C. Impermissible Content
Generally. During closing argument, counsel may not:
Become abusive. See G.S. 15A-1230(a); State v. Sanderson, 336 N.C. 1 (1994);see
also Practice Rule 12 ([c]ounsel are at all times to conduct themselves with dignity
and propriety).
Make uncomplimentary or derogatory comments about opposing counsel. Sanderson,
336 N.C. 1; State v. Miller, 271 N.C. 646 (1967); State v. Jordan, 149 N.C. App. 838
(2002); see also Practice Rule 12 (All personalities between counsel should be
avoided. The personal history or peculiarities of counsel on the opposing side should
not be alluded to.); see also infra § 30.7C (citing cases in which court found that
prosecutor made improper derogatory comments about defendants expert witnesses).
Inject his or her personal experiences. G.S. 15A-1230(a); State v. Simmons, ___ N.C.
App.___, 698 S.E.2d 95 (2010).
Express his or her personal belief as to the truth or falsity of the evidence. Id.
State a personal opinion as to the credibility of a witness. State v. Gladden, 315 N.C.
398 (1986); State v. Thompson, 188 N.C. App. 102 (2008); RPC 3.4(e).
Express his or her personal belief as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant. G.S.
15A-1230(a); see also State v. Britt, 291 N.C. 528 (1977); RPC 3.4(e).
Assert personal knowledge of facts in issue. Sanderson, 336 N.C. 1; State v. Monk,
286 N.C. 509 (1975); RPC 3.4(e).
• Reveal legal rulings made by the trial judge outside the presence of the jury. State v.
Allen, 353 N.C. 504 (2001).
Engage in name-calling. State v. Walters, 357 N.C. 68 (2003); State v. Jones, 355
N.C. 117 (2002); State v. Davis, 45 N.C. App. 113 (1980).
Assert that a witness is lying or call a witness a liar. State v. Gell, 351 N.C. 192, 210
(2000) (although prosecutors argument that a defense witness was lying and a
convicted liar was improper, it was notso grossly improper as to require the trial
judge to intervene ex mero motu because the evidence supported this argument); State
v. McKenna, 289 N.C. 668 (disapproving of language used by both defense counsel
and prosecutor asserting that witnesses and defendant lied), death sentence vacated, Ch. 30: Closing Arguments (DRAFT)
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429 U.S. 912 (1976); but see State v. Brice, 320 N.C. 119, 124 (1987) (trial judge did
not abuse discretion in overruling defendants objection to prosecutors argument that
a witness did not tell you the truth where the evidence supported this inference);
State v. Noell, 284 N.C. 670, 69697 (1974) (prosecutors submission to the jury that
defense witnesses have lied to you was a reasonable comment on the evidence),
death sentence vacated, 428 U.S. 902 (1976).
Make arguments on the basis of matters outside the record except for matters
concerning which the court may take judicial notice. G.S. 15A-1230(a); see also
Allen, 353 N.C. 504; State v. Cousins, 289 N.C. 540 (1976); RPC 3.4(e).
Appeal to the jurys passion or prejudice. Jones, 355 N.C. 117.
Make arguments calculated to mislead or prejudice the jury. State v. Riddle, 311 N.C.
734 (1984);see also Practice Rule 12 ([c]ounsel shall not knowingly misinterpret the
contents of a paper, the testimony of a witness, the language or argument of opposing
counsel or the language of a decision or other authority).
Speculate about the outcome of a possible appeal, parole, executive commutation or
pardon. State v. McMorris, 290 N.C. 286 (1976).
Gratuitously interject race into a jury argument where race is otherwise irrelevant to
the case being tried. See State v. Diehl, 353 N.C. 433 (2001)(no abuse of discretion
in denial of defendants motion for mistrial based on prosecutors reference to the
jury as twelve white jurors in Randolph County where defendants objection to the
reference had been sustained and race was a secondary motivation for the crime);
State v. Moose, 310 N.C. 482 (1984) (prosecutors repeated references to the victim
as an old black gentleman and a black man were not grossly improper where
evidence supported an inference that the murder was, in part, racially motivated).
Capital cases. In addition to the above listed arguments, during the penalty phase of a
capital trial, counsel may not:
Argue the consequences of juror non-unanimity. State v. Huff, 325 N.C. 1 (1989),
death sentence vacated, 497 U.S. 1021 (1990).
Argue that capital punishment does not have any deterrent effect. State v. Cherry, 298
N.C. 86 (1979).
Argue residual doubt as to the offense of first-degree murder or as to a basis
underlying the first-degree murder conviction, such as premeditation and deliberation,
because residual doubt is not a circumstance of the offense and, thus, is inappropriate.
State v. Fletcher, 354 N.C. 455 (2001); State v. Roseboro, 351 N.C. 536 (2000).
Describe the execution procedure because it is not based on the evidence presented