My guess is that some DAs in Florida are getting tired of people thinking a concealed carry permit also makes them a "Regulator". "Regulators" have a long history of rapidly becoming everything they claim to be against- including criminals. Best to nip such thoughts in the bud.
My guess is not one prosecutor thinks this is analogous to "regulators.'
"Regulators" were third parties, not victims who may or may not over-reach in defending from an assault. Killings by regulators in the 'range wars" were almost always long after a precipitating event, no during one -- and by persons not involved in the original event. So you are using a term that is nowhere near accurate. An analogy to a regulator would be if a third party , a few weeks later, killed McGlockton or Drejka. As to the general point about concealed carry, the data indicate non law enforcement gun owners stop or prevent a couple million crimes per year.
This is a case of the individual who is clearly , we all agree, was victim of an assault.
So it is also problematic, frankly specious, to call it "a shooting over a parking space" when it is shooting resulting from a serious criminal assault.
Most juries are going to see being thrown on a concreate or asphalt surface as an assault that created reasonable fear of risk of grievous bodily harm.
The assault already occurred and the conflict situation was ongoing and in the case law an assault that has already occurred means expectation of continuing is present. The issue here turns on whether the assailant McGlockton was reasonably thought to be likely to continue the attack -- which would mean valid use of lethal force by Drejka in any and every US state under long established case law if he did not feel he could safely withdraw. Or not, which would mean I is not a justified homicide, regardless of presence of, or lack of ,stand your ground in a jurisdiction's code.
In a jurisdiction with no stand your ground, the option of withdrawing is usually only raised by prosecutors before the initiation of violence. And the defense can parry that saying Djerka does not have to use withdrawal option unless he could be sure he could do so at no risk.
Also what we have is the persecutor's offices charging. None of us here are looking at the defense arguments, nor the forensics. Anyone drawing conclusion is doing so with half the facts.
Plenty of people have been initially assaulted by a person initiating criminal violence, and then killed as the attack resumed. None of us knows yet all the factors that will be argued toward Drejka's reasonable expectations
My guess is not one prosecutor thinks this is analogous to "regulators.'
"Regulators" were third parties, not victims who may or may not over-reach in defending from an assault. Killings by regulators in the 'range wars" were almost always long after a precipitating event, no during one -- and by persons not involved in the original event. So you are using a term that is nowhere near accurate. An analogy to a regulator would be if a third party , a few weeks later, killed McGlockton or Drejka. As to the general point about concealed carry, the data indicate non law enforcement gun owners stop or prevent a couple million crimes per year.
This is a case of the individual who is clearly , we all agree, was victim of an assault.
So it is also problematic, frankly specious, to call it "a shooting over a parking space" when it is shooting resulting from a serious criminal assault.
Most juries are going to see being thrown on a concreate or asphalt surface as an assault that created reasonable fear of risk of grievous bodily harm.
The assault already occurred and the conflict situation was ongoing and in the case law an assault that has already occurred means expectation of continuing is present. The issue here turns on whether the assailant McGlockton was reasonably thought to be likely to continue the attack -- which would mean valid use of lethal force by Drejka in any and every US state under long established case law if he did not feel he could safely withdraw. Or not, which would mean I is not a justified homicide, regardless of presence of, or lack of ,stand your ground in a jurisdiction's code.
In a jurisdiction with no stand your ground, the option of withdrawing is usually only raised by prosecutors before the initiation of violence. And the defense can parry that saying Djerka does not have to use withdrawal option unless he could be sure he could do so at no risk.
Also what we have is the persecutor's offices charging. None of us here are looking at the defense arguments, nor the forensics. Anyone drawing conclusion is doing so with half the facts.
Plenty of people have been initially assaulted by a person initiating criminal violence, and then killed as the attack resumed. None of us knows yet all the factors that will be argued toward Drejka's reasonable expectations
