I found the Supreme Court ruling about the case where LE
impounded (temporary seizure) the residence of a man while LE obtained a search warrant.
The full text of the opinion is available at the link below.
Barred from entering or as DM cites
not allowed from entering is not the equivalent of being allowed to enter if accompanied by a police officer.
The ruling emphasizes the following points:
1. Police officers,
with probable cause to believe that respondent McArthur had hidden marijuana in his home, prevented him from entering the home
unaccompanied by an officer for about two hours while they obtained a search warrant.
2. When officers later entered (armed with a search warrant), the officers found drug paraphernalia and marijuana, and arrested McArthur. He was subsequently charged with misdemeanor possession of those items.
He moved to suppress the evidence on the ground that it was the "fruit" of an unlawful police seizure, namely, the refusal to let him reenter his home unaccompanied.
Held: Given the nature of the intrusion and the law enforcement interest at stake, the brief seizure of the premises was permissible under the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 330-337.
(a) The Amendment's
central requirement is one of
reasonableness.
Although, in the ordinary case, personal property seizures are unreasonable unless accomplished pursuant to a warrant,
United States v.
Place, 462 U. S. 696, 701,
there are exceptions to this rule involving special law enforcement needs, diminished expectations of privacy, minimal intrusions, and the like, see,
e. g., Pennsylvania v.
Labron, 518 U. S. 938, 940-941.
The circumstances here involve a
plausible claim of specially pressing or
urgent law enforcement need. Cf.,
e. g., United States v.
Place, supra, at 701. Moreover, the restraint at issue was tailored to that need, being limited in time and scope, cf.
Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 29-30, and
avoiding significant intrusion into the home itself, cf.
Payton v.
New York, 445 U. S. 573, 585. Consequently,
rather than employing a per se rule of unreasonableness, the
Court must balance the privacy-related and law enforcement-related concerns to determine if the intrusion here was reasonable. Cf.
Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 654.
In light of the following circumstances, considered in combination, the Court concludes that the
restriction was reasonable, and hence lawful.
First, the
police had probable cause to believe that McArthur's home contained evidence of a crime and unlawful drugs.
Second, they had
good reason to fear that,
unless restrained, he would destroy the drugs before they could return with a warrant.
Third, they made
reasonable efforts to
reconcile their law enforcement
needs with the demands of
personal privacy by avoiding a warrantless entry or arrest and preventing McArthur
only from entering his home unaccompanied.
Fourth, they
imposed the restraint for a limited period, which was no longer than reasonably necessary for them, acting with diligence, to obtain the warrant. Pp. 330-333.
(b) The conclusion that the
restriction was lawful finds significant support in this Court's case law. See,
e. g., Segura v.
United States, 468 U. S. 796;
United States v.
Place, supra, at 706.
And in
no case has this Court held unlawful a temporary seizure that was supported by probable cause and was designed to prevent the loss of evidence while the police diligently obtained a warrant in a
reasonable period. But cf.
Welsh v.
Wisconsin, 466 U. S. 740, 754. Pp.333-334.
(c) The Court is not persuaded by the countervailing considerations raised by the parties or lower courts: that the police proceeded without probable cause; that, because McArthur was on his porch, the police order that he stay outside his home amounted to an impermissible "constructive eviction"; that an officer, with McArthur's consent, stepped inside the home's doorway to observe McArthur when McArthur reentered the home on two or three occasions; and that
Welsh v.
Wisconsin, supra, at 742, 754, offers direct support for McArthur's position. Pp. 334-336.
Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 (2001)
