Dr. Evans is not a "career pediatrician". Simple Wikipedia contains enough information explaining why he had to leave pediatrics. Today, the reprimands for his statements would be way more serious. Let us not praise Dr. Evans.
That is your opinion.
He was in fact a career paediatrician.
I have seen nothing which leads me not to have a great deal of respect for his work, and I think he has come in for so much undeserved vitriolic criticism here and wider afield that I will counter that with praise where I think it is due. He is just a paediatrician with a qualified opinion based on decades of hands-on work with neonates, not a career spent in academia and trying to win awards and notoriety. He identified insulin poisoning, which was in turn verified by a highly qualified independent professor of paediatric endocrinology and diabetes. Opinions that some people don't like, and so they have turned to ad hominem attacks and a personal vendetta against him, because attacking the evidence obviously wasn't possible for the defence. The same thing with Dr Jayaram. So the conspiracists turn to innuendo, such as Dr Evans must have been given the heads up that Letby was the one nurse who looked after all these babies, he's untrustworthy because he determined within 10 minutes that the most egregious injury to a baby was unnatural, he really knew the consultants had queried the possibility of air embolism and he was a stooge brought in to complete the frame-up of an innocent nurse, he had some nefarious reason for getting involved in the case, etc etc etc, with ZERO evidence to back up the claims. Because it has to be personal when the evidence is overwhelming doesn't it. And of course the other independent experts all just abandoned their ethics, duties to the court, knowledge and professional specialist experience, and followed his lead. What is amusing, is that the people attacking him have no idea what the actual evidence was that convicted her. They just parrot untruths half the time.
What was in fact
found by the court of appeal, which unlike wiki is uneditable by conspiracy theorists and non-MSM podcasters who don't respect the juries' verdicts in this case, and therefore have an agenda to hound and trash Dr Evans, is as follows -
Court of Appeal
https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/R-v-Letby-Final-Judgment-20240702.pdf
Ground 1: the submissions to this court
104. The prosecution made some general points to rebut the allegations of bias and unreliability, including that almost every opinion given by Dr Evans was corroborated by another expert. In addition, it was pointed out that Dr Evans was the person who had identified that two of the babies had been poisoned by insulin (Baby F and Baby L). This was a matter which had eluded the treating medics and went to prove that someone was committing serious offences against babies in the unit; and it was particularly important independent evidence, bolstering Dr Evans’ credibility and reliability. Further, when Dr Evans reached his conclusions, he did so without knowing about other circumstantial evidence relied on by the prosecution in establishing guilt, including the applicant’s Facebook searches, the shift pattern evidence, and the “confession” in the note recovered from the applicant’s home on 3 July 2018.
[...]
110. When addressing the submission that Dr Evans lacked the requisite expertise for giving evidence in a case like this, Mr Johnson poses the rhetorical question - who would be better placed to advise on what may have been happening in a neonatal unit than someone who had been dealing with these facilities for 50 years? Dr Evans did have the requisite expertise. If he did step over the line in relation to one baby (Baby C – in which he gave his opinion on the cause of the baby’s collapse for the first time in his evidence to the jury), that did not invalidate his evidence generally. Dr Evans was in a position to give information outside of the knowledge of the court. He held concurrent registration with the General Medical Council and had the requisite experience. The reason Dr Evans did not classify himself as a neonatologist was because when he developed the speciality in South Wales, neonatology was a sub-speciality - so he didn’t train as a neonatologist. Each of these features was addressed by the judge, as was the question of reliability. Reliability can only be measured by reference to another admissible, credible opinion. Looking at each of the requirements of the law, the evidence of Dr Evans was admissible. In the oral submissions of Mr Myers, Mr Johnson said, the shortcomings of the evidence of Dr Evans were not explained. The cases relied upon by the defence in their written submissions were obviously distinguishable from the facts of this case.
Ground 1: discussion
111. As we point out below (in relation to grounds 2 and 3) there is a substantial degree of overlap between the grounds of appeal advanced by the applicant (save for ground 5, which raises a discrete jury management issue). This is because the first three grounds of appeal are essentially rooted in two (related) points: the bona fides of the prosecution experts (in particular, Dr Evans); and the quality of their evidence (in particular, about air embolus). No criticism is made of the summing-up in this case. It follows that (subject to the overarching contention by the defence that parts of the prosecution evidence should not have been left to the jury at all) the strengths or weakness of the prosecution evidence, as it is said to be, and more particularly, that of Dr Evans were fairly set out and left to the jury in appropriate terms.
