The name Bulsara first entered the Operation Oxborough database in the first weeks of the investigation as a result of a series of calls to the incident room by staff at Hammersmith And Fulham Action for Disability, or Hafad, an advice centre in Greswell Street, half a mile from the murder scene on the other side of Fulham Palace Road. They wanted to report the following strange sequence of events. On the day of the murder a local man known to them visited the centre and spoke to various people about his health problems. He had a carrier bag full of papers and it was clear he had a long story to tell, but since Hafad dealt with people only by appointment he was asked to return at noon the next day. In due course he left, but he did not return to keep his appointment, turning up instead on the Wednesday, two days later, and this time in an agitated state. His concerns were now different: he was no longer asking about health matters but wanted the Hafad people to tell him the time of his Monday visit and to describe for him the clothes he had been wearing. The reason, he explained, was that he was afraid the police would suspect him of the Dando murder - he had had trouble with the police before - and he wanted the information so that he could pass it on to his solicitor. Again he spoke to several staff members, making a considerable fuss, before leaving.
The people at Hafad understandably thought this suspicious and the centre's director, Lesley Symes, rang the police that afternoon (28 April) to tell the story. Although she declined to give his name over the phone, she explained that the man had mental health problems and she said that his visit on the Monday took place at 11 a.m. The time was obviously important: 11 a.m. was half an hour before the murder and the Hafad building is just six or seven minutes' walk from Dando's house. Although Symes's information was logged in the Oxborough computer system, however, no officer was despatched to Hafad to follow it up, and after two weeks the staff there grew impatient. So on 12 May a second call was made to the incident room and it was in the course of this call - sixteen days after the murder - that the name Barry Bulsara was first mentioned. The caller was Elaine Hutton, the finance officer of Hafad, and she wanted to give the police more information about the suspicious man, presumably in the hope of galvanizing them into action. She gave the name by which he was known at Hafad and his correct address and she said that several of her colleagues believed Bulsara resembled the man in the E-fit picture that had recently been released. Finally, she gave a different time for that Monday visit: Bulsara had called in at Hafad at 11.50 a.m., she said, or about twenty minutes after the murder.
These two calls were made, of course, at the busiest and most difficult time of the investigation, when the running and sweating men dominated inquiries and when the flood of information coming in was, to use Campbell's later phrase, 'approaching unmanageable proportions'. But the two Hafad calls did not go completely unnoticed, for three days after Hutton phoned an instruction was entered into the police computer system to "T.I.E.' - trace, interview and eliminate - the Barry Bulsara who was said to live in Crookham Road. This requires a little explanation, for such instructions are part of a police process that is almost mechanical. Certain officers in every inquiry have the responsibility to review all the information that is coming in and look out for specific items, no matter how minor, that need to be followed up. Each of these is or should be marked and numbered, with a note attached in the computer system spelling out exactly what step must be taken. These notes are called 'actions', and the action relating to Barry Bulsara was number 1637 in the Oxborough file. But just because an action has been 'raised', as the police put it, does not mean that it will be dealt with immediately, for there are usually so many they have to be ranked according to priority. A low-priority action, therefore, goes into a queue where it may wait some time before being 'allocated' to a named officer to be dealt with. Action 1637 was just such a low-priority action and it remained in the queue, unallocated, for nine months.
Campbell would later acknowledge that this amounted to a failure in his investigation but looking back we can see at least some reasons for it and among them, probably, are two further calls that came in from Hafad after the action had been raised. The first was made by Susan Bicknell, the organization's welfare officer, who had the longest conversation with Bulsara during his visit on the day of the murder. She rang in a week after Hutton to say that Bulsara had appeared to be 'very flustered' when she saw him and that she thought he might have witnessed something to do with Dando's death. In her opinion, she added, he did not look like the E-fit at all. And so far as the time of his visit was concerned she endorsed Hutton's version, saying that her meeting with Bulsara took place at about midday. (In fact Bicknell had a note of the encounter written a week afterwards which put the time at 11.50 a.m.) The last of the four calls from Hafad came from Elaine Hutton, who rang once again on 14 June to express concern that more than six weeks after the murder nobody from the police had yet visited Greswell Street to follow up their information. Again she identified Bulsara by name and this time she added his date of birth. She also said that when he called on the day of the murder he was wearing a casual jacket and a yellow shirt and was carrying a plastic bag. It may well be that these two later calls had the opposite effect to what was intended, for taken together they were likely to make Hafad rather less interesting to the police. The Hafad man now appeared to be dressed in the wrong way - nothing like the eyewitness descriptions of the gunman - and by Bicknell's account he did not resemble the E-fit and was merely a potential witness rather than a suspect. In the early stages of the investigation the job of tracing such a man could well have been regarded as of marginal importance, although the delay that followed was surely excessive.