UK - Lucy Letby - Post-Conviction Statutory Inquiry

Another one of CS2CR's most excellent videos going into detail of the messages between LL and her Union rep. Seems that what was happening between them was becoming very, very personal. Some of the messages between two people who were supposed to be interacting on a professional level - and a fairly effing serious one at that - seem staggeringly inappropriate to me!

 
Another one of CS2CR's most excellent videos going into detail of the messages between LL and her Union rep. Seems that what was happening between them was becoming very, very personal. Some of the messages between two people who were supposed to be interacting on a professional level - and a fairly effing serious one at that - seem staggeringly inappropriate to me!

Reminiscent of her messages with Ali Ventress about them running off to run an NNU in New Zealand together. She really knew how to use texts to her advantage didn’t she… as a way of building up fake feelings of intimacy and loyalty and dare I say “love” … as a friend of course “kiss kiss” xx etc ( vomit emoji )
 
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Interesting examination of Dr Jo McPartland at the Inquiry on Tuesday, the paediatric pathologist at Alder Hey who did baby D's autopsy.

Q. Now, the X-rays in this case, both in life and postmortem, were reviewed as part of the criminal trial by Professor Owen Arthurs, a professor of paediatric radiology at Great Ormond Street Hospital and by a number of members of a multi-disciplinary team and it was noted that there were changes consistent with air embolism on various X-rays taken in life and following death and that there was air in the great vessels. Can you explain where the great vessels are?

A. Well, great vessels you would normally talk about the large vessels in the neck, so for example the large veins leading to the heart or the large vessels leading from the heart. I'm not sure if they are talking about descending aorta as well.

Q. Again, the observation of air in blood vessels on X-rays is something that requires the specialist input of a radiologist?

A. Yes.

Q. It isn't something that you would expect to be able to do on seeing an X-ray yourself?

A. No

page 153 12/11/2024 – Transcript of Week 9 Day 2 | The Thirlwall Inquiry

Also very interesting examination overall regarding lack of neonatal clinical experience and poor communications from the hospital. Starting on page 142:

[Q] Did that strike you as being an unusual course for a child or baby to take in response to sepsis?

A. Well, in my experience when babies have died often they do have a fluctuating course beforehand and I have had cases before where a baby has collapsed, been resuscitated and then collapsed again and then eventually resuscitation fails. So a fluctuating course didn't seem to be that unusual to me. And then obviously she has become mottled and stopped breathing again and her heart has stopped. So the whole picture did seem to suggest that she was unstable and very unwell.

Q. You see Dr Hawdon gave evidence this morning and she said that this, this pattern leading up to the collapse, was atypical for sepsis. It's not what she would expect to see?

A. Well, I suppose she is a neonatologist with clinical experience that I wouldn't have. As you have alluded to, I would need a specific clinical opinion to go --

Q. Yes.

A. -- into a lot of detail.

Q. And I appreciate in asking you to give evidence on clinical matters, I am pushing you outside of your area of expertise. But I mean, you would agree that if Dr Hawdon said that this was unusual for sepsis, that it is unusual for sepsis? You'd defer to her?

A. Well, I would defer to a paediatric clinical opinion on that matter, but just pointing out that I have had cases where children have had multiple attempts at resuscitation in the hours leading up to a final death.

Q. And I don't disagree. I mean, of course I don't have the details of those cases to understand the differences that there might be. But you would defer to Dr Hawdon on that issue?

A. Yes.

Q. What the note goes on to say in the final paragraph: "Reported this had been third death in 12 days for neonatal. Also a further episode of apnoeic event and CPR for previous Twin death. Surviving Twin had successful CPR." Did anything strike you as unusual about the addition of that paragraph, is that something you would see normally?

A. Well, no, but as I discussed earlier with Ms Langdale, without knowing that any of those deaths were unexpected or unexplained or concerning in any way, a cluster in itself would not raise a suspicion of an inflicted mode of death. And especially as a pair of those are twins, and both have collapsed and one has died, I would assume that there had been something specific about that pregnancy and then there's only one other death. But as I mentioned earlier, there are a number of causes why neonates on a neonatal intensive care unit might die, so I would need to have a strong clinical steer that this was concerning for it to be flagging that this should be a case with police involvement. Because I would have thought if that was the case, then whoever wrote that would have flagged that this should be a case with police involvement right at the onset of reporting it to the Coroner.

and page 84

[Q] My question: why is it necessary to conduct paediatric postmortem examinations in combination with a forensic pathologist?

A. Well, if there is a suspicion that criminal activity may have led to the death or in some types of traumatic death where we might need the assistance of someone with forensic expertise then we perform the postmortem jointly and the role of the forensic pathologist is to consider matters of forensic importance and particularly those relating to injuries,and the role of the paediatric pathologist is to consider natural causes of death and look at growth and development and other medical conditions.
 
