Looks like Juan got the ruling JS made about access to the jail records reversed!!
Dang, he's good.
The issue before us is whether the trial court abused its
discretion in precluding the State from obtaining jail
visitation logs. According to the State, the logs are kept by
The issue before us is whether the trial court abused its
discretion in precluding the State from obtaining jail
visitation logs. According to the State, the logs are kept by
the Maricopa County Sheriff as part of his official duties in
operating the county jail system. Thus, the State contends that
these government records are not protected as work product of
defense counsel. We agree.
Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 15.4(b)(1) provides that
“[d]isclosure shall not be required of legal research or of
records, correspondence, reports or memoranda to the extent that
they contain the opinions, theories or conclusions of the
prosecutor, members of the prosecutor’s legal or investigative
staff or law enforcement officers, or of defense counsel or
defense counsel’s legal or investigative staff.” (Emphasis
added.) The comments to the Rule note that the Rule “adopts a
limited work product standard” returning to the concept of
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), and that the Rule
protects documents “only to the extent that they constitute
legal research or the ‘theories, opinions and conclusions’ of
the parties and their agents.” Rule 15.4(b)(1) cmt.
The plain language of the Rule supports the State’s
position that jail visitation logs do not constitute work
product. See State ex rel. Romley v. Superior Court, 168 Ariz.
167, 169, 812 P.2d 985, 987 (1991) (In reference to the Arizona
Rules of Criminal Procedure, “[w]hen the rule’s language is not
subject to different interpretations, we need look no further
than that language to determine the drafters’ intent. We will
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give the rule’s language its usual, ordinary meaning unless
doing so creates an absurd result.” (citations omitted)). The
sheriff keeps a written log of the names of people who visit
particular inmates in the county jail. That information cannot
reasonably be construed as an opinion, theory, or conclusion of
defense counsel or of defense counsel’s legal or investigative
staff and therefore it does not fall within the scope of defense
counsel’s work product. Thus, the trial court abused its
discretion in granting Defendant’s motion. See State v. George,
206 Ariz. 436, 443, ¶ 15, 79 P.3d 1050, 1057 (App. 2003) (abuse
of discretion occurs when trial court exercises its discretion
in a manner which is manifestly unreasonable or based on
untenable grounds).
Defendant’s principal argument in the trial court was based
on work product, although she did include a general statement
that a violation of the Sixth Amendment occurs if counsel fails
to thoroughly investigate potential mitigation evidence. She
did not explain, however, how permitting the State to view the
jail logs would prevent her from obtaining effective assistance
of counsel.
In her response to the petition for special action,
Defendant expands her argument on that issue and raises
additional points not presented to the trial court. She asserts
that allowing the State to obtain the jail logs infringes on her
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right to establish a defense, as a fundamental element of due
process. She claims that jail logs have been used in other
cases by the State “as a fishing expedition to search for
defense strategy in all phases of capital representation,” and
if not prohibited, will cause a chilling effect on defense
counsel’s investigation. She further argues that if the State
is able to view the jail logs, it will “adversely affect defense
[counsel’s] decision making in terms of who to send to visit
[the Defendant], knowing the State will become aware of every
visitor.” Finally, she asserts that defendants will be
reluctant to confide in visiting experts if they know the names
of such experts are readily available to the State.
We decline Defendant’s invitation to address these
speculative issues, raised for the first time in this special
action. We do note, however, that if the State unduly
interferes with the attorney-client relationship, it runs the
risk of violating Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
See State v. Boggs, 218 Ariz. 325, 337, ¶ 51, 185 P.3d 111, 123
(2008) (recognizing that “not every intrusion into the attorney-
client relationship results in a denial of effective assistance
of counsel. Whether a Sixth Amendment violation exists depends
on whether the intrusions were purposeful and whether the
prosecution, either directly or indirectly, obtained evidence or
learned of defense strategy from the intrusions.”

; State v.
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Warner, 150 Ariz. 123, 127, 722 P.2d 291, 295 (1986) (noting
that “defendant’s right to counsel includes the protection
against improper intrusions by the prosecutor or other
government agents into the confidential relationship between a
defendant and his attorney”

. In this case, however, Defendant
has not directed us to any event that constitutes an intrusion,
much less an improper one, into her relationship with her
attorney.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED accepting jurisdiction of this special action
petition.
IT IS ORDERED vacating the trial court’s order prohibiting
the State from viewing and/or accessing jail visitation logs.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the clerk of the court provide a
copy of this Decision Order to the Honorable Sally S. Duncan, a
Judge of the Superior Court, and to each party appearing herein.
DATED this _____ day of November, 2009.
/S/ ____________________________