TX - Uvalde; Robb Elementary, 19 children and 3 adults killed, shooter dead, 24 MAY 2022 #2

[MimosaMornings]

https://www.nfpa.org/-/media/Files/Code-or-topic-fact-sheets/SchoolSafetyUpdate.ashx

“Safe Door Locking
What is code-compliant door locking?
Starting with the 2018 edition of NFPA 101, the Code provides two options for locking classroom doors from the inside. While the 2018 edition of the Code originally allowed for one door locking option, the NFPA Standards Council issued a Tentative Interim Agreement (TIA), which—for existing installations only—allows for a second type of door lock/latch combination that continues to deliver a high level of safety to students and staff.
Option One
The hardware for the first option is sometimes called an interconnected latch or lock, and is similar to what you might see in a hotel room. This type of locking mechanism can be used for newly installed doors. It can also be retrofitted on existing doors.
Option Two
The second option enables existing school classroom doors to be retrofitted with secondary hardware, which might include items such as a thumb turn lock. For existing classroom doors only, this option can be used in lieu of single operation hardware, which combines a latch and lock together.
This is one example of the second door locking option; it’s called a dead bolt lock with a thumb turn:
Performance requirements related to these fixed locking devices include the following criteria regardless of the approach taken:
• The door must be lockable from the egress side without having to open it.
• The lock cannot require special knowledge, a key, or tool to engage or disengage from the egress side of the door.
• The two releasing operations, where permitted, must not be required to be performed simultaneously to unlock/unlatch the door.
• The lock must be installed at an acceptable height— between 34 in. to 48 in. above the floor.
• The door must have the ability to be unlocked and opened from outside the classroom with the necessary key or credential.
• The staff must be drilled in the engagement and release of locks.”

Pictures of both door lock options shown in article.

 

[Wise Old Owl]

The door could have been unlocked that day for the awards assembly. The teacher may have just assumed it was locked as usual.

I have taught in schools that have had rocks placed near doors to be used to prop it open. Occasionally admin would remove the rock but some teachers would put it back.

I've heard "smoke breaks" mentioned a few times on here. Most schools will not allow smoking on campus, so I don't think that was the teacher's reason for going to the parking lot. I hope she is not being blamed for this. A guy had a gun who shouldn't have been allowed to have a gun.

BBM

YES YES AND YES!!!!!

Over the years I have seen doors used this way - with rocks, or "shims' (door stops) left next to it to keep them open. But those were back in the day when all you (the teachers) were given was a key to YOUR door and all the other doors on campus - though locked - you couldn't open. Back then we used an index card and would slide it between the mechanism on the door and the door frame so when the door closed the little "knobby" wouldn't engage.

BUT in the past 6-7 years we have now been given keys to EVERY DOOR and EVERY GATE on campus for just this reason. ALL DOORS LOCKED AT ALL TIMES!!!!!!

Smoking - yes I know all campuses now do not allow it at all BUT - teachers are hard to find and while you aren't supposed to - people "look the other way". All smoking areas are very much (obviously) out of students view - which would have been the case with this door as well. And being able to go out a "back door", grab a ciggy, and come back in - either you need a key to that door or a rock to prop it open.

Now, and this is something that hasn't come up but I do know firsthand. Substitute teachers. Right now teachers are hard to find - VERY HARD. So alot of classrooms are being staffed by subs. When you go to a school to sub - you ARE NOT given a key to ANYTHING! A custodian will come unlock your classroom and THAT DOOR stays unlocked all day!!!!! I guess the reasoning behind this is they are afraid the sub will run off with the key - not returning it at the end of the day. IDK I know this has nothing to do with this case - there was no mention of subs at all - but I wanted to put that out there. Our schools are not secure - not at all - everyday. I have witnessed this for the last 15 or so years and it is one of my main reasons that I retired. (And I really didn't want to..............)

JMHO

 

[RANCH]

I can address the keys and locking/unlocking of doors. Every door I've had in the past 10 years at school is this way - and all schools across the district are like this.

