Context for part of this, regarding baby P, from the Trial: (Mailonline trial podcast)
"Dr Ukoh quickly returned to his bedside and he said one of the nurses, he couldn't remember exactly which one, asked if Doctor A, the doctor who Lucy Letby had a close friendship with, could attend.
The nurse wanted Doctor A in particular, he said. So Doctor A was bleeped and arrived soon afterwards..."
LL's cross-examination on 8th June 2023:
Dr Ukoh, the court is told, gave evidence to say Child P was in a very different condition between 9.35am and 9.40am.
He also said Letby was "very keen" for the doctor colleague to be called. Letby says this was because he had been present for Child O's deterioration. She adds it was one of the other doctors who suggested getting that doctor.
NJ: "Were you trying to attract [the doctor's] attention?"
LL: "No."
NJ: "Did you enjoy being in these crisis situations with [the doctor]?"
LL: "No....[doctor colleague] and I were friends.
NJ: "Something to share?"
LL: "No."
Recap: Lucy Letby trial, June 8 - cross-examination continues
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The Inquiry transcript - Dr U (Choc/A)
Pages 192 to 197
Q. Dr Lambie told us last week that by September 2015 she had observed a group of nurses in a huddle conducting an exercise where they were looking for a name or information that might link someone to events on the unit that had been unexpected, caused concern and suspicion, otherwise they wouldn't have been doing that exercise. That was in September 2015. Did you ever understand that people were putting together information to see who might be present at these unexpected and unexplained events, not just deaths, unexpected and unexplained events be they death or deteriorations, when did you understand that kind of information was being collated?
A. I think that was
later in 2016. I don't recall the exact month but it was in the middle to latter half of 2016.
Q. After Baby O's death or before?
A. I'm not sure.
Q. We know that Dr Brearey had sent an email to fellow Consultants saying that he would like to know or be informed about any deteriorations that had happened, and Baby N fell into -- taking into account after that email had been sent. Did you know about that email from Dr Brearey wanting to know about deteriorations or unexpected events?
A. To the other Consultants?
Q. Yes.
A. No, I don't think I was aware of that email.
Q. But you did talk to the other Consultants, you're a collaborative group, were you not aware informally that Dr Brearey was keen to know about unexpected deteriorations or anything suspicious?
A. Not as a result of that email.
Q. What was it as a result of then?
A. I beg your pardon?
Q. What was it -- you say not as a result of an email, what did you hear that from?
A. There was a discussion with the junior doctors in the office on the paediatric ward,
the middle to latter half of 2016, where I believe it was Dr Jayaram and Dr Brearey mentioned to us -- I think it was at the end of an afternoon handover -- that the deteriorations, the -- the neonatal unit was -- I'm sorry, I'm struggling to find the right words -- he had suggested that
the neonatal unit was having a bad run, that there were more events occurring on the neonatal unit than had been in previous years and we were I think during that handover asked just to keep our eyes open.
Q. Keep your eyes open, what for?
A. Well, I suspect for things -- for things that may be the cause of the deteriorations.
Q. We know the email Dr Brearey sent was May 2016. Is this conversation around that time -- you [he?] sent it to Consultants, but is this a conversation with you around that time?
A.
It was around that time, May or June I suspect.
Q. So by the time of Baby O's death, you are aware of that conversation.
A.
Yes.
Q. And Baby O's death comes out of the blue.
A. Yes.
Q. Baby P. What was your involvement with Baby P?
A. On the Friday morning that Baby P deteriorated, I was conducting the ward round on the children's ward.
I had been told not to go to the neonatal unit that day because of the events of the previous afternoon.
Q. Pausing there. Why, because you'd endured the death the previous day and shouldn't go back again or what -- why?
A. Yes.
Q. So that was a protective way of managing doctors or nurses, was it, if they'd been exposed to something traumatic before?
A. Yes.
Q. So who gave you that instruction or suggested that you shouldn't go back?
A. That will have been done at the morning handover because both wards were handed over at the same time. It was most likely the Consultant of the week. I think that was Doctor V that week.
Q. Again, my Lady.
LADY JUSTICE THIRLWALL: So that name is not to be reported.
MS LANGDALE: So on that next day, you were told not to go there but did you end up going there?
A. I did.
Q. Right. How did that come about?
A. I was contacted using the bleep system to -- I was bleeped and a message was passed that I should go to the neonatal unit.
Q. And what was the scene on your arrival?
A. So Baby P was in the far right-hand side of Nursery 2 and there were a lot of people in that room, doctors and nurses, and Baby P was clearly unwell from the monitoring system and just how he looked. I had a very, very quick handover about what had happened but it was clear that he was at the point of needing to be resuscitated.
Q. Did you think at the time, "How is this happening again?" You'd said earlier you were all conscious, two siblings, and here you are walking into that scene?
A.
At that time my priority was to resuscitate the baby. I -- and I got on with the tasks needed to get him mechanically ventilated and then starting to put more venous lines in so that more drugs could be administered.
Q. And after the intensity of the scene, did you then think, "How can we be here again?"
A.
So the rest of that day, the intensity only dropped slightly. He got a little bit better and then declined again, then got a little bit better and declined. I stayed predominantly at the side the cot dealing with breathing, circulation, volume replacement and I -- I didn't have the big picture. I had a summary of what had happened prior to me arriving there. I didn't know what had happened, I don't think, overnight. And I -- I spent I think the rest of the day in that room. There were some discussions because many of the Consultants came through and joined during the day and I -- I understood that they were discussing with the transport team and what should be done next.
Q. Baby O, P, and R's parents knew that they needed to get Baby R out of the Countess of Chester to keep him safe. They didn't know medically what had happened or how, but they knew Baby R was not safe there. Did you as a doctor think something's happening, he's not safe here after what had happened to O and then P?
A. I was glad that Baby R was transferred. I don't think I had put together the string of events of O and P. I was still looking for a medical cause for their deterioration. But I was glad that Baby R moved.
Transcript of Part B Evidence: - Dr ZA and - Dr V – Consultant Paediatricians, and - Dr U – Consultant Registrar
thirlwall.public-inquiry.uk
Dodging the questions IMO. How could he think the conversation about unexpected events was in the latter part of 2016 when there were no more unexpected events after LL had been removed? He doesn't answer the last two questions at all. Even after being officially warned of unexpected deaths in May 2016 he decided LL was no danger, and continued to support her until his police interview in January 2018. That is when LL said their "friendship" fizzled out. That's not manipulation from LL, it's abandoning sound judgement.