Emerging Infections: What Have We Learned from SARS?
2004
“Given the current size and mobility of the human population, emerging diseases pose a continuing threat to global health. This threat became reality with the outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). The emergence of a disease requires two steps: introduction into the human population and perpetuated transmission. Although preventing the introduction of a new disease is ideal, containing a zoonosis is a necessity. The lessons that we have learned from SARS were the topic of a meeting of The Royal Society on January 13, 2004, in London, England.
Zoonoses are responsible for most emerging infectious diseases, including infections caused by Ebola virus, West Nile virus, monkeypox, hantavirus, HIV, and new subtypes of influenza A. In the case of SARS coronavirus (SARS-CoV), serologic evidence indicates that the virus was spread through interspecies transmission from wild game markets in Guangdong, China (Malik Peiris, University of Hong Kong). This finding led to bans in the wild meat trade from Nan Shan Zhong (Guangzhou Respiratory Disease Research Institute) similar to the ban on eating nervous system tissue from cows that was implemented after new variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease emerged in Britain.
Ecologic changes, concomitant with increasing contact between humans and animal disease reservoirs, contribute to zoonoses. The emergence of SARS was facilitated by increased contact between people and animal disease reservoirs as the wild meat industry expanded recently. Global warming will likely contribute to the spread of dengue beyond tropical regions (Tony McMichael, National Centre for Epidemiology and Population Health, Canberra, Australia). Habitat fragmentation by deforestation may increase the contact between people and reservoir species. For example, hemorrhagic fever virus has been linked to deforestation in South America.”........
[...]
“Population heterogeneity and the network structure of human interactions will affect the spread of an emerging disease. In the 2003 SARS outbreak, healthcare workers were at particular risk (
8) and acted as bridges carrying the infection from the hospital and causing community wide epidemics. High-risk "core groups" have been a major focus of HIV/AIDS models for years (
9), but the movement of SARS patients into the core (i.e., the hospital) adds a further complication (
3).
The two waves of SARS clusters in Toronto (Robert Maunder, Mount Sinai Hospital, Toronto) highlight the need for surveillance even after an outbreak appears extinguished. Management of the SARS epidemic also demonstrated that public service infrastructure, which affords the greatest chance of success (
3), is essential to the rapid containment of an outbreak. In areas most affected, contact tracing was important (
10). In Guangdong, police departments tracked down contacts of infected persons, who were then followed up for 10 days after exposure. Evaluating the surge capacity of public health services and hospitals is one way to assess the preparedness of a medical system.”
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Hmmm, so that article is from 2004, & mentions Guangdong.
Interesting.
Guangdong had a lot of CV cases too, just behind Hubei iirc.
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Hmmm:
Coronavirus - Global Health Emergency, 2019-nCoV #3
Seems I noted something about a market here in Guangdong, etc. on Feb. 9...hmmm Noting to review zzz goodnight