Also Dr Hawdon's evidence (and a dig at the misinformation still being reported by the Telegraph) -

page 31 -

Q. You tell us at paragraph 78 that there were there was further communication in February between yourself and Mr Harvey and indeed one of the things he sent you is a letter I am going to show you now, from the paediatricians to Mr Chambers, so that is INQ0003117, page 1. Take your time to look at this and if we could highlight please, Ms Killingback, paragraph 2 -- sorry, point 2, not paragraph 2. Go overleaf to page 2, the top: "The paediatricians said to Mr Chambers 'we do not consider that the episodes of care that she [that is you, Dr Hawdon] considered sub optimal could explain the rise in neonatal mortality and the sudden collapses in this time period'." Do you agree with that when they say that?

A. That's correct.

Q. So they were right and it was very clear, as far as you are concerned for another medic that you were not saying wherever you describe sub optimal care that explained a sudden death and collapse in the various cases, particularly those that you had highlighted in that group?

A. That is correct.

Q. Pausing there, Dr Hawdon. We have heard from the paediatricians, and one in particular expressed her frustration that in effect both her, the Royal College review, she is a member of the Royal College, and then your report both were used to deflect suspicions and concerns about Letby and in effect to try and criticise the medical care they were providing on the unit. Do you understand now you have seen the whole picture how they must have felt frustrated by that?

A. Absolutely.

Q. Here you are wholeheartedly agreeing with them that your report didn't anyway explain these deaths or sub optimal care resulting in deaths, yet we hear this thrown around as if it did.



(the Telegraph report published the day before Dr Hawdon gave evidence - subscription only: )
Three of Letby’s victims ‘could have deaths explained by medical problems’
 
Also Dr Hawdon's evidence (and a dig at the misinformation still being reported by the Telegraph) -

page 31 -

Q. You tell us at paragraph 78 that there were there was further communication in February between yourself and Mr Harvey and indeed one of the things he sent you is a letter I am going to show you now, from the paediatricians to Mr Chambers, so that is INQ0003117, page 1. Take your time to look at this and if we could highlight please, Ms Killingback, paragraph 2 -- sorry, point 2, not paragraph 2. Go overleaf to page 2, the top: "The paediatricians said to Mr Chambers 'we do not consider that the episodes of care that she [that is you, Dr Hawdon] considered sub optimal could explain the rise in neonatal mortality and the sudden collapses in this time period'." Do you agree with that when they say that?

A. That's correct.

Q. So they were right and it was very clear, as far as you are concerned for another medic that you were not saying wherever you describe sub optimal care that explained a sudden death and collapse in the various cases, particularly those that you had highlighted in that group?

A. That is correct.

Q. Pausing there, Dr Hawdon. We have heard from the paediatricians, and one in particular expressed her frustration that in effect both her, the Royal College review, she is a member of the Royal College, and then your report both were used to deflect suspicions and concerns about Letby and in effect to try and criticise the medical care they were providing on the unit. Do you understand now you have seen the whole picture how they must have felt frustrated by that?

A. Absolutely.

Q. Here you are wholeheartedly agreeing with them that your report didn't anyway explain these deaths or sub optimal care resulting in deaths, yet we hear this thrown around as if it did.



(the Telegraph report published the day before Dr Hawdon gave evidence - subscription only: )
Three of Letby’s victims ‘could have deaths explained by medical problems’
The telegraph did a really bad job with that. Almost totally selective with it, the guardian completed the story with the whole picture. Including Dr Hawdon saying her original report was superficial and made without communication from the consultants who treated those babies.
 
I can totally understand where people are coming from ie the family however it's good to remember that Lucy was more precious to them than anything. For someone seen as everything to them its going to be a huge mountain to climb to actually accept and deal with what she has been convicted of. I feel bad for them just putting myself in their shoes.
 

Week 9 – Part B evidence


Monday 11 NovemberClaire-Louise McLaughlan, Lay Reviewer, Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health (RCPCH)

Alex Mancini, Nurse Reviewer, RCPCH

Dr David Shortland, Paediatrician and Clinical Lead for Invited Reviews, RCPCH

Dr Nicholas Wilson, Consultant Neonatologist and instructed as Quality Assurance Reviewer, RCPCH
Tuesday 12 NovemberDr Jane Hawdon, Consultant Neonatologist, Royal Free London Hospital

Dr Jo McPartland, Consultant Paediatric Pathologist, Alder Hey Hospital
Wednesday 13 NovemberDr Ravi Jayaram, Clinical Lead Children’s Services
Thursday 14 NovemberHelen Cain, Care Quality Commission (CQC) Inspector

Dr Benjamin Odeka, CQC Inspector

Mary Potter, CQC Inspector

Elizabeth Childs, CQC Inspection Chair
Friday 15 NovemberAnn Ford, CQC Inspector

Julie Hughes, CQC Inspector

(Evidence from other CQC witnesses may roll into this day if required)


