me several hours off and on through out the day yesterday learning to fly the plane under the new conditions, I have been practicing without any winds or rain etc, basically "fair weather" conditions.

I flew about 9 times from Seattle to Toledo learning the path all over again :jail:
I should have some good stuff by the weeks end to report with better results.

one thing is for sure, I don't like wind shear! or turbulence! kind of like sneezing while trying to zig zag thru cones....whoooops lol, you would think a 23 minute flight would be a piece of cake Bzzzzz wrong, not as easy as one thinks while try to re-create a flight path just as they did! I can say I am learning a lot as time goes by about the pane and the path itself so if anything this has been a experience I have enjoyed :rocker:

 

[hominid]

re. the difference between wind direction at SEATAC per the weather service and the direction (180, magnetic) someone identified as "ground control" stated to 305 just before takeoff:

According to weather service (METAR) data at WeatherUnderground (historical) the 7pm wind at SEATAC was from 170°true (170°t). According to an aviation weather report printed the night of the hijacking, the 8pm wind at SEATAC was from 160°t. So the wind at takeoff time could easily have been anywhere between 160°t and 170°t, although it would most likely be about 165°t. The weather service reports are rounded to the nearest 10 degrees. That is, the rounding error is ±5 degrees.

The magnetic declination at SEATAC on hijack night was 20.9454°. We'll call it 21°. This means the weather service wind directions for 7pm and 8pm would mean 149° (magnetic) and 139°m(ag), respectively. But the ±5 degrees apply here as well, so the range would be 134°m to 154°m. It would be well outside the range of what could be called 180°m.

I think it is by far most probable that the weather service data is closer to correct than the statement "GC" made to 305 just before takeoff. The weather service data is two different observations, half an hour either side of takeoff time. The 8pm number is from an aviation weather report printed out that very night. It is barely possible that the direction might have been from 180° magnetic (180m) for a short time, but it is not likely that it would be so different from a prevailing direction of 140m to 150m for long.

I think it is likely that whoever made the statement over the radio made a simple mistake. If he got the direction from the weather service it would have been "true" rather than magnetic. To report to 305 in magnetic as flight controllers do, he would have needed to subtract 20° from the "true." There's a good chance he just added the 20 rather than subtracting it.


IMPACT OF FLYING BASED ON INCORRECT WIND INFO

If 305 thought the winds were going to be from 180°m, which would be 201°t, this would be almost a pure headwind coming from just 5° off the nose (from a bit west). They would be expecting to be blown a tiny bit eastward. (V23 airway ran 175°m out from SEATAC in 1971, and runs 178°m now.)

If they expected that they would be flying mostly at 10,000 feet on the way to the Mayfield (now Malay) intersection near Toledo, they would have expected the wind speed to be about 30 to 35 knots (kt). A 35kt wind from 201°t would have blown them barely over 1° off course toward the east. They could compensate by heading the nose 1° to the west of the direction they wanted to go.

If they realized that they would be loitering a while at 7000' while enroute to the intersection, they would expect the average windspeed to be about 25kt, which would have blown them about .74° off course (toward the east). If they wanted to compensate for this so as to stay on the V23 centerline, they could have headed that much to the west of V23. But the smallest heading division on the CDI is 5°. If they wanted to compensate, the best they could do would be to estimate about what 1° would be. They would head toward 176m (197t) rather than 175m. It's likely they would not even try to compensate for such a small wind effect, but let's assume for now that they did.

If the average wind of 25kt was actually from 140°m rather than 180°m, it would be less of a headwind and would push the flight westward (in addition to the 1° westward correction of the heading) rather than eastward. The wind would push the flight about 14.7kt toward 287°t (WNW, perpendicular to the 197°t heading) giving a course of about 5.0° to the west of the heading (205°t or 184°m). This plus the 1° heading correction to account for the wind they mistakenly expected would be about 6° clockwise of V23 centerline. I've measured the flightpath as being about 6° clockwise from V23 centerline, so this matches the plot well.

The average groundspeed to the 19:58 point is 168.81kt based on the "FBI" flightpath plot and a takeoff at 7:36:33 (which seems to be working well). Based on this and the calcs in the preceding paragraph, the average true airspeed (TAS) from takeoff to the 19:58 point would be 188.4kt. Based on the average elevation being 7000', this would be about 169.6KIAS average speed from takeoff to the 19:58 point.

