Pink Panther
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Does anyone know where we can see Amy's testimony?
2011.05.31 Sidebar Thread
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LA-FBI Seeks info to identify a POI in a child sexual assault- Latest: BayouBelle_LA
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Disguiseduser0308
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Just jumping off your post here, tsitra. You have an excellent point... however, no one would sit in jail for three years if their child had died in an accident. No one would tell a nanny story for three years if their baby had died in an accident.
As far as ICA being afraid to tell the truth because of her parents.. she was away from them for three years. I think most people would agree, jail is a lot scarier than her parents. Going to trial for first degree murder is a lot scarier than her parents. Facing the death penalty, yeah.. you get where I'm going.
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From the Huggins case cited:
*snip*
Q During the period of July of 1997, when Mr. Huggins was incarcerated, under part of your supervision, were you ever notified that Mr. Huggins complained of crabs?
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]:  Objection.   Hearsay.
THE COURT:  Sustained.
Q Did Mr. Huggins ever directly contact you and indicate that he had crabs?
A You mean directly?   I don't recall that he did or did not.
․
Q To your knowledge, did Mr. Huggins ever shave his pubic region after complaining of lice?
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]:  Objection.   Hearsay.  Basis of knowledge.
THE COURT:  Overruled.   You can answer the question, if you have personal knowledge.   Not what someone else told you.
A Yes, I did.
Q Okay. And do you know whether he did, in fact, shave himself?
A Yes, he did.
On cross-examination, the State's attorney asked the officer how he knew that Huggins had shaved because of crab lice.   The officer responded, That's what he said.   The State's attorney then asked, So your answer to counsel's question was based upon what Mr. Huggins told you?, and the officer responded, Pretty much.
At the close of the defense's case-in-chief, the State requested judicial notice of Huggins' nine prior felony convictions and an instruction to the jury that they could consider the fact of those convictions in assessing the credibility of Huggins' statement, as related by the correctional officer, that he had shaved due to crab lice.   The defense objected, arguing that any statement was elicited on the State's cross-examination and that introduction of the convictions would be prejudicial.   The court reviewed the trial transcript and found the convictions admissible under section 90.806, Florida Statutes (2002).   The court then informed the jury of the fact of Huggins' nine prior felony convictions, without specifying the nature of the crimes involved, and gave a limiting instruction regarding the jury's use of that information.
Huggins first argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence regarding his shaved pubic region because that evidence was susceptible to an explanation other than consciousness of guilt.   He relies on the decisions in Herring v. State, 501 So.2d 19 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), State v. Esperti, 220 So.2d 416 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969), and Menna v. State, 846 So.2d 502 (Fla.2003), to argue that this incident was so ambiguous as to remove from its invocation any probative value.   However, we find those decisions, which involved voluntary gunshot residue testing, inapplicable to the present case, which involves a court-ordered collection of a hair sample.
  Because the parties cite to and we have found no case law in Florida addressing a factual scenario on point with the instant case, we must look to the general principles governing consciousness-of-guilt evidence.   This Court has stated:
The law is well settled that [w]hen a suspected person in any manner attempts to escape or evade a threatened prosecution by flight, concealment, resistance to lawful arrest, or other indications after the fact of a desire to evade prosecution, such fact is admissible, being relevant to the consciousness of guilt which may be inferred from such circumstance.  Straight v. State, 397 So.2d 903, 908 (Fla.1981).   However, we have held that in order to admit this evidence, there must be a nexus between the flight, concealment, or resistance to lawful arrest and the crime for which the defendant is being tried in that specific case.   See Escobar v. State, 699 So.2d 988 (Fla.1997).   Moreover, such an interpretation should be made with a sensitivity to the facts of the particular case.   See Bundy v. State, 471 So.2d 9 (Fla.1985) (citing United States v. Borders, 693 F.2d 1318, 1325 (11th Cir.1982)).
Looney v. State, 803 So.2d 656, 666-67 (Fla.2001) (quoting Randolph v. State, 463 So.2d 186, 189 (Fla.1984)).   This Court has stated in a number of cases that in order for the State to sufficiently demonstrate relevance and materiality, there must be a sufficient nexus between evidence of flight or concealment and the crime for which the defendant is being tried.   See, e.g., Murray v. State, 838 So.2d 1073 (Fla.2002);  Escobar, 699 So.2d at 995. Here, the evidence indicated that Huggins was present at the court hearing at which the hair collection was ordered.   Additionally, the facts show that Huggins shaved his entire pubic region within one week of the date of that court order.   We conclude that those facts provide a sufficient nexus upon which the trial court could base its exercise of discretion in admitting this evidence.   Furthermore, we note that Huggins' explanation regarding jail conditions and crab lice went to the weight of the evidence, rather than its admissibility.