Week 10 – Part B evidence


Monday 18 NovemberConsultant Community Paediatrician (Safeguarding); Independent Chair of Child Death Overview Panel; Specialist Safeguarding Children’s Nurse; Specialist Nurse (Safeguarding Children)
Tuesday 19 NovemberClinical Lead, Neonatal Unit
Wednesday 20 NovemberClinical Lead, Cheshire and Merseyside Neonatal Network; Designated Doctor for Safeguarding and Child Death Overview Panel (Countess of Chester Hospital);
Police representative on Child Death Overview Panel
Thursday 21 NovemberFormer legal advisers to the Countess of Chester Hospital; NHS England North West Regional Director


Week 11 – Part B evidence


Monday 25 NovemberThe Nursing and Midwifery Council Employer Link Representative; Director of Nursing
Tuesday 26NovemberDirector of People and Organisational Development; Consultant Neonatologist & Clinical Director, Consultant Neonatologist
Wednesday 27 NovemberChief Executive Officer
Thursday 28 NovemberMedical Director
 
Few snippets from Hayley Griffiths' (RCN rep and co-worker in the Risk office) evidence to the inquiry -



Q. You were to subsequently accompany Lucy Letby in her interview with the Royal College, weren't you?

A. Yes, that's correct. [...]


[A.] ...I didn't know what to expect when I went into the meeting to support her, I was asked last minute and Lucy didn't trust anybody in the organisation to go with her. So I went with her but it -- within five minutes of being in the interview it was evident they were just asking very generic questions. [...]

Q. We know because she messaged Dr U about this that she said afterwards the two members were nice, they didn't ask much about the babies, it was more about the unit as a whole. [...]

Q. Yes. So you email him (Dr Green) and you get a meeting with him. If we go to page 18, you say at the top of there: "External review people came in told Lucy she would be interviewed and I attended with her. [that is the RCPCH] I think that the penny started to drop and that there was more to it than what she had been told. Both reviewers expressed their concern following this regarding her health and well-being. At this point she was very distressed." So is that -- who are you referring to there, expressing concern for her health and well-being?

A. I think the people who had interviewed her. [...]

Q. So that is Mr Mancini and Ms MacLaughlan when they were interviewing her. Can you remember what they said expressing that concern?

A. I vaguely recall and I think I have mentioned it in my statement, I think I had to go back into the room for something. I don't know whether I had forgotten my coat, bag, something and they just asked me. It was, you know, obviously it's not word for word but, you know, it was along the lines of: is she okay? Does, does -- does she know what's happening? And I was like: no, I don't -- because we didn't need to speak about it but it was evident to me that -- I thought they knew that she was, you know, potentially a person of interest but that didn't come across in that interview. [...]

Q. Page 31, please, message 2711. "Flowers and fizz for me, how kind?" Yes, we will get her some bits." And then: "You are worth it, my lovely criminal mastermind", from you. [...]

MR SHARGHY: Mrs Griffiths, I ask questions predominantly on behalf of the Family of Child I but I also ask questions on behalf of additional Families of Children A, B, L, M, N and Q. [...]

Q. Your next substantive involvement was when you accompanied Lucy Letby to her RCPCH interview on 1 September?

A. Yes.

Q. You have given quite a lot of evidence about it, so I am not going to recap. But the essence from what I understood of your experience of being in that meeting was that the allegations, in particular regarding serious harm, or indeed any connection with Lucy Letby, did not form part of any questions that the interviewers asked; is that correct?

A. That's correct.

Q. So how did the conversation come about and you deal with this at paragraph 43 of your witness statement, if you would like, you can turn up that paragraph?

A. Yes, I have got it, yes.

Q. Where you say: "I recall one of them saying to me something along the lines of 'does she know what is going on here and what she is potentially being accused of?'" [You] replied that I didn't think that she did." Now that seems to indicate, doesn't it, that at least by this meeting you were aware of the serious concerns of deliberate harm and the connection to Lucy Letby?

A. Yes. [...]

Q. Were you having separate conversations with members of staff regarding these concerns and then separate conversations with Lucy Letby regarding these conversations?

A. I didn't have any conversations with Lucy Letby about the concerns apart from when I spoke to her in the Country Park and spoke to her about the allegations. We never really discussed it again.

Q. Lucy Letby's reaction at this meeting, when no issues around concerns of serious harm or indeed any association with her was raised, was to get very upset and to leave the room and you followed shortly thereafter?

A. Yes.

Q. When you then decide that you need to have a very frank discussion with her, on 7 September, so just under a week later, you go to the Country Park,it's just the two of you, and you have that frank discussion that I suspect went something along the lines of: do you know what they are accusing you of?

A. (Nods)

Q. Multiple occasions of harm being caused deliberately to babies on the unit. Is that fair in terms of how frankly you spoke with her?

A. I do believe I was quite frank to her.

Q. Her reaction was to calmly stand up, say she wanted to be alone, walk away and at some point go on her phone?

A. (Nods)

Q. Do I take and understand by that that she didn't seem surprised that those serious allegations are being made, she didn't burst out crying, did she?