I think it is most probable that the 305 crew intended to fly right down the centerline of V23. They were not accustomed to VOR (victor) airway flying. If they were comfortable with using their VORs they could have done that and just kept the heading where the CDI told them to go. This would have kept them much closer to the V23 centerline than what they did. Or, they could have seen that V23 was a 175°m course out of SEATAC, made a correction for wind, and just headed the nose at 176°m.

The possibility that 305 flew on the basis of an incorrect wind report completely and very closely explains the direction and extent of departure from the V23 centerline as shown on the "FBI" flightpath plot.

 

[AlwaysShocked]

Wow, this thread has sure had some twists and turns since the last time I visited it!

FWIW I used the link provided to go to the website that shows the "Playboy" letter(s). And yes, my understanding is the letter on the left would be an image of the original letter and the letter on the right is a reproduction of the letter.

Something I noticed about the speech pattern of the Narrator of the video is that in words that begin with "th" - such as "this" and "these" - he says "dis" and "dese". This is a pronounciation trait associated with the Northeastern part of the United States. It can be heard here where I live, in Western Pennsylvania and certainly around New Jersey, New York, and on up to the Boston Area.

And not to stereotype, but usually "dese" and "dem" and "dose" instead of "these" and "them" and "those" is heard in people who have not had much, if any, higher education.

To my ear, the Narrator had a "fast" speech pattern. Again East Coast as opposed to West Coast. Also usually means a younger speaker as opposed to an older speaker.

Question: Other than the "hidden clues" garnered from noting which advertisement each specific letter had come from - which I think is quite a stretch - had the name ONLY been released as "Dan Cooper" as of the Dec 1st postmark on the letter?

 

[MrShutter45]

re. the difference between wind direction at SEATAC per the weather service and the direction (180, magnetic) someone identified as "ground control" stated to 305 just before takeoff:

According to weather service (METAR) data at WeatherUnderground (historical) the 7pm wind at SEATAC was from 170°true (170°t). According to an aviation weather report printed the night of the hijacking, the 8pm wind at SEATAC was from 160°t. So the wind at takeoff time could easily have been anywhere between 160°t and 170°t, although it would most likely be about 165°t. The weather service reports are rounded to the nearest 10 degrees. That is, the rounding error is ±5 degrees.

The magnetic declination at SEATAC on hijack night was 20.9454°. We'll call it 21°. This means the weather service wind directions for 7pm and 8pm would mean 149° (magnetic) and 139°m(ag), respectively. But the ±5 degrees apply here as well, so the range would be 134°m to 154°m. It would be well outside the range of what could be called 180°m.

I think it is by far most probable that the weather service data is closer to correct than the statement "GC" made to 305 just before takeoff. The weather service data is two different observations, half an hour either side of takeoff time. The 8pm number is from an aviation weather report printed out that very night. It is barely possible that the direction might have been from 180° magnetic (180m) for a short time, but it is not likely that it would be so different from a prevailing direction of 140m to 150m for long.

I think it is likely that whoever made the statement over the radio made a simple mistake. If he got the direction from the weather service it would have been "true" rather than magnetic. To report to 305 in magnetic as flight controllers do, he would have needed to subtract 20° from the "true." There's a good chance he just added the 20 rather than subtracting it.


IMPACT OF FLYING BASED ON INCORRECT WIND INFO

If 305 thought the winds were going to be from 180°m, which would be 201°t, this would be almost a pure headwind coming from just 5° off the nose (from a bit west). They would be expecting to be blown a tiny bit eastward. (V23 airway ran 175°m out from SEATAC in 1971, and runs 178°m now.)

If they expected that they would be flying mostly at 10,000 feet on the way to the Mayfield (now Malay) intersection near Toledo, they would have expected the wind speed to be about 30 to 35 knots (kt). A 35kt wind from 201°t would have blown them barely over 1° off course toward the east. They could compensate by heading the nose 1° to the west of the direction they wanted to go.

If they realized that they would be loitering a while at 7000' while enroute to the intersection, they would expect the average windspeed to be about 25kt, which would have blown them about .74° off course (toward the east). If they wanted to compensate for this so as to stay on the V23 centerline, they could have headed that much to the west of V23. But the smallest heading division on the CDI is 5°. If they wanted to compensate, the best they could do would be to estimate about what 1° would be. They would head toward 176m (197t) rather than 175m. It's likely they would not even try to compensate for such a small wind effect, but let's assume for now that they did.