You put the key in the lock and turn it clockwise to unlock it. You then push down on the handle - these are "lever" handles (not regular door knobs) and open the door. THEN, you hold the door open while you turn the key back - counterclockwise to lock it. Go in the room - let the door close. IF you DON'T turn the key back counterclockwise - the handle remains open.

As for this door in question. IF it was unlocked - then why prop it open? Maybe you needed to carry some stuff in (no extra hand to open by the handle). But, if whoever initially unlocked it did not turn that key back - then when the rock was kicked away and the door closed - it was still actually open (unlocked) at the handle. Maybe that door was left unlocked all the time as it was a door to the employee parking lot. This is no excuse and should have been locked at all times. Maybe whoever first unlocked it didn't turn that key back and it remained unlocked. IDK - but that is how school doors work.

I am reserving judgment on all of this until we officially hear another report. It is very possible that they have this "interaction" at the door on video and then it will be apparent what happened. If the shooter walked up to a closed door and entered by using the handle - well - there ya go. Or the door was still propped open.

It is obvious that the wagons have circled and everyone - and I mean everyone - is in CYA mode now. The lawyers are jumping on board and the word of the day is "liability"!!! Personally, I like the word "accountability" better.

I will wait for the next press conference on pins and needles. But one thing is glaringly obvious - there were errors made by people (human factor) whether or not those errors were intentional or not - and those people are now hunkered down to avoid the liability "blame game". But I do believe there are people involved in this that should be held accountable - regardless of intention.


JMHO

Seems like a poor lock design. I would suggest having doors that always open from the inside without using a key in case of fire etc and always need a key to unlock from the outside. Have Knox boxes for the fire department to enter if there's a fire. Or for LE to enter during a shooting.

Emergency Key Box - Knox Rapid Access System

Knox Rapid Access System provides non-destructive emergency access to commercial and residential properties. More than 14,000 fire departments and government agencies use Knox key boxes (keybox, keyboxes), vaults, cabinets, key switches, padlocks, narcotics or drug lockers, locking FDC caps or...

www.knoxbox.com

 

[Seattle1]

<modsnip - quoted post was removed>
Given the vehicles parked just outside the subject entrance, I think it likely the door was regularly used (if not during class hours, I bet it's unlocked in the early morning hours when faculty arrive). Before our office converted to electronic card key, against better judgment, the entry from the back lot car park was also unlocked for about 45 mins in the morning. [Photo credit post #427 by @steeltowngirl].

 

[Wise Old Owl]

Seems like a poor lock design. I would suggest having doors that always open from the inside without using a key in case of fire etc and always need a key to unlock from the outside. Have Knox boxes for the fire department to enter if there's a fire. Or for LE to enter during a shooting.

Emergency Key Box - Knox Rapid Access System

Knox Rapid Access System provides non-destructive emergency access to commercial and residential properties. More than 14,000 fire departments and government agencies use Knox key boxes (keybox, keyboxes), vaults, cabinets, key switches, padlocks, narcotics or drug lockers, locking FDC caps or...

www.knoxbox.com

The doors I talked about do just this. From the inside - the door is NEVER locked. It is only from the outside (egress) side of the door that you need a key to lock and unlock.

 

[zecats]

BBM

YES YES AND YES!!!!!

Over the years I have seen doors used this way - with rocks, or "shims' (door stops) left next to it to keep them open. But those were back in the day when all you (the teachers) were given was a key to YOUR door and all the other doors on campus - though locked - you couldn't open. Back then we used an index card and would slide it between the mechanism on the door and the door frame so when the door closed the little "knobby" wouldn't engage.

BUT in the past 6-7 years we have now been given keys to EVERY DOOR and EVERY GATE on campus for just this reason. ALL DOORS LOCKED AT ALL TIMES!!!!!!

Smoking - yes I know all campuses now do not allow it at all BUT - teachers are hard to find and while you aren't supposed to - people "look the other way". All smoking areas are very much (obviously) out of students view - which would have been the case with this door as well. And being able to go out a "back door", grab a ciggy, and come back in - either you need a key to that door or a rock to prop it open.