112.
With respect to Mr Myers, it is unarguably the case that Dr Evans was suitably qualified - or to put it another way, it is not arguable that he lacked the necessary expertise - to give evidence. That is the case whether one examines his professional qualifications and background, or the evidence he gave about this during the course of the trial.
113. A summary of the evidential position is as follows. Dr Evans qualified as a medical practitioner in 1971. He trained in paediatrics in Swansea, then in Cardiff and Liverpool. Each phase of that training involved specific training in neonatology and working in a neonatal unit. He was appointed a full-time clinical consultant paediatrician in Swansea in 1980, a position he held until 2009. During the 1980s he became involved in the development of the newborn services and intensive care services for babies. He was responsible for setting up, supervising and leading a neonatal intensive care service in Swansea from his appointment, developing intensive care services “from scratch.” His experience was, he said, “very much hands-on.” In 1990, in Swansea, the health board built a new children’s department, which included a new neonatal unit which he helped to design. His operational and managerial roles involved serving as clinical director of paediatrics and neonatology in Swansea between 1992 and 1997, and between 2004 to 2008. In his evidence he said that Swansea was one of the bigger units in South Wales and it covered the area of the whole of the southwest of Wales over time. He had training in neonatology. When he arrived, there was no specialist neonatology services at that hospital, and it was just a question of getting on with it. His team had to deal with all the babies in the catchment area. The only babies who were sent elsewhere, were those requiring surgery, who went to Cardiff, or those requiring cardiac care, who went to Bristol. So all of the “tiny babies who required intensive care were under my care and the care of my colleagues in Swansea from 1980 onwards.”
114. In cross-examination, as in his submissions to us, Mr Myers did not dispute that Dr Evans had extensive experience. But Mr Myers put to Dr Evans that his expertise or experience in the field of neonatology was less than that of a consultant neonatologist. Dr Evans did not accept this. He said in the 1980s, when he started out, neonatology was a relatively new discipline, and there were relatively few neonatologists; as a paediatrician in Swansea, he served a large population and was one of only a few consultants, hence, his hands-on experience was extensive, and “full on” and he had greater contact with a greater number of babies. His generation was responsible for the development and evolution of neonatal care in the United Kingdom and the local health board deferred to him in developing the service, and in appointing and training the relevant staff.
He had retired from practice in 2009, having been a consultant paediatrician therefore for 30 years. Since then he had worked as an expert witness, having attended a number of courses to equip to perform that role, and dealt with a large number of cases where there were allegations of clinical negligence involving small babies. He said he saw his role as providing assistance to the court in sorting out some extremely challenging issues. He did not call himself an expert, but an independent medical witness whose opinion was based, not on being an expert, but on being a doctor.
115. Though the defence draws particular attention to the fact that Dr Evans is not a consultant neonatologist, one of the principal experts instructed by the defence, albeit he did not give evidence at trial, is a paediatric consultant not a neonatologist.
Returning to Dr Evans’ position however, he was a highly experienced paediatric consultant with decades of clinical hands-on experience with neonates. He certainly had sufficient knowledge to render his opinion of value; he had expertise that was capable of assisting the jury and was unarguably able to provide evidence with regard to neonates on matters within his expertise, but outwith the experience of the jury.
116. As to his impartiality, the focus here is on Dr Evans’ role in the investigation. It is important to put this into context however, a matter emphasised both by the judge and the single judge. As the single judge said, there was a vast quantity of technical medical material which could not possibly be understood or evaluated without the assistance and appropriate direction of a properly qualified expert with forensic and clinical experience of such cases. Within the space of a month in 2017, Dr Evans provided initial “sift” reports on some 30 babies who had died or suffered life threatening events at the hospital. He then provided follow up reports in respect of babies where there appeared to be no natural explanation for the death or adverse event. He added to or if necessary, revised his reports in the light of further information which became available. He produced some 114 witness statements plus a joint expert report dated 4 September 2022. He identified air embolus as a potential cause of death or collapse in several of the “sift” report statements.