If the average wind of 25kt was actually from 140°m rather than 180°m, it would be less of a headwind and would push the flight westward (in addition to the 1° westward correction of the heading) rather than eastward. The wind would push the flight about 14.7kt toward 287°t (WNW, perpendicular to the 197°t heading) giving a course of about 5.0° to the west of the heading (205°t or 184°m). This plus the 1° heading correction to account for the wind they mistakenly expected would be about 6° clockwise of V23 centerline. I've measured the flightpath as being about 6° clockwise from V23 centerline, so this matches the plot well.

The average groundspeed to the 19:58 point is 168.81kt based on the "FBI" flightpath plot and a takeoff at 7:36:33 (which seems to be working well). Based on this and the calcs in the preceding paragraph, the average true airspeed (TAS) from takeoff to the 19:58 point would be 188.4kt. Based on the average elevation being 7000', this would be about 169.6KIAS average speed from takeoff to the 19:58 point.

I think it is most probable that the 305 crew intended to fly right down the centerline of V23. They were not accustomed to VOR (victor) airway flying. If they were comfortable with using their VORs they could have done that and just kept the heading where the CDI told them to go. This would have kept them much closer to the V23 centerline than what they did. Or, they could have seen that V23 was a 175°m course out of SEATAC, made a correction for wind, and just headed the nose at 176°m.

The possibility that 305 flew on the basis of an incorrect wind report completely and very closely explains the direction and extent of departure from the V23 centerline as shown on the "FBI" flightpath plot.

as we stand now, I am taking off at 7:36:33 and maintaining a speed of 180/190 KIAS until 7:40:37 the back down to 160 arriving at 19 DME at about 7:43:20....my next change is at 7:51:?? start my climb to get at 10,000 7:54:?? level off and speed up 170/180 range making the turn at Maylay about 7:57:30......then shut down the simulator after plotting the 7:59 slot

I stay around V23 178/180 magnetic, I'm surprised that nobody seen the plane from McChord? they fly very close to them?

 

[hominid]

I made this up from data in the aviation weather report for 8pm, plus a tiny bit from WeatherUnderground.com history. Note that there is an isobar for each whole millibar number. It has considerable detail on surface wind in the western third of the state.

 

[CCharger]

It seems pretty clear from my research what happened here.

Cooper jumped just north of Battleground. Shocked from the cold, confused by the chute, disoriented by the darkness, he splashed down either in Salmon Creek or one of her tributaries. Never opened the chute - dead at impact.

His corpse floats downstream overnight along the Salmon River. By sunrise the body is filling with water and begins to sink, dragged slowly along the bottom into Lake River.

Days, perhaps a week or more, passes. The body and the money along are dragged along the bottom. The drawstring opens and the money spills out just as Lake River flows into the Columbia.

The body, freed from the anchor of the money bag, floats to the surface one night and is discharged into the Pacific Ocean.

Some of the money travels up the Columbia very slowly if at all. Tidal actions and low flow during the winter time causes the Columbia to reverse flow and deposits the money on Tena Bar where in time it is covered first in snow and later in sand. It is found 9 years later.

Everything else is lost. Cooper is fish food, and the rest of the money is either completely deteriorated or washed out to sea itself.

I know it doesn't sound as sexy as Cooper landing, getting away, and secretly burying the money on a deserted sandbar, but it is far more logical.

Thoughts.

 

[MrShutter45]

It seems pretty clear from my research what happened here.

Cooper jumped just north of Battleground. Shocked from the cold, confused by the chute, disoriented by the darkness, he splashed down either in Salmon Creek or one of her tributaries. Never opened the chute - dead at impact.

His corpse floats downstream overnight along the Salmon River. By sunrise the body is filling with water and begins to sink, dragged slowly along the bottom into Lake River.

Days, perhaps a week or more, passes. The body and the money along are dragged along the bottom. The drawstring opens and the money spills out just as Lake River flows into the Columbia.

The body, freed from the anchor of the money bag, floats to the surface one night and is discharged into the Pacific Ocean.

Some of the money travels up the Columbia very slowly if at all. Tidal actions and low flow during the winter time causes the Columbia to reverse flow and deposits the money on Tena Bar where in time it is covered first in snow and later in sand. It is found 9 years later.

Everything else is lost. Cooper is fish food, and the rest of the money is either completely deteriorated or washed out to sea itself.

I know it doesn't sound as sexy as Cooper landing, getting away, and secretly burying the money on a deserted sandbar, but it is far more logical.

Thoughts.

Just as you were told on DZ, Salmon CREEK is not large enough to carry a body or money to the lake, there is also a levy it would not get past.

