Certain pretrial delays are automatically excluded from the Act's time limits, such as delays caused by pretrial motions. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F). In Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321, 330 (1986), the Supreme Court held that § 3161(h)(1)(F) excludes "all time between the filing of a motion and the conclusion of the hearing on that motion, whether or not a delay in holding that hearing is 'reasonably necessary.'" The Act also excludes a reasonable period (up to 30 days) during which a motion is actually "under advisement" by the court. 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (h)(1)(J). Other delays excluded from the Act's time limits include delays caused by the unavailability of the defendant or an essential witness (18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(3)); delays attributable to a co-defendant (18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)); and delays attributable to the defendant's involvement in other proceedings, including delay resulting from an interlocutory appeal. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(E). (Note, however, that the 30-day defense preparation period provided for in § 3161(c)(2) is calculated without reference to the Section 3161(h) exclusions).
A defendant may not expressly waive his rights under the Speedy Trial Act. See, e.g., United States v. Saltzman, 984 F.2d 1087, 1090-1092 (10th Cir. 1993). However, if the trial judge determines that the "ends of justice" served by a continuance outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial, the delay occasioned by such continuance is excluded from the Act's time limits. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A). The judge must set forth, orally or in writing, his reasons for granting the continuance. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A). The government should never rely on a defendant's unilateral waiver of his rights under the Act. The government should make sure that the judge enters an "ends of justice" continuance and that he sets forth his reasons for doing so.