 Huggins also contests the admission of his nine prior felony convictions for impeachment purposes, arguing that the State, rather than defense counsel, elicited the hearsay statement attributed to Huggins and that evidence of Huggins' nine felony convictions should have been excluded under the balancing test of section 90.403, Florida Statutes (2002).   The trial court admitted the fact of Huggins' convictions on the basis of section 90.806(1), Florida Statutes (2002), which provides in part that [w]hen a hearsay statement has been admitted in evidence, credibility of the declarant may be attacked and, if attacked, may be supported by any evidence that would be admissible for those purposes if the declarant had testified as a witness.   The trial court's ruling was made in accordance with First and Fourth District Court of Appeal holdings that section 90.806 permits the introduction of a defendant's felony convictions when the defendant elicits his or her own exculpatory, hearsay statement through another witness at trial.   See Kelly v. State, 857 So.2d 949 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003);  Werley v. State, 814 So.2d 1159 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002);  Llanos v. State, 770 So.2d 725 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).   Two of those decisions cite the following treatise passage concerning the functionally identical federal evidence provision:  A defendant who chooses not to testify but who succeeds in getting his or her own exculpatory statements into evidence runs the risk of having those statements impeached by felony convictions.   5 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 806.04(2)(b) (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed.2002).   We agree with the First and Fourth Districts on that point of law.   Under section 90.806(1), a hearsay declarant is treated as a witness and his or her credibility may be attacked in the same manner as any other witness's credibility.   In turn, section 90.610(1), Florida Statutes (2002), provides in pertinent part that [a] party may attack the credibility of any witness ․ by evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of 1 year. 7
  Additionally, we find that the testimony quoted above supports the trial court's conclusion that defense counsel initially elicited testimony from the correctional officer attributing a hearsay statement to Huggins.   Indeed, defense counsel specifically asked the officer, Did Mr. Huggins ever directly contact you and indicate that he had crabs?   When the State's hearsay objection was sustained, defense counsel indirectly elicited the same information by including it as an implied assumption within the question To your knowledge, did Mr. Huggins ever shave his pubic region after complaining of lice?   The State's later question, So your answer to counsel's question was based upon what Mr. Huggins told you?, was designed merely to reveal the implication that defense counsel had already succeeded in getting before the jury.   Thus, pursuant to section 90.806, as properly construed in Llanos, Werley, and Kelly, Huggins opened the door to his own impeachment.
 Regarding Huggins' argument that evidence of his nine prior felony convictions should have been excluded under the balancing test of section 90.403, this Court must determine if the trial court abused its discretion.   See Mansfield v. State, 758 So.2d 636, 648 (Fla.2000).  Section 90.403 provides that relevant evidence is inadmissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.   The general principle behind section 90.610, Florida Statutes (2002), which permits the use of convictions for impeachment purposes under certain circumstances, supports the conclusion that the fact of Huggins' prior felony convictions had probative value regarding the credibility of the hearsay statement attributed to him.   The trial court attempted to limit any danger of unfair prejudice by refraining from informing the jury of the nature of Huggins' crimes and by giving a limiting instruction regarding the jury's use of the information.   On the basis of these facts, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence for impeachment purposes.
I think this portion covers the gist of what HHJP was referring to. Sorry so lengthy...I cant summarize this.
*snip*
Q During the period of July of 1997, when Mr. Huggins was incarcerated, under part of your supervision, were you ever notified that Mr. Huggins complained of crabs?
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]:  Objection.   Hearsay.
THE COURT:  Sustained.
Q Did Mr. Huggins ever directly contact you and indicate that he had crabs?
A You mean directly?   I don't recall that he did or did not.
․
Q To your knowledge, did Mr. Huggins ever shave his pubic region after complaining of lice?
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]:  Objection.   Hearsay.  Basis of knowledge.
THE COURT:  Overruled.   You can answer the question, if you have personal knowledge.   Not what someone else told you.
A Yes, I did.
Q Okay. And do you know whether he did, in fact, shave himself?
A Yes, he did.
On cross-examination, the State's attorney asked the officer how he knew that Huggins had shaved because of crab lice.   The officer responded, That's what he said.   The State's attorney then asked, So your answer to counsel's question was based upon what Mr. Huggins told you?, and the officer responded, Pretty much.
At the close of the defense's case-in-chief, the State requested judicial notice of Huggins' nine prior felony convictions and an instruction to the jury that they could consider the fact of those convictions in assessing the credibility of Huggins' statement, as related by the correctional officer, that he had shaved due to crab lice.   The defense objected, arguing that any statement was elicited on the State's cross-examination and that introduction of the convictions would be prejudicial.   The court reviewed the trial transcript and found the convictions admissible under section 90.806, Florida Statutes (2002).   The court then informed the jury of the fact of Huggins' nine prior felony convictions, without specifying the nature of the crimes involved, and gave a limiting instruction regarding the jury's use of that information.