 

[MrShutter45]

It seems pretty clear from my research what happened here.

Cooper jumped just north of Battleground. Shocked from the cold, confused by the chute, disoriented by the darkness, he splashed down either in Salmon Creek or one of her tributaries. Never opened the chute - dead at impact.

His corpse floats downstream overnight along the Salmon River. By sunrise the body is filling with water and begins to sink, dragged slowly along the bottom into Lake River.

Days, perhaps a week or more, passes. The body and the money along are dragged along the bottom. The drawstring opens and the money spills out just as Lake River flows into the Columbia.

The body, freed from the anchor of the money bag, floats to the surface one night and is discharged into the Pacific Ocean.

Some of the money travels up the Columbia very slowly if at all. Tidal actions and low flow during the winter time causes the Columbia to reverse flow and deposits the money on Tena Bar where in time it is covered first in snow and later in sand. It is found 9 years later.

Everything else is lost. Cooper is fish food, and the rest of the money is either completely deteriorated or washed out to sea itself.

I know it doesn't sound as sexy as Cooper landing, getting away, and secretly burying the money on a deserted sandbar, but it is far more logical.

Thoughts.

Just as you were told on DZ, Salmon CREEK is not large enough to carry a body or money to the lake, there is also a levy it would not get past.

 

[hominid]

It has been said by someone that a person on flight 305 would have had to see past an overcast ("OVC") layer of clouds plus some lower cloud layers in order to see something such as lights at ground level. This reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of how cloud layers are measured and what the information means. The OVC layer is defined in terms of its coverage PLUS the coverage of the lower layers, so it is not legitimate to talk about an OVC layer as though it provides almost complete sky coverage by itself.

The fact is that the OVC layer above other layers does not necessarily cover a large portion of the sky. The reason for this is that the coverage criterion for considering a layer as "overcast" includes the coverage of the lower layers.

At the time of the hijacking, coverage was specified based on the number of TENTHS of the sky that was covered. Current standards are in terms of EIGHTHS. A "broken" (BKN) layer was a layer which, along with lower layers, blocked .5 to .9 of the sky. An OVC layer was a layer which, along with lower layers, blocked more than .9 of the sky.

If the BKN layer (and layers beneath it) blocked .8 of the sky, for example, the layer above could be considered an OVC layer if it blocked anything over 1/10 of the sky over and above what was blocked by the lower layers.

 

[hominid]

What does it take to demonstrate that the "FBI" flightpath chart is valid? That it truly shows, within the limits of its accuracy, the locations over which flight 305 passed after leaving SEATAC during the "Cooper" hijacking?

First, don't get sidetracked into looking at the flightpath plot with red and blue pushpin symbols, a broad green "path," and notations about positions according to plot and estimated positions. This is a product a person made from the original FBI chart. It's resolution is not nearly as good as the FBI chart, and the pretty symbols and green line obscure the plot positions. The "FBI" chart has positions marked by light red crosses.

Any "proof" that the flight was, at any time, within "x" miles of the centerline of "victor" ("VOR") airway V23 does not validate the flightpath plot. Such "proof" would only validate a contention that the flight at some point was close to the airway.

The best we can do is to verify that the plotted flightpath is consistent with the best information we have from other evidence. If the other evidence from the FBI and the flightpath were all provided as part of a conspiracy to obscure the truth, then consistency between the different pieces would be insignificant. But, if you believe that most of the info from the FBI has been truthful, that there has not been a "grand Cooper conspiracy," consistency of the pieces would indicate that the flightpath plot is truthful.

THE OTHER EVIDENCE

The other evidence applicable to the flightpath consists of the transcripts of communications, the NWA incident report, the crew notes, the '72 "searchzone" map, the placard, and the Tena Bar money find. We must prioritize these different pieces of evidence based on their precision with respect to locating the flight at different times. That is, the most important things with which the flightpath should be consistent are those things that are most precise and accurate.

Among the communication transcripts, there are three different types. There are transcripts of recordings of communications with practically zero time information. There are transcripts of recordings with times identified to the second. And there are the teletype communications with only the minutes at the ends of the communications logged when the messages were sent. Some communications of this last type could have been excluded since the different messages were stuck (taped?) together onto carrier pages.

Because the most accurate time info is on the one type of recording transcript, this transcript must be given highest priority. Use of the logged teletype messages must account for the fact that the times indicated are only the hour and minute portions of the time when the message was sent at varying times after the words were actually spoken and (approximately) typed into the teletype.

