THIS JUDGMENT IS A MESS NO MATTER HOW YOU LOOK AT IT...
Still reviewing Masipa's judgment for clarity and it appears more flawed every time I try to analyze it.
1. Re: Does PPD automatically exclude Dolus? Erroneous killing is still UNLAWFUL CONDUCT even though successful PPD claim "may well" exclude Dolus (BBM)
On page 3326 Masipa cites S v Adair Oliveira 1993 (2) SACR 59(A) at 63 and 64 regarding the difference in lawful conduct under Private Defense and how that same conduct becomes UNLAWFUL under Putative Private Defense:
"In putative private defence it is not lawfulness that is in issue but culpability...If any accused honestly believes his life or property is in danger but objectively viewed they are not, the defensive steps he takes cannot constitute private defence. If, in those circumstances, he kills someone, his conduct is unlawful. His erroneous belief that his life or property was in danger may well (depending on the precise circumstances) exclude dolus in which case the liability for the persons death based on intention will also be excluded. At worst for
him, he can then be convicted of culpable homicide.”
2. Re: Intent
Pages 3326-3327
"In murder the form of culpability required intention, the test to determine intention is subjective. In the present case the accused is the only person who can say what his state of mind was at the time he fired the shots that killed the deceased.
The accused has not admitted that he had the intention to shoot and kill the deceased or any other person for that matter. On the contrary, he stated that he had no intention to shoot and kill the deceased. The court is however entitled to look at the evidence as a whole and the circumstances of the case to determine the presence or absence of intention at the time of the incident.
In the present case, on his own version the accused suspected that an intruder had entered his house through the bathroom window. His version was that he genuinely, though erroneously, believed that his life and that of the deceased was in danger.
There is nothing in the evidence to suggest that this belief was not honestly entertained. <SNIPPED> There is no doubt that when the accused fired shots through the toilet door, he acted unlawfully. There was no intruder. In fact, the person behind the door was the deceased and she was dead."
3. Re: the Question of Dolus eventualis
Continued on page 3327 she immediately goes on to address Dolus eventualis--
"I now deal with dolus eventualis or legal intent. The question is:
1. Did the accused subjectively foresee that it could be the deceased behind the toilet door and
2. Notwithstanding the foresight did he then fire the shots, thereby reconciling himself to the possibility that it could be the deceased in the toilet.
The evidence before this court does not support the state’s contention that this could be a case of dolus eventualis. On the contrary the evidence shows that from the onset the accused believed that, at the time he fired shots into the toilet door, the deceased was in the bedroom while the intruders were in the toilet."
4. Re: Her rationale for excluding Dolus
Page 3328-3329 "The question is: Did the accused foresee the possibility of the resultant death, yet persisted in his deed reckless whether death ensued or not? In the circumstances of this case the answer has to be no.
How could the accused reasonably have foreseen that the shots he fired would kill the deceased? Clearly he did not subjectively foresee this as a possibility that he would kill the person behind the door, let alone the deceased, as he thought she was in the bedroom at the time. To find otherwise would be tantamount to saying that the accused’s reaction after he realised that he had shot the deceased was faked; that he was play acting merely to delude the onlookers at the time. Doctor Stipp, an independent witness who was at the accused’s house minutes after the incident had occurred, stated that the accused looked genuinely distraught, as he prayed to God and as he pleaded with him to help save the deceased. There was nothing to gainsay that observation and this court has not been given any reason to reject it and we accept it as true and reliable. It follows that the accused’s erroneous belief that his life was in danger excludes dolus. The accused therefore cannot be found guilty of murder dolus eventualis. That however, is not the end of the matter, as culpable homicide is a competent verdict."
So there it is... in all its absurdity.
She gives no legitimate rationale however for her statement: "Clearly he did not subjectively foresee this as a possibility that he would kill the person behind the door". Only that after realizing the consequences of his actions he cried, he prayed to God= Not Guilty
I think this is the question most of us would like to answer (or re-phrase) for her: "How could the accused reasonably have foreseen that the shots he fired would kill the deceased?"