Huggins first argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence regarding his shaved pubic region because that evidence was susceptible to an explanation other than consciousness of guilt.   He relies on the decisions in Herring v. State, 501 So.2d 19 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), State v. Esperti, 220 So.2d 416 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969), and Menna v. State, 846 So.2d 502 (Fla.2003), to argue that this incident was so ambiguous as to remove from its invocation any probative value.   However, we find those decisions, which involved voluntary gunshot residue testing, inapplicable to the present case, which involves a court-ordered collection of a hair sample.
  Because the parties cite to and we have found no case law in Florida addressing a factual scenario on point with the instant case, we must look to the general principles governing consciousness-of-guilt evidence.   This Court has stated:
The law is well settled that [w]hen a suspected person in any manner attempts to escape or evade a threatened prosecution by flight, concealment, resistance to lawful arrest, or other indications after the fact of a desire to evade prosecution, such fact is admissible, being relevant to the consciousness of guilt which may be inferred from such circumstance.  Straight v. State, 397 So.2d 903, 908 (Fla.1981).   However, we have held that in order to admit this evidence, there must be a nexus between the flight, concealment, or resistance to lawful arrest and the crime for which the defendant is being tried in that specific case.   See Escobar v. State, 699 So.2d 988 (Fla.1997).   Moreover, such an interpretation should be made with a sensitivity to the facts of the particular case.   See Bundy v. State, 471 So.2d 9 (Fla.1985) (citing United States v. Borders, 693 F.2d 1318, 1325 (11th Cir.1982)).
Looney v. State, 803 So.2d 656, 666-67 (Fla.2001) (quoting Randolph v. State, 463 So.2d 186, 189 (Fla.1984)).   This Court has stated in a number of cases that in order for the State to sufficiently demonstrate relevance and materiality, there must be a sufficient nexus between evidence of flight or concealment and the crime for which the defendant is being tried.   See, e.g., Murray v. State, 838 So.2d 1073 (Fla.2002);  Escobar, 699 So.2d at 995. Here, the evidence indicated that Huggins was present at the court hearing at which the hair collection was ordered.   Additionally, the facts show that Huggins shaved his entire pubic region within one week of the date of that court order.   We conclude that those facts provide a sufficient nexus upon which the trial court could base its exercise of discretion in admitting this evidence.   Furthermore, we note that Huggins' explanation regarding jail conditions and crab lice went to the weight of the evidence, rather than its admissibility.
 Huggins also contests the admission of his nine prior felony convictions for impeachment purposes, arguing that the State, rather than defense counsel, elicited the hearsay statement attributed to Huggins and that evidence of Huggins' nine felony convictions should have been excluded under the balancing test of section 90.403, Florida Statutes (2002).   The trial court admitted the fact of Huggins' convictions on the basis of section 90.806(1), Florida Statutes (2002), which provides in part that [w]hen a hearsay statement has been admitted in evidence, credibility of the declarant may be attacked and, if attacked, may be supported by any evidence that would be admissible for those purposes if the declarant had testified as a witness.   The trial court's ruling was made in accordance with First and Fourth District Court of Appeal holdings that section 90.806 permits the introduction of a defendant's felony convictions when the defendant elicits his or her own exculpatory, hearsay statement through another witness at trial.   See Kelly v. State, 857 So.2d 949 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003);  Werley v. State, 814 So.2d 1159 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002);  Llanos v. State, 770 So.2d 725 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).   Two of those decisions cite the following treatise passage concerning the functionally identical federal evidence provision:  A defendant who chooses not to testify but who succeeds in getting his or her own exculpatory statements into evidence runs the risk of having those statements impeached by felony convictions.   5 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 806.04(2)(b) (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed.2002).   We agree with the First and Fourth Districts on that point of law.   Under section 90.806(1), a hearsay declarant is treated as a witness and his or her credibility may be attacked in the same manner as any other witness's credibility.   In turn, section 90.610(1), Florida Statutes (2002), provides in pertinent part that [a] party may attack the credibility of any witness ․ by evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of 1 year. 7
  Additionally, we find that the testimony quoted above supports the trial court's conclusion that defense counsel initially elicited testimony from the correctional officer attributing a hearsay statement to Huggins.   Indeed, defense counsel specifically asked the officer, Did Mr. Huggins ever directly contact you and indicate that he had crabs?   When the State's hearsay objection was sustained, defense counsel indirectly elicited the same information by including it as an implied assumption within the question To your knowledge, did Mr. Huggins ever shave his pubic region after complaining of lice?   The State's later question, So your answer to counsel's question was based upon what Mr. Huggins told you?, was designed merely to reveal the implication that defense counsel had already succeeded in getting before the jury.   Thus, pursuant to section 90.806, as properly construed in Llanos, Werley, and Kelly, Huggins opened the door to his own impeachment.