When analyzing the '72 searchzone map, again, don't get sidetracked and misled by the Google Earth image a person made by transfering his interpretation of positions into Google Earth. Don't just trust that the positions were correctly transferred into Google Earth. This image is of low resolution and shows practically zero features that can be used to determine the point locations. The black and white copy of a marked-up topo map is the original information and includes many recognizable features. It happens that a high resolution version of this is among the group files of the Yahoo research group site, and I can provide a copy to anyone who is interested (because I download/save everything).

The location of the placard tells us almost nothing about the flightpath. An analysis based on the placard's drag coefficient being unity is worthless for several reasons, including the fact that the placard very likely was bent and certainly would have picked up a heavy load of ice after falling the first 2000 feet.

The money find tells us something significant about the flightpath only if we are so stupid as to believe that the plane must have flown over Tena Bar because we don't understand how the money could have gotten there otherwise.

PLOT ACCURACY

What about the tolerances for the positions plotted on the flightpath chart?

Precise, detailed analysis of the chart reveals that the plotted positions were rounded to whole minutes of latitude and longitude. So the inaccuracy (likely errors) for the plot would be something plus a rounding error of ±.5 minutes for N-S and some other something plus the same rounding error for E-W. Because the radar from which the plane was tracked was at a bearing of approximately 45° from due south of the plane, the "something" errors (not including the rounding errors) reflecting the accuracy of the basic radar data would be approximately the same for N-S and E-W.

Equally precise, detailed analysis of the 1972 searchzone map reveals that the point "D" on the map is exactly the location annotated (probably incorrectly) as 2010 on the "FBI" chart, and that point "E" is exactly the location annotated as 2011 on the "FBI" chart. This means that the '72 searchzone map and the "FBI" flightpath chart were made from the same data set, and that the inaccuracies of the plotted positions on the two charts are identical.

The explanatory information that accompanied the '72 searchzone map indicated that the position tolerance for points drawn on that map was ±.5 nautical miles (nm). But the N-S tolerance for the FBI chart is ±.5' (which is ±.5nm) plus the "something". So the "something" must be so small as to be neglegible in order for the two tolerances to be the same.

Note that the ±.5' of longitude (E-W) does not equal ±.5nm as the ±.5' of latitude (N-S) does. Non-technical people typically do not understand the difference. Hence, the mistake is often made of equating a minute of longitude to a nautical mile of E-W. This was apparently the case in the explanation of position tolerance that was part of the explanation of the '72 searchzone map.

Conclusion: The position tolerances for the FBI flightpath chart plots is ±.5' of latitude and longitude. The plot positions should be within those tolerances of being what the actual aircraft positions were unless the chart is part of a conspiracy to confound the public.

 

[hominid]

As part of a statement that "Coop" must not have been very familiar with the ventral airstair, someone occasionally mentions Cooper having trouble dropping the stairs.

The difficulty he had was hardly related to his prior knowledge of the airstair. The simple instructions that any idiot could follow to drop the stair in the normal way were right there beside the control handle, largely in graphic form so that the operator wouldn't even need to read English.

And the crew had been given a different way ("procedure") to drop the stair because of safety concerns - specifically that the hijacker would fully extend and lock the stairs. The crew was not even aware of this method of dropping the stair until they were given the procedure prior to takeoff from SEATAC.

The probable reason for Coop's difficulties is simple.

When the plane is sitting on the tarmac, as it is when the stair is normally used, the tail of the plane sags downward under its own weight. This being the case, the distance between the forward end of the stair hatch (or the stair hinge/pivot) and the aft end of the hatch (or the latch mechanism out there) is shorter than when the plane is flying.

When the plane is flying, the tail of the plane is bent upward or neutral and the distance from the stair pivot and the uplatch is greater. The distance between the airstair pivot and latch mechanism would be greater than when the plane is resting on the ground, especially if the plane is flying slow with the nose up so that the lift by the little "wing" on the tail would be larger than usual.

When the airstair is installed, it is not just simply attached. Large assemblies of aircraft are not produced to sufficient precision for this. The position of the uplatch has to be adjusted so as to allow the uplatch rollers near the end of the stair to fit smoothly into the uplatch. This is done with the plane on the ground and the tail of the plane sagging--as it would be in normal use. So, when the plane is flying, the uplatch rollers on the stair no longer match up correctly with the uplatches fastened to the fuselage. The STAIR BINDS.