A. No.

Q. She didn't ask reasonable questions such as: well, who's making those allegation? Why are they saying this? How do you think I have done it? Or anything like that, did she?

A. She never said anything to me.

Q. How strange was that to you as a reaction given that the week before, when no such discussions are had, she became so upset?

A. I -- I thought it was a little strange and I put that in my statement but everybody deals with things differently and maybe I might have viewed as to how I would be if somebody said that to me. I don't know. I did think it was strange at the time but ...

Q. Again I am not going to go through the messages that you have been taken to already. But it seems from the totality of those messages, that you became extremely close to Lucy Letby; is that fair?

A. That's correct.

Q. You became so close that it actually clouded your professional judgment as regards patient safety and indeed how appropriate you should be acting as an RCN representative?

A. No, I don't believe that that's correct, I don't believe it did cloud my judgment and as I said before, I was there to support her. I wasn't her representative. I can see how it looks but I never had access to her case and she had two other officers that were representing her at more formal meetings like the grievance meeting and that it was probably because more I was a local rep however I accept I became close to her. The girl was put in my office, she had more access to me than any other member would and quite a lot of us became friends with her in the office and we supported each other. It was a difficult time for me personally, but I accept that.

Q. Would you go so far as to say that you loved her as a friend?

A. She was a friend and she was a very good friend at the time.

Q. The reason, Mrs Griffiths, to be entirely fair to you, is that is exactly one of the messages that you sent to her. Would you like to see that message?

A. I don't need to see the message. But that's the kind of message I would possibly send any of my friends.

Q. Okay. Given the severity of the allegations that were made, and would you agree that they are possibly the most serious allegations that anybody could make against a healthcare professional?

A. Yes, absolutely.

Q. Were you making light of those allegations when you were referring to "potentially committing a crime"?

A. No.

Q. Can you even begin to imagine or put yourself in the position of the families of the babies who were harmed when they see those messages?

A. I know. And as I have said before, I'm -- I am so remorseful. I've seen -- as soon as I seen them myself, I was, I was upset and I can't begin to imagine and I can only apologise and say I've learnt. I can't go back in time, but I have reflected absolutely on it.

Q. There is one document though I would like you to have a look at and it is at INQ0006346. Mrs Griffiths, this is an email that you sent to Alison Kelly and others on the Executive Board on 23 November of 2016 and it's essentially raising a concern, and probably even a complaint, that Dr Brearey had already seen a copy of the RCPCH report. What you say, if we can go just to the bottom of the paragraph: "On behalf of my member we would like to know why this is happening as we were given assurances not two weeks ago that a confidential meeting would take place with the Medical Director and key people regarding the draft report and that it would be kept confidential until the report [I think it should say 'was'] finalised and that nothing would be discussed as yet." Who gave you or indeed Lucy Letby those assurances?

A. I would imagine it was members of the Executive Team. I -- [...]

LADY JUSTICE THIRLWALL: Okay, thank you very much, Mr Sharghy. May I just ask you one question. You were asked some questions by Counsel to the Inquiry about your interview with Dr Green.

A. Yes.

LADY JUSTICE THIRLWALL: There was a sentence which we did look at. I just wanted to check something with you. You were talking about Lucy Letby and the note says: "She didn't want some things in the grievance in regards to the police." I just wondered what that meant?

A. I can't really recall, to be honest. I just knew she, she was -- she was a very private person and I'd be surmising if I could remember. Whether it was to do with the Consultants or whether there had been suggestions of any personal relationships, I can't really recall to be honest.

LADY JUSTICE THIRLWALL: I was asking you about it in regards to the police.

A. In her going --

LADY JUSTICE THIRLWALL: Yes. She didn't want some things in the grievance in regards to the police. You have told us that you had a discussion with her about going to the police.

A. Okay, yes, sorry

LADY JUSTICE THIRLWALL: So I mean, I just wondered if this was a reference in that context.

A. Yes. Apologies, my Lady. That may well have been a reference to she hadn't wanted to ask the question of why hadn't the police been called. I'm not sure to be honest.

LADY JUSTICE THIRLWALL: No. But do you think that seems quite a likely --

A. It's likely, yes.

LADY JUSTICE THIRLWALL: Yes. Yes, thank you. That is my only question. Anything else, Ms Langdale?

MS LANGDALE: No more questions. Thank you, Mrs Griffiths
 
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Thank you Tortoise, for your summaries. I have read some of the transcripts and half of Dr Ravi's and it's truly shocking how these managers behaved. It goes beyond unprofessional - they seemed determined to protect LL at all costs, crossing multiple boundaries and breaching confidentiality by sharing information with her that she shouldn't have been privy to. All the while, the consultants were trying to raise a safeguarding concern and being thrown under the bus. I really hope that some kind of action is taken against TC and IH. It should be their money going to compensate the families, not the taxpayers'.

