DCA - American Airlines passenger plane collides with Blackhawk over the Potomac River, all 67 on both dead, 29 Jan 2025

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(From your linked article)

Runway 33 draws scrutiny ...... The primary approaches to the airport’s main runway provide jets with hundreds of feet of clearance over the helicopter corridors, but Runway 33 is not as accessible, the Washington Post reported.

The approach to Runway 33 can take jets within 15 feet of the top of the Route 4 helicopter corridor that the Black Hawk was using, the Post said, citing FAA documents.

The helicopter route and landing path for the runway almost put aircraft “in the same place,” Scott Dunham, who has worked as a National Transportation Safety Board investigator and an air traffic control instructor, told the Post. “You have to move one of them.”
 
I think this is why I thought he was alone:

this article says the controller was doing the job of two people


but I see now that he was not alone:

this says there was five people in the tower

The five personnel in the air traffic control tower included an operations supervisor with oversight of the tower and an operations supervisor in training, Inman said.

 
I think this is why I thought he was alone:

this article says the controller was doing the job of two people


but I see now that he was not alone:

this says there was five people in the tower

The five personnel in the air traffic control tower included an operations supervisor with oversight of the tower and an operations supervisor in training, Inman said.


There were clearly other people in the control tower. We can hear the conversations of the female ATC who was acting as the Ground Controller that evening. With great calm and efficiency, she was summoning the Metro Emergency people, the DCA Airport Fire Department, and other emergency personnel, specifying as best as she could tell where the crash site was, freezing planes on the ground, telling a Southwest Airlines plane to stop and not to taxi onto the runway.

For example, she was summoning the emergency personnel to the east side of the Potomac River, just abeam the Joint Base Anacostia-Bollling facilities. Important, because it was critical for the emergency responders to be on the correct side of the Potomac. The DCA Fire Department was directed to the west side of the Potomac, just at the east end of Runway 33. It took a lot of composure and excellent training to be the one leading the organization of the responders and keeping the planes and passengers on the taxiways and at the gates safe.

(Edited for a small typo.)
 
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A boater asked if he was allowed to go on the Potomac, authorities said yes as long as he kept away from the crash site.
Now he has found debris that has floated downstream.
Part of a window, sugar packets, landing gear instructions, and other things.
The video in the link shows the floating debris field he came across.

 
I HOPE they have postponed all training/refresher flights until after they've figured out how to SAFELY accommodate them along with reduced commercial traffic.

Not holding my breath....
I had read that the Army was suspending flights from Ft. Belvoir but I don't know for how long. Unfortunately, they still have mission requirements that will require some flights.
 
Why does an airport that busy close so early?

ETA. I just checked my local airport, Sacramento International, and the last flights land between midnight and 1:00AM.
Regan National airport does not close early. The tower is manned continuously.

There is a noise rule in effect from 10:00 PM until 7:00 AM to discourage noisier aircraft from landing there during these times. This rule was made up back in the 80's, most of the modern aircraft operating at Regan National at this time do not make enough noise to fall under this rule.


DCA Nighttime Noise Rule
The DCA Nighttime Noise Rule allows the Airport Authority to impose financial penalties (fines) against airlines operating non-compliant aircraft during nighttime and early-morning hours. The intent of the noise rule is to discourage arrivals and departures of noisier aircraft after 10:00 PM and before 7:00 AM. Aircraft limits are based on noise certification levels which are defined in FAA Advisory Circular 36-3H, “Estimated Airplane Noise Levels in A-Weighed Decibels.” Historically, the Nighttime Noise Rule was effective in limiting the nighttime noise exposure associated with aircraft operations. The DCA Nighttime Noise Rule is not a curfew. When the restriction was implemented in the early 1980s, most aircraft exceeded the noise limits and were therefore not permitted to operate at DCA overnight. Through regulations and innovation, aircraft today are significantly less noisy than those operating in the 1980s and most aircraft operating today meet the DCA Noise Rule noise limits allowing them to operate at DCA without penalty.

 
Runway 33 is shorter.
The airport closes at 10 pm. Air traffic backs up the closer to 10 pm. They're trying to get everyone in and out before 10 or the flights are deferred to Dulles and BWI. It's a one to two hour commute back to DCA, if diverted and passengers are not happy.

I was surprised the tower was short one at a peak time.
Moo
@Simply Southern Could you please provide your source to flights being deferred to Dulles and BWI when the airport closes at 10:00 PM?
 
I HOPE they have postponed all training/refresher flights until after they've figured out how to SAFELY accommodate them along with reduced commercial traffic.

Not holding my breath....

The FAA put some restrictions in place until the preliminary investigation is completed (at least).


"The Federal Aviation Administration will limit helicopter flights on routes along the Potomac River between the Woodrow Wilson Bridge and the Memorial Bridge, and over the airport itself.

