9m ago 12:59
Pistorius is back in court in his suit. Nel is set to conclude his closing argument, with Judge Masipa having indicated the court will sit today for as long as is needed to finish the sentencing hearing.
She will then retire to consider what sentence to impose. We don’t yet know when she will come back with that – Friday would probably be the earliest opportunity.
1m ago 13:07
Gerrie Nel continues with his argument for the state in aggravation of sentence.
Nel cites case law to say that “wholly suspending” a prison sentence, even in compelling circumstances, is "not permitted".
The starting point is 15 years, he says.
1m ago
13:24
The victims here are the mother, father and family of Reeva Steenkamp, Nel goes on. They have rights that must be considered.
The deceased has done nothing wrong … She will never walk again … The accused murdered her.
He reminds the judge that Barry Steenkamp said he would never get over his daughter’s death.
The victims’ voices must be heard, he says, but this is not decisive: the court must still decide, even if the victim has forgiven. Forgiveness does not mean the impact is less severe.
Justice must still be properly administered … despite an admission of forgiveness.
Forgiveness has more to do with the person forgiving than with the crime.9m ago
13:17
In a crime as serious as murder, retribution and deterrence should be at the fore, with rehabilitation less important, Nel says.
We’re dealing with a matter that is severe … we argue that the rehabilitation of the offender will play a relatively smaller role.
Nel says the defence witness Dr Jonathan Scholtz “ignored the violent aspects of the accused” – that is, the report by the prison psychologist about incidents of aggression while he was serving his sentence.
Nel says Scholtz is clearly biased.
He says it is the duty of the court to lead public opinion, not to follow it. But it must reflect the “indignation and outrage” of the public and deter others:
A sentence by this court should deter people from acting in this way.
s to the remorse said to have been manifested by his guilty plea, what this court said in Matyityi is instructive. It said (para 13): ‘It has been held, quite correctly, that a plea of guilty in the face of an open and shut case against an accused person is a neutral factor. . . There is, moreover, a chasm between regret and remorse. Many accused persons might well regret their conduct, but that does not without more translate to genuine remorse. Remorse is a gnawing pain of conscience for the plight of another. Thus genuine contrition can only come from an appreciation and acknowledgement of the extent of one's error. Whether the offender is sincerely remorseful, and not simply feeling sorry for himself or herself at having been caught, is a factual question. It is to the surrounding actions of the accused, rather than what he says in court, that one should rather look. In order for the remorse to be a valid consideration, the penitence must be sincere and the accused must take the court fully into his or her confidence. Until and unless that happens, the genuineness of the contrition alleged to exist cannot be determined.