Hayley Griffiths' comments and actions, which you posted above are another level. Sending her champagne and calling her my lovely little criminal mastermind - she should be sacked as a bare minimum IMO.
 
Hayley Griffiths' comments and actions, which you posted above are another level. Sending her champagne and calling her my lovely little criminal mastermind - she should be sacked as a bare minimum IMO.
She qualified as a registered nurse in 1997 which put her in her forties at least by 2017. I'd imagined she was a silly young lady close to Letby's age, but no, turns out she was another mother hen type clucking around her.

LL's reaction in the park when HG told her what the allegations were is so strange.
 
An inspection team from the Care Quality Commission (CQC) was not told of a spike in baby deaths or that a number of the deaths were unexpected and unexplained when they visited the Countess of Chester Hospital in mid-February 2016.

[...]

A week before the inspection, an external 'thematic' review into 10 deaths on the unit in 2015 and January 2016 noted 'some of the babies suddenly and unexpectedly deteriorated and there was no clear cause for the deterioration/death identified'.

[...]

Medical director Ian Harvey and director of nursing Alison Kelly received copies of the review the day before the inspection after Mr Harvey requested it with reference to the CQC visit, the Thirlwall Inquiry has heard.

[...]

She said she first learned of an increase in neonatal mortality on June 29 2016 in a phone call from Ms Kelly after the inspection report had been published earlier that day and had rated services for children and young people as 'good'.

 
Worth a read - snippets from the evidence of the delightful Deputy Director for HR, who refuses to apologise to the babies' parents or even admit she didn't know what her responsibilities were. She doesn't even think it was "that many" deaths.

05/11/2024 – Transcript of Week 8 Day 2 | The Thirlwall Inquiry

MR BERSHADSKI: Yes, my Lady.

MS DEE APPLETON-CAIRNS (affirmed)

Questions by Mr Bershadski.

Q. So by the time of 2016/2017 you had some 17 years' experience in HR; is that right?

A. That's correct.

Q. I think you have got some professional qualifications in HR as well; is that correct.

A. It is, yes.

Q. So would it be fair to say that the very fact of a concern being raised or an allegation about somebody who works with children that they may have harmed a child, that that would be sufficient to trigger a referral to be made to the Local Authority Designated Officer?

A. […] I think that if there was evidence with regard to somebody who was harming a child, if something had been raised in that -- in that context then the person who was the conduit between the Trust and the local authority could have made that referral, yes.

Q. Would it be fair to say that you as the deputy director of HR at that time would be expected to have a particularly sound knowledge of this policy and other HR policies within the Trust?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, is it right that within this section of the policy, it doesn't talk about any particular evidence being provided or of any evidential threshold for a referral to be made; it simply says that if a concern is raised, a referral should be made; is that right?

A. Yes

Q. Okay. If we could please turn up the Speak Out Safely policy, it is INQ0003012. Now, is this a policy that you would have been familiar with in 2016?

A. No.

Q. Why is that?

A. Because the Speak Out Safely policy was dealt with entirely by Alison Kelly and Sue Hodkinson.

Q. Okay. If we can please turn one page back to page 11, can you see "Monitoring arrangements" –

A. Yes.

Q. […] it says: "Process for monitoring and annual audit is undertaken to ensure compliance with the policy current legislation and best practice." Then underneath that it says: "Responsible individual: deputy director for HR and OD"?

A. Yes.

Q. Was that you at the time?

A. That was me. […]

Q. Yes. So were you responsible for it?

A. Yes.

Q. Then if we skip to the middle of the paragraph or in fact seven lines down, we can see it says: "A referral must always be made if the employer thinks that the individual has harmed a child or poses a risk of harm to children."

A. Yes. […] Alison Kelly was the LADO conduit, was the lead person for that. So it wouldn't have been me who would have made the referral.

[…]

Q. I am asking you about your knowledge of what the purpose was of you establishing whether she had been working anywhere else?

A. My understanding is I was asked to -- to find that information out, which I did, I brought it back. …the bit about not working at any Trust, that was just what I was asked to find out, did I – did I personally believe that there was evidence to show that she was harming children anywhere at that time? I would have to say no



Q. What investigations had you conducted into the evidence of Letby harming children by that point?

A. I had done no investigations at all because I wasn't aware there was any evidence – […]

Q. On what basis was it your role to come to a conclusion about the evidence of Letby harming children?

A. It wasn't. It's just a question you asked me.

[Q.] Would you agree looking back on it that given that clearly the concern by this point was that Letby might pose a risk to children, that if you had applied the policies that I have taken you to you should have recommended a referral be made to the LADO?

A. So based on the fact that there was no evidence that I was aware of at that time and I didn't raise the fact that it should be a LADO referral, the person who should make the referral was the LADO lead, who is Alison Kelly and it had been raised so there was no reason for me to raise it again.

