This is interesting commentary on the status of religious exemption cases:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news...gally-excuse-you-from-doing-part-of-your-job/
It's by Eugene Volokh, a lawyer who written extensively about these types of cases in the past.
Part of the article is about when and to what extent employers have an obligation to accommodate the religious beliefs of employees. There's a great deal of case law already in existence. Employers have an obligation to exempt you from specific tasks based on religious objections if it's possible to do so without "undue cost."
Then the article addresses Kentucky's Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which requires government agencies to exempt religious objectors from generally applicable laws, unless denying the exemption is the least restrictive means of serving a compelling government interest.
Then it turns specifically to this case and the monkey wrench that it has thrown into the works. It appears that KD doesn't have much of a case under federal law:
denying County residents their constitutional right would certainly be an “undue hardship” imposed on the County and its citizens, and requiring her to comply with the Constitution would be the least restrictive means of serving the compelling interest in protecting citizens’ constitutional rights.
But she might have a pretty strong claim under state law:
Modifying the Kentucky marriage license to remove her name from them would be a
"cheap accommodation that, it seems to me, a state could quite easily provide."
But, here's the monkey wrench: this is a federal case, and a federal judge generally can’t issue an injunction against state officials under state law (to change the KY marriage license).
It's the author's opinion that
"if Kim Davis does indeed go through the state courts, and ask for a modest exemption under the state RFRA — simply to allow her to issue marriage licenses (opposite-sex or same-sex) without her name on them — she might indeed prevail. Rightly or wrongly, under the logic of Title VII’s religious accommodation regime and the RFRA religious accommodation regime, she probably should prevail."
My opinion, now: I think that if this objection really is based on her religious belief, she's going about it all wrong. She needs to request from the
state an exemption to allow her office to issue licenses without her name on them.
I'm not suddenly changing my mind about the whole issue and saying it's fine for her to refuse to issue same-sex marriage license. But I
think I'm changing my mind about her right to a limited religious exemption related to the job duty of issuing marriage licenses. And I think it's in the wrong court, and I think all parties involved have turned it into a showdown rather than engaging in a productive discussion about how to accommodate her religious beliefs without interfering with the obligations and duties of her office.
Anyway, the article is an interesting and astute analysis of the legal issues, whether or not it changes your mind about any of it.