The FAA said helicopter flights would be restricted but not completely suspended. There are exemptions for medical emergency flights, active law enforcement and air defense, or presidential transport missions that must operate in the restricted area.

The restrictions will remain in place at least until the National Transportation Safety Board completes its preliminary investigation ... The NTSB has said it expects to release a preliminary report in about four weeks."

 
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As @acutename mentioned, its done to increase landing efficiency.

A commercial pilot on a Youtube channel mentioned that it is a routine option asked by ATC when they need to land planes quickly. He then related that he had flown the switched route and that it demands total concentration from the flight crew.

The pilot also implied that accepting the switch is voluntary as the ATC asks crews if they "can accept" the new assignment. This implies that if the flight crew is not comfortable with a rapid new assignment to a tricky approach, they can decline and still land at the originally assigned run way.
There was another plane that had landed just ahead of Bluestreak 5342 (Crashed plane) which was asked if they would accept a RWY 33 landing and they refused. This aircraft was Bluesteak 5307. That audio is linked below. The conversation starts at 12:20 when Bluestreak 5307 tells the tower they are on the Mount Vernon visual approach for RWY 1 and then at 12:30 the tower controller asks if they can accept RWY 33. Bluestreadk 5307 replies they are unable. The controller then clears them to land on RWY 1.

Blue Streak 5342 (Crash aircraft) checks in with the tower at 12:55 stating they are on the Mount Vernon Visual.


Also included in this audio is the conversation from the tower controller with the Blackhawk. At 1:59 PAT25 is given an altimeter setting of 29.89. At 3:07 tower calls the Blackhawk again aparenlty because he never got a response. At 3:23 the contoller says he has radar contact, and gives the position of the Blackhawk as he sees it (this is to confirm he is looking at the correct aircraft) and asks their intentions. At 3:36 the controller gives approval to the request from the Blackhawk.

I haven't yet found the complete audio that includes the transmissions from the Blackhawk before the accident. Given my 17 years experiance as a private pilot, my guess would be the Blackhawk asked for approval to transition the airspace when asked what their intentions were. This is standard procedure for an aircraft not intending to land to move through the airspce.

 
the conversation with ATC and Pat-25 the helicopter is two way. Twice they discuss the inbound CRJ and twice the helicopter acknowledges it and requests visual separation rules. That is what is supposed to happen. Then the helicopter is supposed to just keep separation from the incoming traffic. There are competing needs for airspace and this is the system used. For some reason the Army helicopter instead of avoiding the incoming plane as it was required to and had requested to do, just flew right in to it.
In the audio linked below, you will hear the audio in real time between the tower and the Blackhawk. Although you can't hear the Blackhawk since they are on a differant frequency.

At 15:50 the tower controller tells PAT25 (Blackhawk) there is traffic (Bluestreak 5342) just south of the Widrow Bridge, a CRJ for RWY 33. The controllers transmission ends at 15:56. PAT25 then responds (can't hear this audio, but we know from other sources what PAT25 said). At 16:00 the tower controller then approves the Blackhawk for visual seperation.

In other words it took less than 4 seconds for the Blackhawk crew to locate a plane over 6 miles away and make a radio call saying they have the CRJ in sight and request visual seperation. In my opinion as a private pilot, the male pilot who was the instructor on Blackhawk making the radio calls was complaisant and had made the radio call saying he had the CRJ in sight without ever looking for the CRJ in question or any other plane for that matter, just as he had probally done many times before.

To further complicate things, PAT25 was on a heading of aproximatly 090 degrees when making this call which would have put the CRJ at their 3 oclock. In a helicopter the pilot in command sits in the right seat, the co-pilot sits in the left seat. The male instructor pilot should have been sitting in the left seat, the female pilot in the right seat. In order for the male pilot to see the CRJ he would have needed to look accross the helicotor past the female pilot and out the right side window. Without a cockpit voice recorder we may never know if any of the other two crew members in the helicopter told the male pilot they had the CRJ in sight, but I highly doubt the male pilot could have looked where he needed to look given the position of the helicopter and seen the CRJ in that short of time.

Radar position and track of aircraft at times when radio calls were made can be seen in the video below. Without offical heading information it is hard to determine what the actual heading of the Blackhawk was during the radio call. I'm sure the NTSB will look into this. It seems the data from the accident flight for PAT25 has been deleted from flight tracking systems sites such as Flightaware and Flightradar24.


.
 
In the audio linked below, you will hear the audio in real time between the tower and the Blackhawk. Although you can't hear the Blackhawk since they are on a differant frequency.

At 15:50 the tower controller tells PAT25 (Blackhawk) there is traffic (Bluestreak 5342) just south of the Widrow Bridge, a CRJ for RWY 33. The controllers transmission ends at 15:56. PAT25 then responds (can't hear this audio, but we know from other sources what PAT25 said). At 16:00 the tower controller then approves the Blackhawk for visual seperation.

