NC vs. Raven Abaroa ~ the Trial 3

OH yes, you can and you should. Unless of course NC has another law where its not allowed but I dk about that......all I know is this state team shouldn't be a team.

I'm not overly thrilled with this prosecution team either but I'm trying to keep in mind that this case was pushed to the back burner several times in the past 8 years due to horrible troubles in the DA's office. I think this prosecution team is the 2nd or 3rd to get this case.....so the Durham's DA's office may not have been able to put their ace prosecutors on it. I just hope they will impress the heck out of all of us during their closing arguments.
 
"The state has thrown out a scatter shot" for motive - doesn't that just show that there were PLENTY of motives? Life insurance money, getting out of his marriage, gets to keep his kid without a custody battle, etc.
 
So his contention is that if a husband is cheating on his wife, he wouldn't be jealous if SHE talked to other men? That just doesn't make sense.
 
OK this is the worst closing I've ever heard. Trying to use the element of time passing as a deterrent in this case to find him NG is absolutely ridiculous, it's lame, and it's shotty. Some Defense team! What a poor Closing by both trying to use the 8 yrs, when we daily try cases that are sometimes 30 yrs old!!!! For Shame.
 
Per the NC Ethics Regulations (at http://www.ncbar.com/rules/rules.asp):

Advocate
Rule 3.3 Candor Toward the Tribunal

(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:

(1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer;

(2) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or

(3) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer, the lawyer's client, or a witness called by the lawyer, has offered material evidence and the lawyer comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal. A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence, other than the testimony of a defendant in a criminal matter, that the lawyer reasonably believes is false.
 
Per the NC Ethics Regulations (at http://www.ncbar.com/rules/rules.asp):

Advocate
Rule 3.3 Candor Toward the Tribunal

(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:

(1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer;

(2) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or

(3) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer, the lawyer's client, or a witness called by the lawyer, has offered material evidence and the lawyer comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal. A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence, other than the testimony of a defendant in a criminal matter, that the lawyer reasonably believes is false.

But these do not apply to opening and closing arguments. Jurors do not have to accept as fact, nor do the attorneys have to present as fact, issues in either argument.
 
Does Char mean they will be able to present their ENTIRE argument in one hour. Oh Lord, I hope not.
 
Does Char mean they will be able to present their ENTIRE argument in one hour. Oh Lord, I hope not.

She said the pros. man will do his half of their closing, they will all go to lunch, and then she will conclude her part of the closing after they return from lunch.
 
