The 1st quote backs my comment.
The 2nd and 3rd quotes are from NC, which many of you chose not to believe except when the argument suits
The 4th quote, I'm looking for the link, but I thought was a reference the judge was making to another case with other children, that the judge was using as a precedent, to show his decision making in the releasing of WT's status as a foster child, but not sure on that.
Yes you are right on #4. The Judge cites previous case law.
(quote)
The parens patriae jurisdiction
Aside from where statute confers jurisdiction to make orders restraining publication in the media of information concerning a child, the court’s power to do so is an aspect of its inherent parental - or parens patriae - jurisdiction. In New South Wales, this aspect of that jurisdiction was first referred to in P v P, [3] where Powell J (as he then was) held that the court, in exercise of its wardship jurisdiction, has power to protect a ward from injury by publicity by making an order restraining anyone, whether a party to the proceedings or not, from publishing information relating to, or likely to injure, the ward; but that such an order should not be made of course, but only after due regard to other rights which the court has a duty to protect; [4] and further that those principles were not limited to wardship cases but extended to any case in which the court was exercising its parental jurisdiction. [5] However, his Honour declined to grant an injunction restraining the proposed televising of a segment on a television program relating to children who were wards of the court, their maternal grandparents and their mother, the matter being in the public interest and there being no real risk of substantial harm to the children: [6]
Although my concern as to the second matter has been less easy to resolve, I have, after anxious consideration, concluded that it would be contrary to principle for me to intervene in order to have the scenes in question deleted from the segment when televised.
Given the present state of society, it is, in my view, only proper that the public be made aware of the bitterness, distrust, and, at times, irresponsible actions which are a commonplace of disputes such as these, and of the often intractable problems which judges commonly encounter when called upon to resolve such disputes. So too, I think it only proper that the public be made aware that, despite the fact that the parties to such disputes almost always claim to be motivated by a desire to advance the best interests of the child or children in question, the tragic fact is that it is usually the child, or children, in question who is, or are, most likely to be hurt by the bitterness and tensions to which it is, or they are, exposed, and the irresponsible actions to which it is, or they are, subjected. Even if the proposed segment does nothing more, it, at the least, makes those matters brutally clear.
This being so, it seems to me that, unless I can perceive a real risk of substantial harm to the two young children whose interests I am concerned to protect, it would be wrong for me to intervene. Since the children are so young, and since, as chance would have it, the plaintiffs, with whom they live do not own a television set, it is unlikely, in the extreme, that the televising of the proposed segment would have any immediate effect upon either of them. While, if the facts had been different, one might have been concerned as to the effect of the viewing of the segment by members of the community in which the children live, I have come to the sad conclusion that, in the light of what I already know as to the parties' past history, it is more probable than not that this unhappy dispute has, long since, become part of the folklore of the little community in which the children have lived for the greater part of their lives.
(unquote)
https://www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au/decision/58853ecfe4b058596cba36a9