Now, and this is something that hasn't come up but I do know firsthand. Substitute teachers. Right now teachers are hard to find - VERY HARD. So alot of classrooms are being staffed by subs. When you go to a school to sub - you ARE NOT given a key to ANYTHING! A custodian will come unlock your classroom and THAT DOOR stays unlocked all day!!!!! I guess the reasoning behind this is they are afraid the sub will run off with the key - not returning it at the end of the day. IDK I know this has nothing to do with this case - there was no mention of subs at all - but I wanted to put that out there. Our schools are not secure - not at all - everyday. I have witnessed this for the last 15 or so years and it is one of my main reasons that I retired. (And I really didn't want to..............)

JMHO

I am a retired teacher and I continue to sub in my district. The classroom doors are locked. I have a magnetic strip I can use for when I leave the room at lunch, for instance. But while the kids are in the room the magnetic strip stays out and the door stays locked.

 

[Seattle1]

6 PM NBC Evening News just starting PT has good photos of School and interview with border patrol officer (wife and his child in bldg).

 

[RANCH]

The doors I talked about do just this. From the inside - the door is NEVER locked. It is only from the outside (egress) side of the door that you need a key to lock and unlock.

So you can't leave the doors unlocked by mistake?

 

[Wise Old Owl]

I am a retired teacher and I continue to sub in my district. The classroom doors are locked. I have a magnetic strip I can use for when I leave the room at lunch, for instance. But while the kids are in the room the magnetic strip stays out and the door stays locked.

So, this magnetic strip is applied to the locking mechanism on the door? Like, when you leave the room you put the strip down the side of the door so the locking mechanism doesn't engage?

If that is the case - well................ What if you are in a suite room - like the 2 rooms in question here. If a shooter can enter the room you have put the strip on and that room is empty (you are all at lunch) - shooter then has free access to the other room ("suite" room).

Am I getting this right?
TIA

 

[Wise Old Owl]

So you can't leave the doors unlocked by mistake?

Yes you can - if when you enter the room - you don't turn that key back counterclockwise - the handle remains unlocked. But from the inside - you can always go out - regardless.

 

[RANCH]

Yes you can - if when you enter the room - you don't turn that key back counterclockwise - the handle remains unlocked. But from the inside - you can always go out - regardless.

You misunderstood my OP. I should have made it clear that the doors would automatically lock the outside handle when shut so that a key would always be needed to open. No matter what. No mistakes leaving children vulnerable.

The Knox boxes would contain master keys to every room on campus for first responders to use. JMO.

 

[steeltowngirl]

11-year-old who survived Uvalde massacre struggles to deal in aftermath​

UVALDE, Texas — Miah Cerrillo is a true survivor.
When she was 3, she had a tumor in her stomach. She survived that.
But what she endured last week at Robb Elementary School in Uvalde is already affecting her in ways that are beyond imaginable.

The aftermath​

"She is scared ... Anything will set her off. She thinks he is out to get her," her mother said.
Not only was her innocence and happiness taken, but she also lost her classmates and friends.
"She'll be, like, 'I don't have friends anymore,'" her mother said.
The healing process will be a long road. Her mother said she wants to go to the beach and asked for peace and quiet. Her parents said they are hoping to take her soon.

11-year-old who survived Uvalde massacre struggles to deal in aftermath

Miah Cerrillo, 11, was in the room when 19 of her classmates and two of her teachers were killed last week at Robb Elementary School.

www.khou.com

 

[Wise Old Owl]

You misunderstood my OP. I should have made it clear that the doors would automatically lock the outside handle when shut so that a key would always be needed to open. No matter what. No mistakes leaving children vulnerable.

The Knox boxes would contain master keys to every room on campus for first responders to use. JMO.

OK - sorry. You know - I have wondered that myself. I had a "suite" partner one year that NEVER EVER locked her door. This concerned me greatly as it was a "suite" room and that put my students at risk as well.

