I understand AZlawyer said this secret testimony could be converted into being Killer's allocution and thus not subject to cross. OK with that since she gets an allocution opportunity (though those do not usually entail questions by counsel leading the defendant on what to say) but I wonder if she gets another chance at allocution (on her own with no questioning/leading) in addition to this being labeled her allocution.
IOW, might Arias be given a chance to say more to the court/jury that is not subject to cross examination? Are there laws governing this or is it basically up to the court's discretion?
I have no problem with her doing an allocution or three, but do have a problem with the fact that changes in this trial from what was said first trial might not be evident to jurors who never heard what was said first trial.
ETA: The following was posted over on the Sidebar thread:
Quote Originally Posted by YESorNO View Post
As to being cross-examined by JM on her secret testimony:
"...¶ 32 In Arizona, a defendant has a right to allocute before sentencing.   Ariz. R.Crim. P. 19.1(d)(7), 26.10(b)(1).   This right, however, is “not absolute.”  Anderson, 210 Ariz. at 350 ¶ 100, 111 P.3d at 392.   Defendants may not “shift a mitigating circumstance ․ [into] allocution and thereby insulate that mitigating circumstance from rebuttal evidence.”  State v. Armstrong, 218 Ariz. 451, 463 ¶ 59, 189 P.3d 378, 390 (2008).   We have repeatedly upheld trial courts' admonitions that defendants may be subject to cross-examination if they exceed the scope of permissible allocution.   See, e.g., State v. Womble, _ P.3d _, 2010 WL 2720408, *7-8 ¶¶ 42-45 (Ariz. July 12, 2010);  Armstrong, 218 Ariz. at 463 ¶ 59, 189 P.3d at 390.   The judge did not abuse his discretion in so warning Chappell.
¶ 33 We find similarly unpersuasive Chappell's argument that placing limits on his allocution violated due process. The cases Chappell cites address a complete denial of a defendant's right to speak before sentencing, rather than the effect of limiting such speech.   See, e.g., Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962);  McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 217-20 (1971);  Boardman v. Estelle, 957 F.2d 1523, 1530 (9th Cir.1992).   Here, in contrast, Chappell was permitted to speak to the jury before sentencing.
- See more at:
http://caselaw.findlaw.com/az-suprem....dEnLDiKp.dpuf
http://caselaw.findlaw.com/az-suprem...t/1533676.html