Here's an excerpt from a similar case:
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=482&invol=451
Second, contrary to the city's contention, the First Amendment protects a significant amount of verbal criticism and challenge directed at police officers. "Speech is often provocative and challenging. . . . [But it] is nevertheless protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest." Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949). In Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974), for example, the appellant was found to have yelled obscenities and threats at an officer who had asked appellant's husband to produce his driver's license. Appellant was convicted under a municipal ordinance that made it a crime "`for any person wantonly to curse or revile or to use obscene or opprobrious language toward or with reference to any member of the city police while in the actual performance of his duty.'" Id., at 132 (citation omitted). We vacated the conviction and invalidated the ordinance as facially overbroad. Critical to our decision was the fact that the ordinance "punishe[d] only spoken words" and was not limited in scope to fighting words that "`by their very utterance [482 U.S. 451, 462] inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.'"
Can anyone say that Professor Gates really presented a danger of "serious substantive evil"? Of course not. The cop overreacted. He should have just left Gates standing on his own porch, un-hancuffed, un-arrested, and with his cane. Remember, Gates knows all about professor-type stuff, and the police officer is supposed to know all about cop-type stuff.
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=482&invol=451
Second, contrary to the city's contention, the First Amendment protects a significant amount of verbal criticism and challenge directed at police officers. "Speech is often provocative and challenging. . . . [But it] is nevertheless protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest." Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949). In Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974), for example, the appellant was found to have yelled obscenities and threats at an officer who had asked appellant's husband to produce his driver's license. Appellant was convicted under a municipal ordinance that made it a crime "`for any person wantonly to curse or revile or to use obscene or opprobrious language toward or with reference to any member of the city police while in the actual performance of his duty.'" Id., at 132 (citation omitted). We vacated the conviction and invalidated the ordinance as facially overbroad. Critical to our decision was the fact that the ordinance "punishe[d] only spoken words" and was not limited in scope to fighting words that "`by their very utterance [482 U.S. 451, 462] inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.'"
Can anyone say that Professor Gates really presented a danger of "serious substantive evil"? Of course not. The cop overreacted. He should have just left Gates standing on his own porch, un-hancuffed, un-arrested, and with his cane. Remember, Gates knows all about professor-type stuff, and the police officer is supposed to know all about cop-type stuff.