In other words it took less than 4 seconds for the Blackhawk crew to locate a plane over 6 miles away and make a radio call saying they have the CRJ in sight and request visual seperation. In my opinion as a private pilot, the male pilot who was the instructor on Blackhawk making the radio calls was complaisant and had made the radio call saying he had the CRJ in sight without ever looking for the CRJ in question or any other plane for that matter, just as he had probally done many times before.

To further complicate things, PAT25 was on a heading of aproximatly 090 degrees when making this call which would have put the CRJ at their 3 oclock. In a helicopter the pilot in command sits in the right seat, the co-pilot sits in the left seat. The male instructor pilot should have been sitting in the left seat, the female pilot in the right seat. In order for the male pilot to see the CRJ he would have needed to look accross the helicotor past the female pilot and out the right side window. Without a cockpit voice recorder we may never know if any of the other two crew members in the helicopter told the male pilot they had the CRJ in sight, but I highly doubt the male pilot could have looked where he needed to look given the position of the helicopter and seen the CRJ in that short of time.

Radar position and track of aircraft at times when radio calls were made can be seen in the video below. Without offical heading information it is hard to determine what the actual heading of the Blackhawk was during the radio call. I'm sure the NTSB will look into this. It seems the data from the accident flight for PAT25 has been deleted from flight tracking systems sites such as Flightaware and Flightradar24.


.
I don't think this is correct. The AA plane was on their 9:00, not 3:00. And the male was not an instructor, but an observer. The pilot was fully qualified. What the mess up was regarding the crj is unclear, but widely speculated that when the male BH says they have the CRJ, that they must actually be looking at a different aircraft. They wouldn't just ignore the information, and if they actually saw the AA they would realize they were on collision course. It is perplexing. There were two experienced pilots sitting in the cockpit of that Blackhawk, receiving information about an approaching jet, and still they just flew right into the side of that jet.
 
Anderson Cooper had a special on the other night discussing and dissecting what went wrong here.

One commentator, Peter Goelz, gave his informed opinion as the former head of the NTSB.

It struck me because he said that this is going to be human error somewhere, and that it is always distressing when “highly trained, highly skilled” people make such a human error.

Obviously no one is infallible, but this seems like such a routine day in the life of the pilots and ATC, and just a perfect storm of someone or several someones slipping up in a manner that turned catastrophic.

Unless and until the black boxes indicate an issue with the helo’s altimeter, which doesn’t seem to be the case, then I do believe it was an overlooked error that steamrolled immediately into the worst possible outcome.

A few seconds here and there would have avoided that collision and it would have instead been a near miss.

IMO as an ignorant layperson, it’s a combination of the ATC not being specific enough with the standard hours system of location (@ your 3:00, etc.) and the helo pilot somehow being 100 feet out of range.

Everyone aboard both aircraft paid the ultimate price. As to the ATC, that remains to be determined.

My niece was flying cross-country two days later, and of course intervening was the Medical transport crashing in Philly. I’ve been flying for 60 years and generally trust in the expertise of those whose livelihood is flying or air traffic control, but this time I was nervous for her and watched the news all day until she landed safely.

My own thought is still that ATC, being understaffed and fatigued, omitted the one sentence that would have told the helo pilot where precisely to look for the plane. I still can’t account for why the helicopter was 100 feet too high.

Just my thoughts.
 
I also wonder about what kind of visual radar was available to the helicopter crew, and what it would have shown them during the two communications with the ATC.

If they had radar, I find it hard to understand how they would not be seeing the aircraft that was directly in front of them, even with the other planes lining up for the subsequent landings.
 
I don't think this is correct. The AA plane was on their 9:00, not 3:00. And the male was not an instructor, but an observer. The pilot was fully qualified. What the mess up was regarding the crj is unclear, but widely speculated that when the male BH says they have the CRJ, that they must actually be looking at a different aircraft. They wouldn't just ignore the information, and if they actually saw the AA they would realize they were on collision course. It is perplexing. There were two experienced pilots sitting in the cockpit of that Blackhawk, receiving information about an approaching jet, and still they just flew right into the side of that jet.
Here is a diagram to help you better understand the direction in which the CRJ was at relative to the location and direction of travel of the Blackhawk at the time when ATC contact the PAT25 crew to tell them about the CRJ making a landing on RWY 33.

As you can see, the Blackhawk is on a heading of aprox. 90 degrees. The CRJ is directly south of their location, making it necessary for the PAT25 crew to look out of the right window in order to see the CRJ, placing the CRJ at their 3:00 O'clock. The Blackhawk was following the river, which turns to the East and then back to the South. The Blackhawk later turned to a heading more towards the South as they followed the river (heading 180) making the CRJ then at their 12:00 O'clock moments before impact.

Radar Image 5342.jpg
 
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