Q. Okay. So you have explained that you had checked that Lucy Letby wasn't working anywhere else at this point. Did you take any steps to make sure that she wouldn't be able to work anywhere else in the future?

A. No, because it was -- it was going to be -- my understanding was it was going to be made clear to Lucy Letby that if she wanted to work anywhere else then she had to declare that to -- I believe it was Karen Rees.

Q. But forgive me, what was to stop her not complying with that instruction and seeking work elsewhere?

A. Nothing.

Q. Were you aware that Lucy Letby visited the Alder Hey Hospital on a number of occasions and that she was only stopped from doing that in June 2017?

A. No.

Q. Were you aware that plans were made for her to go on a course to another hospital Glan Clwyd?

A. No.

[…]

Q. […] it appears to be a concern from a police officer to make sure that Nurse Lucy Letby is unable to work at any other hospitals which ends up making its way to you. Did you take any action to address that police officer's concerns as far as you can remember?

A. I can't recall this email at all.

[…]

Q. Okay. I am going to ask you a few questions about the legal advice that you obtained from DAC Beachcroft and you discuss this within your witness statement from paragraph 25. …you have said in your statement -- that you contacted him on 5 July 2016: "The purpose of the call was to seek advice from Ian as to the organisational risks around removing Letby from the NNU." […]

Q. Well, were you aware that there had been a large number of unexplained, unexpected deaths on the neonatal unit?

A. At that point it wasn't that, it wasn't that many because they were talking -- we had had the Coroner's report that -- I can't remember the date, but it was they were, they were commissioning a report from the Royal College of Paediatricians in there. There was no commonality on the -- on the spreadsheets that I saw and then there was this, and then there was this Dr Brearey saying he had a drawer of doom but he wouldn't let anybody see what was in the drawer and it was all just very vague and odd.

Q. Well, were you aware by this point that there were a number of Consultants who had a genuine concern that there was a nurse deliberately causing these deaths?

A. The only Consultant that I knew of that was expressing any kind of concern for a long, long time was Dr Brearey.

Q. Did you go and speak to Dr Brearey about why he had these concerns?

A. No.

Q. Well, how were you able to tell your legal adviser that you were satisfied that there were no malicious issues involved when there had been an increase in deaths and a Consultant, as far as you were aware, was concerned that they were being deliberately caused by a nurse?

A. Well, I would like to have seen what was in his drawer of doom, but –

Q. Did you ask to go and see his drawer of doom?

A. Well, no, because I had said to Alison Kelly: send somebody down there, this is ridiculous. Somebody needs to -- he needs to give us whatever he's got. Why -- why isn't he doing that?

Q. Right, so –

A. But -- but to answer your question, Andrew, I kept asking -- don't forget, I am not an Executive, I am on the peripheries, I am doing the day-to-day job and I kept saying, you know, have we got any evidence yet, is there anything at all we can hang our hat on here? And I just kept being told: no and that they were looking into it, that Ian Harvey had gone through every case, Alison Kelly had gone through every case and the -- there was nothing untoward from the Coroner. So for me there was -- there was nothing here other than Dr Brearey saying he had some concerns about a nurse, a specific nurse.

Q. How could you be satisfied that there were no malicious issues if a Consultant was saying as far as you were aware that there were malicious issues, you hadn't even spoken to him about his concerns and as far as you were aware, he had a drawer of evidence of some description that you hadn't even seen; so how could you be satisfied that there were no malicious issues involved despite all of that?

A. […] I was satisfied that we had no evidence of any wrongdoing at that time because I kept asking the question.

Q. But you knew by this point, because this was now a number of days after the NNU action planning meeting, so you knew that Letby had been removed from shift and that you had undertaken the task of checking that she wasn't working anywhere else, so there was surely enough of a concern to have taken those steps that there might be malicious issues involved?

A. I -- at that point, my view was if we take her off the unit, let's see if there is a correlation between, you know, the -- the spike and there not being now a spike. …

A. From my perspective. That's what I saw, Andrew.

(A short break) (3.55 pm)

MR BERSHADSKI: Ms Cairns, just before I resume my questioning I am going to ask you refer to me as "Mr Bershadski" rather than by my first name, if you don't mind.

A. Sorry?

Q. I am just going to ask you before we get back into the questions that you refer to me by "Mr Bershadski" rather than by my first name, if you don't mind, in your responses?

A. Sorry.

Q. Ms Cairns, just before the break, I think you said that one of the reasons that you thought there were no malicious issues involved when you spoke to Ian Pace on 5 July 2016 is because there hadn't been that many deaths as far as you were concerned. Now, are you aware that there had been 13 deaths in the space of just a little bit over a year by that point?

A. No, I wasn't.

Q. How many deaths did you think there had been?

A. I can't remember.

You told this Inquiry that you thought there hadn't been that many deaths?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, I am suggesting to you that that was completely wrong and there had been a very high number of deaths compared to the usual two to three average deaths per year that the neonatal unit experienced up until 2015?