Gen. R. Prac. Super. & Dist. Ct. 12 [hereinafter Practice Rule 12]; N.C. Rules of
Professional Conduct, Rule 3.4(e)[hereinafter RPC 3.4(e)].Control of the argument is
left largely in the trial judge’s discretion and rulings thereon will not be disturbed on
appeal in the absence of an abuse of that discretion. Jones, 355 N.C. 117.
Examples of permissible and impermissible arguments are collected below. The lists are
not intended to be exhaustive. The information below applies to closing arguments by
prosecutors and defense attorneys. Additional examples of restrictions on closing
arguments by prosecutors are collected infra in § 30.7.
B. Permissible Content
During closing argument, counsel may:
• Argue any position or conclusion with respect to a matter in issue based on his or her
analysis of the evidence. G.S. 15A-1230.
• Argue the evidence that has been presented and all reasonable inferences that can be
drawn from that evidence. State v. Forte, 360 N.C. 427 (2006).
• State the law applicable to the case. G.S. 7A-97; State v. Monk, 286 N.C. 509 (1975);
see also infra § 30.2E.
• Comment on the demeanor of witnesses before the jury. State v. Cummings, 323 N.C.
181 (1988), death sentence vacated, 494 U.S. 1021 (1990).
• Assert the guilt of another as long as there is evidence pointing directly to another’s
guilt. State v. Bullock, 154 N.C. App. 234 (2002); see also Holmes v. South Carolina,
547 U.S. 319 (2006) (unduly restricting evidence of another’s guilt violates
defendant’s constitutional right to present a defense).
• Argue that a witness is credible or incredible. See State v. Augustine, 359 N.C. 709
(2005); State v. Golphin, 352 N.C. 364 (2000).
• Draw the jury’s attention to the opposing party’sfailure to produce certain available
witnesses(other than the defendant) or introduce particular evidence. See State v.
Walters, 357 N.C. 68 (2003)(prosecutor may comment on a defendant’s failure to
produce witnesses or exculpatory evidence to contradict or refute evidence presented
by the State); State v. Skeels, 346 N.C. 147 (1997) (same); see also State v. Ratliff,
341 N.C. 610 (1995) (in response to defendant’s argument that the State failed to
introduce a statement made by defendant after arrest, State improperly argued to jury
that defendant should have introduced it; State’s argument misstated law because
hearsay rules precluded defendant from introducing his own statement in this case);
State v. Snider, 168 N.C. App. 701 (2005) (in response to defendant’s argument that
the State had failed to call two witnesses and the absence of that evidence was “very
important,” prosecutor properly argued that defense also failed to call those
witnesses)
• Use illustrations and anecdotes. State v. Maynor, 272 N.C. 524 (1968).
• Make arguments based on common knowledge. See State v. Murillo, 349 N.C. 573
(1998); State v. Harris, 338 N.C. 129 (1994).
• Display exhibits and use them in a proper manner as long as they were actually Ch. 30: Closing Arguments (DRAFT)
4 NC Defender Manual Vol. 2 | Jan. 2011 | © UNC School of Government
introduced into evidence. See State v. Call, 349 N.C. 382 (1998)(prosecutor’s waving
revolver in front of jury was not improper); State v. Oliver, 309 N.C. 326 (1983)
(prosecutor’s use of photographs of victim during closing argument in the sentencing
phase of a capital case was not improper); State v. Torres, 77 N.C. App. 345 (1985)
(trial judge erred in allowing prosecutor to display pellet gun during closing argument
because it had never been admitted into evidence); but see State v. Golphin, 352 N.C.
364 (2000) (stating that the court does not condone the pointing of weapons at the
jury).
• Tell the jury that it may request review of the exhibits and testimony during their
deliberations. See G.S. 15A-1233.
• Advise the jury to carefully scrutinize the testimony of a witness. State v. Brown, 327
 