Maybe the locks like that (turn once and open - without having to turn back to lock) are more expensive? IDK Whoever won the business contract bid from the school board got the job. But those would certainly be much better and safer - helps to avoid the "human factor".

 

[zecats]

So, this magnetic strip is applied to the locking mechanism on the door? Like, when you leave the room you put the strip down the side of the door so the locking mechanism doesn't engage?

If that is the case - well................ What if you are in a suite room - like the 2 rooms in question here. If a shooter can enter the room you have put the strip on and that room is empty (you are all at lunch) - shooter then has free access to the other room ("suite" room).

Am I getting this right?
TIA

Yes, exactly as you picture it. The magnet strip covers the door latch so it won't engage. The janitor unlocks the doors in the morning of the room(s) where subs are headed and places the strip there, so we can enter. But the outside door knob remains locked and when the magnet is off, the door cannot be opened. Believe me, I spend a ton of time letting students back into the classroom from going to the lav, to the office, to the nurse, to guidance, etc.

All doors leading to the hallways are locked in this way, so even where classrooms are connected no one can get in. There are no suites, but some science rooms are connected by an inner office between the rooms. These door are locked as well from the office into the classroom . Security walks around from time to time and checks the locks to be sure.

And all outside doors are locked. Teachers have a fob to enter from their parking lot. Visitors must go to the main door to be buzzed in by security.

 

[gitana1]

I'm not sure what you mean by teachers doing crazy things but I do agree that keeping unwanted people off of school campuses should be mandatory. Adequate fencing and locked doors with a screened single point of entry for visitors.

Trained LE stationed at schools would be a good idea. What if there were several trained teachers and other staff members who voluntarily arm themselves to back up the LE officer? That would be even better. JMO.

<modsnip>

But teachers should be focused on teaching. Not being LE, IMO.

Teachers are regular people. And regular people make too many mistakes. Regular people can have mental health issues. <modsnip>

In addition, when someone conceal-carry’s,there tends to be a hyper alertness, a totally different mindset (in my experience). Ready for battle.

The thought of arming teachers for battle is insane to me. Backup should be trained LE and they should do their job and be paid well to do it.

No way in hell would I want teachers armed in my kid’s classroom. Even if they had “training.” What training? What re-training? Any tests? Who would oversee that? There’s just way too much room for not only liability but fatal error.

There are just way too many accidents and killings with guns that are owned by people who have been trained in their use and safety. Huge amounts. Every day.

And what about when some crazy student decided to overpower a teacher and take their gun?

This idea is a perilous, illogical one, IMO. The only people who should be tasked with going to war with the bad guys in order to protect the public are those for whom that is their sole responsibility.

We don’t need more guns in school.

 

[Wise Old Owl]

https://www.nfpa.org/-/media/Files/Code-or-topic-fact-sheets/SchoolSafetyUpdate.ashx

“Safe Door Locking
What is code-compliant door locking?
Starting with the 2018 edition of NFPA 101, the Code provides two options for locking classroom doors from the inside. While the 2018 edition of the Code originally allowed for one door locking option, the NFPA Standards Council issued a Tentative Interim Agreement (TIA), which—for existing installations only—allows for a second type of door lock/latch combination that continues to deliver a high level of safety to students and staff.
Option One
The hardware for the first option is sometimes called an interconnected latch or lock, and is similar to what you might see in a hotel room. This type of locking mechanism can be used for newly installed doors. It can also be retrofitted on existing doors.
Option Two
The second option enables existing school classroom doors to be retrofitted with secondary hardware, which might include items such as a thumb turn lock. For existing classroom doors only, this option can be used in lieu of single operation hardware, which combines a latch and lock together.
This is one example of the second door locking option; it’s called a dead bolt lock with a thumb turn:
Performance requirements related to these fixed locking devices include the following criteria regardless of the approach taken:
• The door must be lockable from the egress side without having to open it.
• The lock cannot require special knowledge, a key, or tool to engage or disengage from the egress side of the door.
• The two releasing operations, where permitted, must not be required to be performed simultaneously to unlock/unlatch the door.
• The lock must be installed at an acceptable height— between 34 in. to 48 in. above the floor.
• The door must have the ability to be unlocked and opened from outside the classroom with the necessary key or credential.
• The staff must be drilled in the engagement and release of locks.”