When the stairs would not drop when released, Coop may well have used some knowledge of the system to come to the final solution. He used the air-operated emergency extension system to "blow" the stair open. This is the system the "Toutle" placard related to. It's possible Coop figured out on his own to use the emergency extension system and may have known of its existence and capabilities ahead of time.

 

[kilahchris]

After reading this case and doing some research. I think it is highly likely that the parachute that was given to Dan Cooper was a fake or the parachute malfunctioned. I believe that man plummeted to his death!

I find it amazing that the FBI would not mark the bills in an undetectable way. There is no way they can track the money!

 

[Lorne Malvo]

I encourage anyone who hasn't to read the latest DB Cooper book titled Skyjacked. It makes me believe he is still alive and got away with 95% of the cash. Let's discuss the book HD case.

 

[Nmiwrecks]

While researching missing persons cases in my area, I came across an obscure case where a man disappeared and his car was left in an airport parking lot in Traverse City, Michigan. His name was Dick Lepsy. He was about 6'1" and weighed about 180 pounds, with black hair and brown eyes. The photo on the left is of Dick Lepsy circa 1963, and the photo on the right is the second FBI sketch of the D.B. Cooper suspect. For more info, check out: http://www.michiganmysteries.com/#/lepsy/4581551701

 

[Irish_Eyes]

Amazing. Looked at other pics of Lepsy and sure see the likeness. (And in one of the pics, he could be wearing that same suit and tie!) And the glasses....I don't know much about the menswear of the era to know whether the glasses, and suit/tie would have been very common, but there is a lot of promise here. The timeline works too. I looked and can't find any military record for RRL. Wasn't it thought DB had such training?

 

[AlwaysShocked]

I read a book called "Still Missing" in which the Richard Lepsy case was fully described. Despite the physical resemblance to the sketch (and yes, the glasses and the suit were typical for men in those days) it is highly doubtful that Lepsy was D.B. Cooper. The Cooper highjacking took place two years after Lepsy had already disappeared.

1.) Lepsy was only 33 at the time of his disappearance, thus if alive he would have been 35 at the time of the Cooper highjacking. Cooper was described by both flight attendants - who talked to him and sat next to him on the plane - as being in his 50's.

2.) Lepsy had no military experience and no parachuting experience.

3.) Lepsy was a supermarket manager. The morning after he disappeared it was found that the safe at the supermarket was jammed shut. A locksmith worked all day to get the safe open. Then it was found that $2,000 cash was missing from the safe.

4.) Lepsy was never listed at the time as a Missing Person. Both local and state police involved believed it was a voluntary departure, based on both the missing money and a man and a woman purchasing airline tickets the evening of his disappearance at an airport one hour away from Lepsy's home. (Lepsy and his wife had been having marital problems because she suspected him of having an affair.) Police investigations were based on the missing money.

Interestingly, there was more than $2000 in the safe at the time. But only $2000 was taken. The owner of the family-owned supermarket later stated "That's just like Dick Lepsy. He only took what he needed."

 

[scoobydoobie]

I thought maybe Brad Bishop was the hijacker DB Cooper.

I attached a picture of Bishop and a recent composite made of Cooper. Sry but I don't remember the source where I stole these pics from. FBI site and some DB Cooper convention site maybe.

-I think the faces look identical except for the cleft chin is absent on Cooper. Could Bishop have disguised his cleft chin (he did spend years in military counter intelligence). Also, Cooper appeared a little older than Bishop was at the time, about 10 years older. Again, maybe he disguised himself to look older.
- both drank whiskey
- both smoked
- both about 6 foot tall and 180 pounds
- Bishop was trained as a pilot and was well read. Cooper obviously knew about planes, like which kind to hijack, refueling times, etc.
- Bishop was likely very familiar with airline procedures and maybe even the Seattle Tacoma area from his years of traveling for the state department. Cooper is thought to have used the city lights on the ground to orient himself and to know when to jump out, i.e. he was familiar with how Sea-Tac would look from a plane.
- Bishop was an avid outdoorsman, hiker, athlete. I'd assume Cooper would have to have been too considering how he bailed into the wilderness like he did.

So again, DB Cooper apparently did not have a cleft chin and looked to be in his mid forties. Whereas bishop did have a cleft chin and was in his mid thirties. other than that, they seem to be similar.

Of course the FBI could compare DNA samples of each guy...

 

[scoobydoobie]

-same complexion. Cooper was "olive/latin" according to fbi poster. Bishop was "medium" according to fbi poster

The last entry in Bishop's journal : "Still, you stand on the threshold. You have soared to the heights & plummeted, each time, to the depths.”