C. Impermissible Content
Generally. During closing argument, counsel may not:
• Become abusive. See G.S. 15A-1230(a); State v. Sanderson, 336 N.C. 1 (1994);see
also Practice Rule 12 (“[c]ounsel are at all times to conduct themselves with dignity
and propriety”).
• Make uncomplimentary or derogatory comments about opposing counsel. Sanderson,
336 N.C. 1; State v. Miller, 271 N.C. 646 (1967); State v. Jordan, 149 N.C. App. 838
(2002); see also Practice Rule 12 (“All personalities between counsel should be
avoided. The personal history or peculiarities of counsel on the opposing side should
not be alluded to.”); see also infra § 30.7C (citing cases in which court found that
prosecutor made improper derogatory comments about defendant’s expert witnesses).
• Inject his or her personal experiences. G.S. 15A-1230(a); State v. Simmons, ___ N.C.
App.___, 698 S.E.2d 95 (2010).
• Express his or her personal belief as to the truth or falsity of the evidence. Id.
• State a personal opinion as to the credibility of a witness. State v. Gladden, 315 N.C.
398 (1986); State v. Thompson, 188 N.C. App. 102 (2008); RPC 3.4(e).
• Express his or her personal belief as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant. G.S.
15A-1230(a); see also State v. Britt, 291 N.C. 528 (1977); RPC 3.4(e).
• Assert personal knowledge of facts in issue. Sanderson, 336 N.C. 1; State v. Monk,
286 N.C. 509 (1975); RPC 3.4(e).
• Reveal legal rulings made by the trial judge outside the presence of the jury. State v.
Allen, 353 N.C. 504 (2001).
• Engage in name-calling. State v. Walters, 357 N.C. 68 (2003); State v. Jones, 355
N.C. 117 (2002); State v. Davis, 45 N.C. App. 113 (1980).
• Assert that a witness is lying or call a witness a liar. State v. Gell, 351 N.C. 192, 210
(2000) (although prosecutor’s argument that a defense witness was lying and a
“convicted liar” was improper, it was notso grossly improper as to require the trial
judge to intervene ex mero motu because the evidence supported this argument); State
v. McKenna, 289 N.C. 668 (disapproving of language used by both defense counsel
and prosecutor asserting that witnesses and defendant lied), death sentence vacated, Ch. 30: Closing Arguments (DRAFT)
NC Defender Manual Vol. 2 | Jan. 2011 | © UNC School of Government 5
429 U.S. 912 (1976); but see State v. Brice, 320 N.C. 119, 124 (1987) (trial judge did
not abuse discretion in overruling defendant’s objection to prosecutor’s argument that
a witness “did not tell you the truth” where the evidence supported this inference);
State v. Noell, 284 N.C. 670, 696–97 (1974) (prosecutor’s submission to the jury that
defense witnesses “have lied to you” was a reasonable comment on the evidence),
death sentence vacated, 428 U.S. 902 (1976).
• Make arguments on the basis of matters outside the record except for matters
concerning which the court may take judicial notice. G.S. 15A-1230(a); see also
Allen, 353 N.C. 504; State v. Cousins, 289 N.C. 540 (1976); RPC 3.4(e).
• Appeal to the jury’s passion or prejudice. Jones, 355 N.C. 117.
• Make arguments calculated to mislead or prejudice the jury. State v. Riddle, 311 N.C.
734 (1984);see also Practice Rule 12 (“[c]ounsel shall not knowingly misinterpret the
contents of a paper, the testimony of a witness, the language or argument of opposing
counsel or the language of a decision or other authority”).
• Speculate about the outcome of a possible appeal, parole, executive commutation or
pardon. State v. McMorris, 290 N.C. 286 (1976).
• Gratuitously interject race into a jury argument where race is otherwise irrelevant to
the case being tried. See State v. Diehl, 353 N.C. 433 (2001)(no abuse of discretion
in denial of defendant’s motion for mistrial based on prosecutor’s reference to the
jury as “twelve white jurors in Randolph County” where defendant’s objection to the
reference had been sustained and race was a secondary motivation for the crime);
State v. Moose, 310 N.C. 482 (1984) (prosecutor’s repeated references to the victim
as an “old black gentleman” and a “black man” were not grossly improper where
evidence supported an inference that the murder was, in part, racially motivated).
Capital cases. In addition to the above listed arguments, during the penalty phase of a
capital trial, counsel may not:
• Argue the consequences of juror non-unanimity. State v. Huff, 325 N.C. 1 (1989),
death sentence vacated, 497 U.S. 1021 (1990).
• Argue that capital punishment does not have any deterrent effect. State v. Cherry, 298
N.C. 86 (1979).
• Argue residual doubt as to the offense of first-degree murder or as to a basis
underlying the first-degree murder conviction, such as premeditation and deliberation,
because residual doubt is not a circumstance of the offense and, thus, is inappropriate.
State v. Fletcher, 354 N.C. 455 (2001); State v. Roseboro, 351 N.C. 536 (2000).
• Describe the execution procedure because it is not based on the evidence presented
 
He's at the podium, I hope he doesn't read his entire closing argument. I cannot stand for attorneys to do that.
 
I wish I had kept track of all the peeps the peeps the def says either lied or were "mistaken".
Donna
Det Soul
The guy who heard Raven say Janet spoke to him.
The gal who said the LR was vacuumed.
The gal who stopped by Raven's.

Who else? This is a really wide spread conspiracy! lol
 

Members online

Online statistics

Members online
162
Guests online
1,032
Total visitors
1,194

Forum statistics

Threads
626,154
Messages
18,521,430
Members
240,946
Latest member
Kimberly 71
Back
Top