Pictures of both door lock options shown in article.

That is interesting. In ALL my years teaching - I NEVER had a door with a knob on the inside of the room that you had to turn to lock it. NEVER. And the outside of the door in the picture doesn't have a handle. That would never fly in a school. Teachers, admins, and even more so students - come and go all day long and to have to have someone go to the door to open it every time for them..... nope.
That article is from the National Fire Prevention Association. I think the schools association is a little different - the doors have to have handles from the outside - some, maybe even a lot, of the inside doors can have those "bars" that you just push and they open.

 

[Sundog]

Actually, I think this was expected once the Director of DPS affirmed that the UCISDP (police chief/incident commander) made the wrong decision PRIOR to the completion of any internal investigation.

While I certainly understand why he made the statement during such a very raw, emotional time, I think it was premature to make this public announcement within 3 days of the incident. MOO

I agree, he threw the local LE under the bus before the review was completed. Doesn't surprise me that other LE divisions would stop cooperating, as he had already apparently come to his conclusion.

 

[Wise Old Owl]

Yes, exactly as you picture it. The magnet strip covers the door latch so it won't engage. The janitor unlocks the doors in the morning of the room(s) where subs are headed and places the strip there, so we can enter. But the outside door knob remains locked and when the magnet is off, the door cannot be opened. Believe me, I spend a ton of time letting students back into the classroom from going to the lav, to the office, to the nurse, to guidance, etc.

All doors leading to the hallways are locked in this way, so even where classrooms are connected no one can get in. There are no suites, but some science rooms are connected by an inner office between the rooms. These door are locked as well from the office into the classroom . Security walks around from time to time and checks the locks to be sure.

And all outside doors are locked. Teachers have a fob to enter from their parking lot. Visitors must go to the main door to be buzzed in by security.

WOW
Thank you for this. I guess since the are no suite rooms - that works.

Have to ask - so when you go to lunch - when you are bringing them back from lunch how to do you get in the hallway doors to be able to get to the classroom?

 

[WingsOverTX]

I see rooms 130, 131, 132 and 116 on the diagram. Four rooms at least besides other areas.

The "floor plan" released by DPS is not adequate to draw any conclusions, IMHO.

In fact, I would suggest it could be misleading due to its simplicity with only numbers for the rooms. With all the misinformation we have seen, can we trust this mockup?

Why are there question marks on the arrows outside the entrance to the adjoined rooms assumed to have been occupied by the 4th graders and teachers Ruiz & Garcia?

Why are all rooms not marked as to their use? Is this floor plan just one building or two adjoining buildings? Looking above from outside, it looks like two to me.

Why are children reporting they hid in the cafeteria/auditorium? Is that part of the floor plan for this building, meaning there are two cafeterias on campus (see labeled diagram below)? It shows a cafeteria on the other side of the campus. I doubt there were two. But maybe an area in this building also serves as an auditorium?

What was happening in all the other rooms during the incident? There are pics of children exiting windows. Which rooms are those and what ages are those children?

Where is the closet located that SR supposedly exited from when the BP agents finally breached "the" door & which door? Did this adjoining classroom setup have two doors into the hallway or not?

Are there any cameras inside this building anywhere? Is this the only building involved in this incident? How many students normally attend school in this building and what ages?

I could go on and on. Until I know much, much more is clear and triple verified, I personally am trusting nothing.

Source:

Police failure in Uvalde mass shooting: What we know

Law enforcement officials in Texas are facing intense criticism for their response to the shooting.

www.axios.com

Cafeteria lower right:

 

[HMSHood]

I wonder if anyone at the Hillcrest Memorial Funeral Home called the police when Salvador Ramos filed at them.