A. There had been a spike in deaths but at that point when I spoke to Ian Pace, I didn't think that there had been anything other than that spike.

Q. Yes, that is a spike of 10 deaths that Eirian Powell had looked at in her thematic review. So on any account it was a very significant spike and very many deaths, wasn't it?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, you explain in your statement at paragraphs 39 and 41 that you worked with Sian Williams to look at shift patterns and, in particular, whether there was a particular correlation with Lucy Letby; is that right?

A. No, I don't think I said that. Sian was looking at the patterns.

A. […] I just had a look at it and I just said, you know: have you found anything? And she went "not really" and then she went off to speak to Alison Kelly but it wasn't – it wasn't my decision to make.

Q. Sorry, so you are saying that Sian Williams told you that she hadn't really found anything as a result of her analysis?

A. I think she said there was a cluster – there was a cluster of three days/nights or babies that she may have a concern about and that was -- but then she said she wanted to go and speak to Alison about it so that was it. It was a passing comment.

Q. The Inquiry has heard evidence from Sian Williams this morning who has explained that after she had conducted her analysis, she had real concerns about the amount of time that Lucy Letby was on shift when babies were collapsing and dying and that she recommended that the police be called in on a number of occasions; that was her evidence to the Inquiry this morning?

A. (Nods)

[…]

Q. Well, did you give any consideration to whether Chris Green was sufficiently independent to act as the investigating officer for the grievance?

A. I have always known Dr Chris Green to be an extremely honest and honourable man who had a lot of experience with grievance investigation -- in fact disciplinary investigations. So there was -- there was himself and there was a couple of other people that I put forward as suggestions but it was again up to the Executive Team who they chose.

Q. Well, do you agree that it's not appropriate when you have appointed an independent chair to hear a grievance to start involving Executives at the Trust and yourself in drafting the outcome?

A. It would be absolutely usual for me to draft, so that is the first thing. To include Alison and Sue, they wanted a copy of the draft. They weren't being involved, they weren't being invited to make any comments and certainly that was curtailed. Should I have sent it on reflection? No probably I shouldn't of, because I think you are right, I think that they thought oh -- well, certainly Alison, Sue wouldn't of, but Alison thought: oh, here's -- you know, I think I can add something in and it was like, well, no, you can't. So I think you are right on that point.

Questions by MR BAKER

MR BAKER: Ms Appleton-Cairns, my name is Richard Baker. Can I begin by offering a space at the start of my questions for reflection. I represent a number of Families whose children were murdered or attacked by Lucy Letby. Do you feel, on reflection, that the HR process and the way in which you managed it contributed to a delay in bringing Letby to justice?

A. No, I do not.

Q. Even with the benefit of all that you have seen and heard, you don't think that your actions contributed at all to a delay in bringing Letby to justice?

A. No, I do not. I think that the grievance procedure was an opportunity for the Consultants to bring forward and explain in more detail what their concerns were and any evidence that they had. And there was nothing in that grievance that they brought, that they brought to the attention of somebody who was independent, an independent chair.

Q. Well, I think you have already been asked questions about how independent that process was. But can I say this: this was a process that was designed to pander to the whims of a serial killer, wasn't it, the grievance process, with the benefit of hindsight?

A. I don't believe that.

Q. Do you have any skills or experience at all that permitted you to understand or interpret the clinical issues in this case?

A. The what, sorry?

Q. Did you have any skills or experience that permitted you to interpret the clinical issues in this case?

A. No. […]

Q. Can we look at your witness statement, please, and to paragraph 17, which I think sets out your first involvement. You should have a copy of it in front of you I think, it won't appear on the screens. It's a reference to a meeting on 30 June 2016, which you attended two neonatal unit action planning meetings and in attendance to both meetings were Alison Kelly, Jill Galt, Sue Hodkinson, Sian Williams, Ruth Millward, Julie Fogarty and Karen Rees?

A. Yes.

Q. And they were meetings arranged to provide assurance to the Executives as to how the situation on the NNU was being handled in light of the increase in neonatal deaths?

A. Yes.

Q. So that was a meeting that was attended only by yourself and the nursing staff?

A. Okay.

Q. Well, that's "yes", isn't it?

A. Yes.

Q. You have already said in evidence that you at no time went to speak to any of the Consultants who were making allegations against Lucy Letby?

A. (Nods)

Q. That's correct, isn't it? That's what you say in your witness statement?

A. Yes.

Q. So you approached this issue by having a meeting on the face of it about these issues with the nursing staff, but didn't seek to balance that by speaking to any of the Consultants. Why was that?

A. I was -- I was asked to attend this meeting. It wasn't my meeting.

Q. Well, no, that's, I'm sorry, not a very good answer because you have made various assertions in this Inquiry about the evidence that was being presented to you as to the quality of the allegations that were being made by the Consultants?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, if you say before the Inquiry that the evidence was never presented to your satisfaction, then I think it's important that you justify your approach. So you spoke to the nurses. You never spoke to the doctors?