 Regarding Huggins' argument that evidence of his nine prior felony convictions should have been excluded under the balancing test of section 90.403, this Court must determine if the trial court abused its discretion.   See Mansfield v. State, 758 So.2d 636, 648 (Fla.2000).  Section 90.403 provides that relevant evidence is inadmissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.   The general principle behind section 90.610, Florida Statutes (2002), which permits the use of convictions for impeachment purposes under certain circumstances, supports the conclusion that the fact of Huggins' prior felony convictions had probative value regarding the credibility of the hearsay statement attributed to him.   The trial court attempted to limit any danger of unfair prejudice by refraining from informing the jury of the nature of Huggins' crimes and by giving a limiting instruction regarding the jury's use of the information.   On the basis of these facts, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence for impeachment purposes.
I think this portion covers the gist of what HHJP was referring to. Sorry so lengthy...I cant summarize this.
Blue_Dolphin308
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check wftv for amys testimony... they usually have every day broken down into several parts.
Kat
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When he mentioned her "*advertiser censored*" I assumed he was talking about Baez and Cheney? Seriously. I'm not trying to make a funny or get myself banned.
Bon
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How could you not talk about the shirt...way to tight and totally inappropriate for court...........
TakeNote
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ebedeeb
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oh there are words...just cant say them here.
I for one enjoyed that "oops" moment....but I do understand where others might have been offended by it.
Yes it would make sense that Lee would be the next witness, then the first arriving officers, then Yuri, then the forensic folks. But what about Jesse Grund, Tim Miller, Tracey -- not sure if/when they fit in here.
MOO
Mel
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Humm, I misunderstood HHJP. I was working while streaming the video. I thought he said it went all the way to the US Supreme Court. Looks like it never made it there just the Florida Supreme Court the certiorari was denied by the US Supreme Court.
Attached is the the opinion (with footnotes)
ETA: PARIENTE'S dissent starts on page 21
AZlawyer
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I think Levi's talking about when Lee told the FBI that he would address the allegations Casey made about him touching her "when the time was right" or something like that. One of the FBI guys mentioned it in his depo.
Leila
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Just my opinion, but I doubt that Eric Baker exists, just like Zanny, Samantha, Juliette Lewis, etc. KC made up people and intricate scenarios she passed off as real when they were just imaginary people.
Me thinks Vinnie should take a cue from your siggie here.
"Live today as you never know if you may have a tomorrow!"
Maybe he should "Talk like your microphone is always on."
imo.
grammieto5
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I'm watching HLN I believe Vinny is on. I think he just played the phone call betwwen Christina and KC. I think he said it was between CA and KC. I noticed he or some said the same earlier today. I'm very surprised how little the people reporting/discussing on this channel know. Someone needs to do some reading, starting about 3 years ago.
ziggy
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In Huggins, a correctional officer testified that Huggins had shaved his pubic area to deter lice (LE were attempting to get a hair sample from Huggins when they found out he'd shaved his complete public area) and when asked how the officer knew that he said because Huggins told him so. The prosecution then wanted to introduce his prior felony convictions to impeach his credibility - basically letting the jury decide how credible his statement was about his reason for shaving; this is my very fast rough brief of the issue.
So because Casey was a hearsay declarant making the out of court statement to Cindy which Cindy relayed through her testimony, Casey's credibility (as the hearsay declarant) can be impeached the same way any other witness can.
However, if the matter is collateral, then impeachment is not proper. (perhaps this will be relevant to the testimony that was taking place re: who the father of Caylee was, or who Casey said it was).
Going to read more...
So because Casey was a hearsay declarant making the out of court statement to Cindy which Cindy relayed through her testimony, Casey's credibility (as the hearsay declarant) can be impeached the same way any other witness can.
However, if the matter is collateral, then impeachment is not proper. (perhaps this will be relevant to the testimony that was taking place re: who the father of Caylee was, or who Casey said it was).
Going to read more...
wenwe4
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OK guys.... I am off to go spend some quality time with my hubby on his last day of an 11 day vacation.....he is feeling a bit neglected (don't blame him a bit!)..... and I am feeling as if I have neglected him as well...... thank you for the positive comments! It helps me feel as if I am helping someone somewhere...... see ya'll tomorrow.[COLOR="DarkGreen[/COLOR]"]
allycat1208
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Poor Cindy. Jose Baez asked her if it ever occurred to her that many of the people that Casey mentioned were not real. CA said she did not. She's made to appear so naive. I don't know why JB is accentuating these fictitious people made up by Casey. It seems like this is what the State would want. Is JB trying to stress Casey's lies to show that she's just not totally based in reality and this explains her nonchalant behavior after Caylee is missing?
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