The single judge said, and we agree, that the judge was fully entitled to conclude that the approach of Dr Evans to his task was reasonable and did not amount to partiality or lack of independence, nor was it unreasonable for Dr Evans thereafter to provide some direction and structure in relation to identified cases. To the extent that he was acting as an investigator or director of the investigation, he was not doing so in a way that precluded him from being an expert witness in the case.
117. It is obvious that wherever possible, objections to admissibility, particularly to expert evidence, should be dealt with before the evidence is given, rather than afterwards. The risk otherwise is that the trial process will be derailed. The procedural rules contained in what is now para 7 of the Criminal Practice Direction 2023 are indeed designed to streamline the process for the admission of expert evidence, and to minimise the areas of contention at the trial itself. It is to be noted in this case however that the application to exclude Dr Evans’ evidence on the grounds it was inadmissible was not made until part way through the trial. This tends to suggest that the real bone of contention was not Dr Evans’ qualifications or competence
per se (matters that otherwise could and should been addressed pre-trial) but concerned the way in which he gave his evidence.
118. In general terms, the quality of a witness’s evidence in that respect is quintessentially a matter for the jury to assess. The judge referred in his ruling both to the nature of the cross-examination, and Dr Evans’ response to it (“I accept that at times Dr Evans, particularly when asked repeated questions on a topic to which he believed he had given an answer engaged in a form of argument and, on occasions, he appeared to be frustrated by the persistence of the questioning and/or was dismissive of suggestions. He was often prolix and would answer a question by an explanation rather than directly”). The particular trial dynamic which arose between counsel and the witness was also apparent to us from the transcripts of Dr Evans’ cross-examination. The judge’s interventions as to the questions asked or the responses to them, were rare. Wisely, in our judgement, he let these matters play out in front of the jury. As it was, by the time of the judge’s ruling, Dr Evans had given evidence on seven separate days in respect of seven of the babies. The judge was therefore particularly well-placed, as the single judge put it, to make a carefully considered assessment of Dr Evans’qualifications and competence to give the expert evidence in question.
119. Further, when considering whether Dr Evans’ evidence was sufficiently reliable to be admitted (one of the criteria for admissibility identified in what is now para 7.1.1 of the Criminal Procedure Rules 2023) it was material, as the judge pointed out, that
Dr Evans’ expert opinion was given in ignorance of other potentially incriminating material relied on at the trial. It was also material that there was other expert evidence which supported Dr Evans’ conclusions (indeed as the prosecution asserted, almost all of Dr Evans’ opinions were corroborated by another expert). We should add that the suggestion made in this context that Dr Bohin was simply basing her opinions on those of Dr Evans, rather than reaching her own conclusions, is not supported by evidence. And it would be wrong to imply that her bona fides, or that of the other prosecution experts for that matter, should be doubted simply because she or they agreed with Dr Evans’ conclusions in certain respects.
120. Though none were highlighted in submissions to us, we have carefully considered the particular examples of Dr Evans’ conduct relied on in the Perfected Grounds of Appeal, and the prosecution’s answer to them. We have done so by reference to the extracts from the transcripts to which we were specifically directed, but in the context of the vast volume of other material (including the transcripts of the evidence) we have read for the purposes of this application more generally. In the event, we have no doubt that all of the criticisms of Dr Evans, including those made by reference to the observations of Jackson LJ in a different case, were capable of being dealt with within the trial process, or that the judge was fully entitled to conclude that ultimately, as with any other witness, it was for the jury to assess Dr Evans’ reliability having regard to all the evidence in the case, with the assistance of comment and submissions from counsel on each side. By the same token, there is no arguable basis for interfering with the judge’s exercise of his discretion not to exclude the evidence of Dr Evans under section 78 of PACE.
121. It follows that we do not consider this ground of appeal to be arguable.
122. We should note finally, that after the judge’s ruling of 10 January 2023,
Dr Evans was asked about the observations of Jackson LJ in cross-examination. The effect of Dr Evans’s evidence, and we summarise, was that the criticisms made in the decision were based on a false premise. The report was not an expert report prepared for the court or a witness statement; rather, it was a letter to the solicitors in the care case, and had been used by the solicitors (for the purposes of the application for permission to appeal) without his knowledge or consent. Further, he had not known of the decision before it was brought to his attention by the prosecution. Everyone in this trial (i.e. that of the applicant) had seen the decision before he did.