A. There was no evidence presented to me at all.

Q. Well –

A. By anybody.

Q. I'm sorry. We are going to come on to a note in a moment where you make assertions about the quality of evidence that was available. I think it's quite a simple point. You spoke to the nurses, but you never spoke to the doctors. Why not?

A. Because the doctors would only speak to the Executives.

Q. So you are saying that the doctors –

A. And I knew Ravi. I knew Ravi quite well.

Q. Are you saying the doctors refused to speak to you?

A. The doctors didn't speak to me. You would have to ask them why they didn't speak to me.

Q. No. Are you saying that you sought to speak to the doctors and they refused to speak to you?

A. No.

Q. Okay. So the answer is you didn't seek to speak to the doctors, did you?

A. No. […]

Q. Well, doesn't this bring us to a key issue in your interactions with this case; that employment issues are of nothing compared to the seriousness of a potential murderer on this ward?

A. I would agree.

Q. So in permitting this grievance process to proceed, you would accept, wouldn't you, that you did so based upon incomplete and un-investigated facts?

A. No because we had -- there had been the Coroner who had looked at each of the deaths and the Chief Executive had brought in the Royal College of Paediatricians.

Q. Sorry, which -- which –

A. We had had that –

Q. Which Coroner?

A. -- we had had that report –

Q. Sorry, you keep saying things in your evidence that I'm afraid don't appear to have any reality to the facts of the case. Which Coroner made a determination in which case?

A. The Coroners had gone -- I was told that the Coroner had gone through each of the baby deaths.

Q. That's untrue.

A. Oh, okay. That's what I was told.

Q. Who told you that?

A. I was told by the Chief Executive and also by Alison Kelly.

Q. So Ian Harvey and Alison Kelly reassured you that the Coroner had investigated all of the deaths?

A. Yes.

Q. And that there was nothing to be concerned about?

A. Yes -- well, no. They said that there was only -- there was two where they couldn't be very specific about what the cause of death had been.

Q. Right.

A. But they couldn't identify that there was foul play either is what they told me.

Q. And that's information that had come from the Coroner?

A. Sorry?

Q. That is information that had come to you, obviously via Ian Harvey, but from the Coroner?

A. It wasn't Ian Harvey. It was Alison Kelly and Tony Chambers.

Q. Yes, but they were referring to determinations by a Coroner?

A. Yes, but they had also instigated the Royal College of Paediatricians to come in who had already completed their investigation and I – again I was told verbally that there was nothing untoward within that report and that's the only reason that the grievance went ahead when it did.

Q. But you hadn't been told that by the date of your conversation with Mr Pace in July 2016, had you?

A. I don't recall.

Q. Well, no because the investigation hadn't been concluded by then.

A. Okay.

Q. Again, throughout the grievance process, Letby via her Royal College of Nursing representative, advocated strongly that the Consultants should be disciplined, didn't she?

A. He. Yes.
 
Interesting evidence from Dr Jayaram concerning a valve that he found closed on baby H's chest drain.


You say you didn't have specific concerns around the care of Child H or the conduct of Letby at that time. Looking at paragraph 279 and 280, though, you do recall observing to Dr Brearey privately the next morning something. Can you tell us what you said to Dr Brearey?

A. Yes, I --

Q. Also your thoughts or observations about the valve on the chest drain --

A. So having been called in that night and again it -- as I walked in it struck me it's -- it's Letby again. And my thinking at the time is, you know, she's very unlucky that she seems to be associated with all of these. Again -- and I in terms of the chest drain valve, it was something at the time there was a lot of hands in the incubator there was a lot of -- of -- of moving, there is a lot of procedures. I saw it seemed to be in a closed position and opened it and I mentioned to Dr Brearey the next morning that it was -- it was -- it was Lucy Letby again, simply because I was thinking, well, she's -- she's very unlucky. Now, obviously knowing what I know now and subsequently when I -- when the investigation was launched talking about these and sort of before then talking to Sue Hodkinson, I raised this because again retrospectively and again I -- I can't say whether that was deliberately closed or not, it wasn't something that I had even considered at the time, because at that time I was not thinking somebody could be causing deliberate harm. I had noticed that association with Letby being present but not with any, any thought of anything untoward.

Q. And the chest drain in a closed position rather than open, is that easy to -- well, what did you make of that?

A. Well, at the time my thought process -- and again trying to make things fit, there was a lot of handling going on, there was a lot of hands in the incubator, there was a lot of -- a lot of examination. I was wondering whether it could just have been accidentally knocked. Now, again, thinking about it, it could happen but in retrospect it's less likely. The honest answer is I don't know.

Q. You mentioned that you spoke with Sue Hodkinson about that in March 2017 and we will go to that later, if I may.

A. Yes.

Q. But at that point around Baby H, you had those thoughts and you had that conversation with Dr Brearey.
 

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